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616 So. 2d 1150

Docket No. 92-2145.

Thomas v. State

Timothy THOMAS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

District Court of Appeal of Florida · decided 1993-04-14

Cited by 1 later decisions — most recently January 2000

1 state decisions

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“It is not enough for the defendant to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding. Virtually every act or omission of counsel would meet that test and not every error that conceivably could have influenced the outcome undermines the reliability of the result of the proceeding. On the other hand, we believe that a defendant need not show that counsel's deficient conduct more likely than not altered the outcome in the case. This outcome-determinative standard has several strengths.... Nevertheless, the standard is not quite appropriate. ... The result of a proceeding can be rendered unreliable, and hence the proceeding itself unfair, even if the errors of counsel cannot be shown by a preponderance of the evidence to have determined the outcome. Accordingly, the appropriate test for prejudice ... [is that] [t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. . . . . ... [W]hen a defendant challenges a conviction, the question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt. In making this determination, a court hearing an ineffectiveness claim must consider the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury. Some of the factual findings will have b”

quoted by 1 later decision, including 748 So. 2d 1082 - Bowman v. State

Relies on Strickland v. Washington · Cave v. Singletary · Duest v. Singletary

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1993-04-14

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, and Ellen Morris, Asst. Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

¶2Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Carol Cobourn Asbury, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee.

¶3PER CURIAM.

¶4Timothy Thomas appeals the denial of his motion for post-conviction relief under rule 3.850. His motion listed seven grounds for relief. The focus was ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The trial court granted an evidentiary hearing, but only as to one of the grounds raised by Thomas. Under the circumstances present here this was error and we reverse.

¶5It is by now commonplace that the effectiveness of trial counsel is measured from two perspectives. In order to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, appellant must demonstrate both that counsel's performance was deficient and that there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different absent the deficient performance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 690 (1984); see also Ferguson v. State, 593 So.2d 508, 510 (Fla. 1992).

¶6It is also well established that a determination whether the deficient performance affected the outcome of the trial is a mixed question of law and fact. See, e.g., Cave v. Singletary, 971 F.2d 1513, 1516-17 (11th Cir.1992) (determination whether defendant received adequate assistance of counsel is a mixed question of law and fact); Duest v. Singletary, 967 F.2d 472, 476 (11th Cir.1992) (ineffective assistance of counsel claim presents a mixed question of law and fact and is therefore subject to de novo review), pet. for cert. filed, No. 92-1163 (U.S. Jan. 4, 1993).

¶7The record in this case amply demonstrates that Thomas made a primae facie *1151 showing of ineffectiveness. He is thus entitled to an evidentiary hearing as to whether the reliability of his trial result was thereby compromised.

¶8We reverse and remand for a full evidentiary hearing at which appellant shall be entitled to produce evidence on each of the seven grounds raised in his motion, including the failure to file a motion to suppress previously argued.

¶9REVERSED AND REMANDED.

¶10HERSEY and DELL, JJ., and DOWNEY, JAMES C., Senior Judge, concur.

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