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← 618 F.2d 758 - In re Walter

In re Walter’s Empirical Analysis

618 F.2d 758 · 1980

Citation profile

33
cited by 33 later decisions
1
cited 1 times by the Supreme Court
May 2013
most recently cited

2 federal appellate · 1 district ·

How this case has been cited

Cited by 33 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently May 2013 · most notably Diamond v. Diehr (1981), In re Bilski (2008)

2 federal appellate · 1 district ·

1601980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 35 U.S.C. § 101 · 35 U.S.C. § 112

Relies on Eibel Process Co. v. Minnesota & Ontario Paper Co. · Gottschalk v. Benson · Parker v. Flook · Tilghman v. Proctor · O'Reilly v. Morse

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 33 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “Once a mathematical algorithm has been found, the claim as a whole must be further analyzed. If it appears that the mathematical algorithm is implemented in a specific manner to define structural relationships between the physical elements of the claim (in apparatus claims) or to refine or limit claim steps (in process claims), the claim being otherwise statutory, the claim passes muster under § 101.”
    9 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
  2. “Determination of whether a claim preempts nonstatutory subject matter as a whole, in the light of Benson , requires a two-step analysis. First, it must be determined whether the claim directly or indirectly recites an “algorithm” in the Benson sense of that term, for a claim which fails even to recite an algorithm clearly cannot wholly preempt an algorithm. Second, the claim must be further analyzed to ascertain whether in its entirety it wholly preempts that algorithm.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
  3. “If the functionally-defined disclosed means and their equivalents are so broad that they encompass any and every means for performing the recited functions, the apparatus claim is an attempt to exalt form over substance since the claim is really to the method or series of functions itself. In computer-related inventions, the recited means often perform the function of “number crunching” (solving mathematical algorithms and making calculations). In such cases the burden must be placed on the applicant to demonstrate that the claims are truly drawn to specific apparatus distinct from other apparatus capable of performing the identical functions. If this burden has not been discharged, the apparatus claim will be treated as if it were drawn to the method or process which encompasses all of the claimed “means.” [In re Walter, 618 F.2d at 768 , 205 USPQ at 408.]”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.