Johnson v. State’s Empirical Analysis
1980
Citation profile
2 federal appellate · 37 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 41 later decisions — most recently July 2020 · most notably United States v. Garcia (1989), State v. Jones (1985)
2 federal appellate · 37 state decisions — followed in 16 states
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Coolidge v. New Hampshire · Sedillo v. United States · Jones v. United States · Steele v. United States No. 1 · Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 41 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“In approaching questions of this sort, the decision of the judicial officer who has issued the warrant is to be given `great deference' and `the resolution of doubtful or marginal cases in this area should be largely determined by the preference to be accorded to warrants.' Further, in resolving uncertainties and ambiguities with respect to search warrants and affidavits made to support them, the court should look to the circumstances surrounding the issuance of the warrant and need not artificially limit its inquiry to the writing itself.”
3 later decisions quote this exact passagee.g. Matter of JA · State v. Jones“For an anticipatory warrant to be valid, there must be probable cause to believe that the items to be seized will be at the place to be searched at the time the warrant is executed, or in other words, that the warrant will not be prematurely executed. 4”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissente.g. State v. Wright · State v. Witwer“"`Several cases construing the positivity standard as contained in the former federal rule did not construe it to require a significantly higher standard than probable cause. Thus, it was stated in United States v. Daniels , 10 F.R.D. 225 (D.C.N.J. 1950): "`It is our opinion that the rule requires nothing more than an explicit statement, supported by positive evidence, as distinguished from negative evidence "that the property is in the place to be searched." The explicit statement may not rest upon inferences drawn from the absence of evidence. The rule requires averments of fact sufficiently persuasive to support a reasonable inference that the property is in fact on the premises. A more rigid *Page 195 construction would require proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the property is in the place to be searched. Such a construction would enable the criminal to completely conceal an illegal enterprise behind an insurmountable barrier, provided, of course, he pursued it only at night. "If the positivity requirement were interpreted literally, it would be practically impossible to obtain a warrant to search premises at night." For example, if a police officer had observed drugs in a building, and then left the building in order to secure a warrant from the nearest available magistrate, he could not be positive that the drugs were in the building at the time that he gave the oath. The language must be construed to equate "positive" with being reasonably certain.'" (Citations omit”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.