Averhart v. Tutsie’s Empirical Analysis
618 F.2d 479 · 1980
Citation profile
15 federal appellate · 1 district · 6 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 37 later decisions — most recently September 2018 · most notably Solomon v. Elsea (1982), 174 Ill. 2d 268 - Hanrahan v. Williams (1996)
15 federal appellate · 1 district · 6 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act))
Relies on Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth · Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co. · Bishop v. Wood · Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex · United States v. Dinitz
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 37 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“It is axiomatic that before due process protections can apply, there must first exist a protectible liberty or property interest. [Citation omitted.] Just last term . . . the United States Supreme Court considered whether inmates have a general, constitutionally protected interest in being conditionally released on parole before the expiration of a valid sentence. In Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1 , 99 S.Ct. 2100 , 60 L.Ed.2d 668 .(1979), the Court concluded that an inmate does not have a protectible expectation of parole unless that expectation is created by a state statute. According to the Court, a validly obtained conviction, with all its procedural safeguards, extinguishes a convict’s liberty interest in release. A state is under no constitutional obligation to create a parole system, and even when it does, the mere possibility of parole does not a fortiori result in a protectible expectation of release. Rather, the state statute must be phrased in such a way that it creates a real expectation of and not just a unilateral hope for parole.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“The Double Jeopardy Clause protects a defendant in a criminal proceeding against multiple punishment or repeated prosecutions for the same offense, U.S. v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 606 , 96 S.Ct. 1075, 1079 , 47 L.Ed.2d 267 (1976); its protections are not triggered by the denial of parole. Rather than constituting another punishment for the same offense, the denial of parole merely perpetuates the status quo: the prisoner remains incarcerated under a validly imposed sentence. Roach v. Board of Pardons and Paroles, 503 F.2d 1367, 1368 (8th Cir.1974); Carlisle v. Bensinger, 355 F.Supp. 1359, 1362 (N.D.Ill.1973). Indeed, in Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1 , 99 S.Ct. 2100 , 60 L.Ed.2d 668 (1979), the Supreme Court recognized that parole determinations must necessarily include the seriousness of the offense. Id. at 15 , 99 S.Ct. at 2107 .”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majoritye.g. Braxton v. Josey“The Board shall not parole a person eligible for parole if it determines that: (1) there is a substantial risk that he will not conform to reasonable conditions of parole; or (2) his release at that time would deprecate the seriousness of his offense or promote disrespect for the law; or (3) his release would have a substantially adverse effect on institutional discipline.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.