Pubs Inc of Champaign Bank of Illinois in Champaign’s Empirical Analysis
Citation profile
2 federal appellate · 2 district · 17 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 55 later decisions — most recently July 2014 · most notably Farmers & Merchants National Bank v. Schlossberg (1986), Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. G-K-G, Inc. (1994)
2 federal appellate · 2 district · 17 state decisions — followed in 10 states
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on 15 Ill. App. 3d 784 - Perlman v. First National Bank of Chicago · 60 Ill. 2d 529 - Perlman v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago · Avco Delta Corp. Canada Ltd. v. United States · 56 Cal. App. 3d 315 - K.N.C. Wholesale, Inc. v. AWMCO, Inc. · Drain v. LaGrange State Bank
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 55 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“has generally been recognized to include: (1) the debtor has possession and title to the goods; (2) the true owner consents to the debtor's use of the collateral as security; or (8) the true owner is estopped from denying the creation of the security interest. Id. at 479. The court found that the son consented to the company's use and possession of the equipment, which created the appearance of ownership of the equipment in the company. Id. at 480. Thus, the company had”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“Under Illinois law one may be estopped from asserting his rights if his words or conduct has led another party to take some action which he would not otherwise have taken but for the words or conduct of the estopped party. The party asserting the estoppel in such a case must have actually relied on the words or conduct and may not have had knowl edge of (or convenient access to) facts contrary to those on which he relied. A party may also be estopped from asserting his rights where he has merely been silent but ‘where silence is the ground of the estoppel it is essential that the party estopped should have knowledge of the facts and the other party be ignorant of the truth and be misled into doing that which he would not have done except for that silence.’ If the president, vice-president or director of a corporation has knowledge or notice of a fact, knowledge or notice of that fact is generally imputed to the corporation. Notice to the director of a corporation is notice to the corporation and estops the corporation and its receiver from questioning the validity of a prior transaction. Parties to an agreement are also estopped to deny the recitals contained in the agreement.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“[M]ere possession of collateral does not create sufficient rights in the collateral for a security interest to attach, the necessary rights, otherwise non-existent, may be created by means of estoppel. If the owner of collateral allows another to appear as the owner or to dispose of the collateral, such that a third party is led into dealing with the apparent owner as though he were the actual oumer, then the owner will he es-topped from asserting that the apparent owner did not have rights in the collateral.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.