¶2The appellant, Donald Richard Wells, was convicted of sexual abuse in the first degree, a violation of § 13A-6-66, Code of Alabama 1975. He was sentenced, pursuant to the Habitual Felony Offender Act, to 5 years' imprisonment.
¶3The state's evidence presented at trial tended to show that in June 1988, the appellant sexually abused T.L.,1 a ten-year-old child. T.L. testified that she was spending the night with her cousin, the appellant's daughter, when the incident occurred. T.L. said that the appellant, his daughter, and T.L. were all sleeping in the same bed. T.L. further testified that during the night, she was awakened and saw the appellant leaning over her. She testified that the appellant was rubbing his penis on her panties on the area covering her vagina. She testified that she could see his penis. T.L. said that she got out of the bed and slept on the sofa the rest of the night.
¶4The appellant presents four issues for review.
¶6The right to a speedy trial attaches when the defendant is arrested. Russaw v. State, [Ms. 91-1773, April 16, 1993], 1993 WL 213875 (Ala.Cr.App. 1993). In this case, 13 months elapsed between the appellant's arrest and his trial. It appears from the record that most of the delay in bringing this case to trial was caused by the appellant's dissatisfaction with his attorneys and the resulting appointment of new counsel.
¶7Although the appellant did assert his right to a speedy trial in April and in December 1992, it does not appear that the state did anything to delay this case. He contends that he was prejudiced because he was incarcerated while he awaited trial and because he could not therefore locate witnesses and prepare an adequate defense. The appellant was, however, represented by counsel, who had the opportunity to locate and question witnesses. The appellant has failed to show how he was prejudiced by the delay.
¶8After reviewing the factors enunciated in Barker, we find that the appellant's right to a speedy trial was not violated by the 13-month delay.
¶10Here, evidence that the appellant had been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude was admissible to impeach his credibility as a witness. The court correctly limited the use of this evidence to impeachment purposes. A proper limiting instruction is deemed to cure the effects of prejudicial remarks made before a jury. Soriano v. State, 527 So.2d 1367 (Ala.Cr.App. 1988). The court did not err in refusing to grant the appellant's motion for a mistrial.
¶13 "(a) A person commits the crime of sexual abuse in the first degree if:
¶14". . . .
¶15 "(3) He, being 16 years old or older, subjects another person to sexual contact who is less than 12 years old."
¶16When reviewing a sufficiency claim, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the state and we can not substitute our judgment for that of the jury. Marks v. State,581 So.2d 1182 (Ala.Cr.App. 1990). Here, the victim testified that the appellant was rubbing his penis on her panties when she awakened. At the time of the incident, the victim was less than 12 years old and the appellant was older than 16.
¶17There was sufficient evidence presented to the jury to support the jury's verdict of guilty of sexual abuse in the first degree.
¶18For the foregoing reasons, the judgment in this cause is due to be affirmed.
¶19AFFIRMED.
¶20All the Judges concur.