Lindhorst v. Wright’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

10 federal appellate · 1 district · 20 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 35 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[W]here the width, length and location of an easement for ingress and egress have been expressly set forth in the instrument the easement is specific and definite. The expressed terms of the grant or reservation are controlling in such case and considerations of what may be necessary or reasonable to a present use of the dominant estate are not controlling. If, however, the width, length and location of an easement for ingress and egress are not fixed by the terms of the grant or reservation the dominant estate is ordinarily entitled to a way of such width, length and location as is sufficient to afford necessary or reasonable ingress and egress.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Squaw Peak Community Covenant Church v. Anozira Development, Inc. · 6 Haw. App. 312 - Consolidated Amusement Co. v. Waikiki Business Plaza, Inc.

2. “Easements do not vest title in their possessors, they simply grant them a limited use of the fee holder's property. City of Elk City v. Coffey, Okl.App., 362 [562] P.2d 160, 163 [(1977)]. Just as the express language of the grant controls the extent of the easement, it also controls the scope. The limited use granted the Lindhorsts is a right to use the land of the defendants as a passageway to their property. There is no language indicating that such usage is exelusive to the Lindborsts. Absent such express language, the fee owner may use the land upon which the easement is imposed in any reasonable manner that does not unduly burden the use made by the easement owner .... The holding of the trial court that the parties have a nonexclusive right to the easement is proper. But the Lindhorsts assert that other acts of the defendants, such as the planting of gardens and trees on the easement, and the stacking of brush thereon should be enjoined. The denial of an injunction lies within the sound discretion of a trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal unless clearly against the weight of the evidence. City of Bartlesville v. Amber [Ambler], Okl., 499 P.2d 433, 437 [(1971)]. An injunction does not lie for every act complet ed or threatened, but is appropriate if in light of all the facts equity would require its issuance. Leathers v. Commercial National Bank, Okl., 410 P.2d 541, 545 [ (1965) ]. Although none of the acts of the defendants obstruct the present roadway throug”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 2010 OK CIV APP 143 - Tidwell v. Bezner

3. “[Wjhere the easement owner is not the sole user of a private right-of-way, but uses it in common with the servient tenants, then the costs of repair and maintenance should be distributed among all users in proportions that closely approximate the usage of the parties.... Thus, ... the broader rule, which comes into effect where there are more users, is but a recognition “that the duty of repair should fall where reason, convenience and equity require ...””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Marvin E. Nieberg Real Estate Co. v. Taylor-Morley-Simon, Inc.