Lewis v. Williams’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

1 federal appellate · 9 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 12 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"`Definitions of probable cause, however differently expressed, all agree in these two essentials: (1) The prosecutor must in good faith have honestly believed the accused was guilty of the crime charged; and (2) his belief must have been reasonable — based on facts and circumstances sufficient to lead an ordinarily prudent person to believe the accused was guilty of the crime charged. The prosecutor must have made the investigation an ordinarily prudent person would have made in the circumstances.'" 618 S.W.2d at 302 .”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Logan v. Kuhn's Big K Corp. · Perry v. Sharber

2. “"We granted defendants' application for permission to appeal to reiterate the statement of principle set forth in Cohen v. Cook, supra ( 224 Tenn. 729 , 462 S.W.2d 499 [1970]), and to determine whether the submission of the issue of probable cause to the jury without qualifying instructions, being error, was prejudicial error requiring a reversal of the judgment. The resolution of the latter issue is dependent on whether the evidence germane to the issue of probable cause was disputed and, if not, whether the evidence established an absence of probable cause. We are also faced with the question of whether there is material evidence to support the jury's finding of malice. " Cohen was a malicious prosecution case in which the issue of probable cause was presented to the jury. The Court of Appeals approved this action. See Cohen v. Cook, 62 Tenn. App. 292 , 462 S.W.2d 502 [1969]. The petition for certiorari to the Court of Appeals was denied initially; however, on receiving a petition to rehear, certiorari was granted to consider whether or not the trial judge erred in permitting the jury to determine the issue of probable cause. The court concluded that it was error, but pointed out that the error had been waived by the defendant's failure to raise the issue in its motion for new trial and affirmed the judgment entered in the Court of Appeals. "On the issue of probable cause, the court had the following to say: `In a malicious prosecution action the determination from the evid”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Logan v. Kuhn's Big K Corp. · Brown v. SCOA Industries, Inc.

3. “In my judgment, the question of probable cause should be for the jury ... . the heart of the inquiry as to whether or not probable cause exists is reasonableness. The crucial question is whether the defendant was reasonable in his belief that the accused committed the crime. Inextricably bound up with that question is the reasonableness of the defendants' examination of the situation... . I find the procedure outlined in Cohen v. Cook, cumbersome, unnecessary, and extremely difficult for judge and jury. The better procedure would be to let the jury decide whether the instigator of criminal proceedings acted reasonably and avoid the difficulties presented by the majority's approach. .. . I see no good reason to take the issue of probable cause away from the jury and yet require the jury to determine malice and punitive damages.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Logan v. Kuhn's Big K Corp.