Henry v. Purnell’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

3 federal appellate · 1 district ·

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 9 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “The Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures encompasses the right to be free of “seizures effectuated by excessive force.” Schultz v. Braga, 455 F.3d 470, 476 (4th Cir.2006). Whether a degree of force is reasonable is measured “by a standard of objective reasonableness.” Clem v. Corbeau, 284 F.3d 543, 550 (4th Cir.2002). Courts accordingly inquire “whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 , 109 S.Ct. 1865 , 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989).... Properly applying the test of objective reasonableness requires courts to give “careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case.” Id. at 396 , 105 S.Ct. 2806 . The reasonableness of an officer’s use of force is a fact-bound question, which turns on the “totality of the circumstances.” Young v. Prince George’s County, 355 F.3d 751, 757 (4th Cir.2004). Determining “what a ‘reasonable officer on the scene’ would have done” thus depends on a careful weighing of all of the relevant facts. Sigman v. Town of Chapel Hill, 161 F.3d 782 , 787 (4th Cir.1998) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 , 109 S.Ct. 1865 ). In other words, courts determining whether an application of force is objectively reasonable must consider “ ‘the totality of the circumstances,’ ” which includes (1) the severity of the crime at issue, (2) whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to the officer or others, and (3) w”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 743 F. Supp. 2d 561 - Vandyke v. Hall

2. “if the test of “clearly established law” were to be applied at this level of generality, it would bear no relationship to the “objective legal reasonableness” that is the touchstone of Harlow . Plaintiffs would be able to convert the rule of qualified immunity that our cases plainly establish into a rule of virtually unqualified liability simply by alleging violation of extremely abstract rights. Harlow would be transformed from a guarantee of immunity into a rule of pleading. Such an approach, in sum, would destroy “the balance that our cases strike between the interests in vindication of citizens’ constitutional rights and in public officials’ effective performance of their duties,” by making it impossible for officials “reasonably [to] anticipate when their conduct may give rise to liability for damages.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. Rock for Life-UMBC v. Hrabowski