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62 Ala. 119

Martin v. State

Supreme Court of Alabama

Decided December 15, 1878

Supreme Court of Alabama · decided 1878-12-15

Tried before Hon. Lewis Wyeth. This was a bastardy proceeding, commenced against the appellant, John Martin, before a justice of the peace, by one Cynthia. C. Barnes. The justice having found appellant to be the father of the bastard, bound him over to appear at the next term of the Circuit Court.

Relies on Merritt v. Flemming · Wilson v. Judge of the Co. Court · Ex parte Grantland

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1878-12-15

How this case has been cited

Cited by 11 later decisions — most recently January 1951

11 state decisions

40187818801890190019101920193019401950decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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STONE, J.

¶1In Wilson v. The Judge of the County Court of Pike, 18 Ala. 757, Chief Justice Dargan, delivering the opinion of the court, said: “ But for the decisions heretofore made by this court, I should be very reluctant to hold that the mother of a bastard, after she had instituted proceedings against the putative father, could compromise the cause and dismiss the prosecution. I, however, admit that the law is settled in this State that she can, and we can not hold otherwise without overruling decisions that have for a long time been acquiesced in.” The court cited in support of this view Robinson v. Crenshaw, 2 St. & Por. 276; Ashburne v. Gibson, 9 Por. 549. The same principle is reaffirmed in the case of Merritt v. Fleming, 42 Ala. 234. We do not feel at liberty or inclined to depart from, or weaken this principle, which has stood so long as the law of this State.

¶2There was a disputed question in the court below, whether the attorney, in concluding a compromise with defendant, exceeded the authority conferred. According to his testimony he did not; but according to the testimony of the mother of the bastard he did. Whether the mother, on being informed of the terms of the compromise, acquiesced in it, was also a question which should have been, and we suppose was, submitted to the jury. These were questions of fact, arising under this line of the defense, which the jury alone could determine under proper instructions from the court. — 1 Brick. Dig. 55, § 26. The second written charge asked by defendant should have been given.

¶3The first charge asked for the defendant should also have been given. A compromise made or offered, is not evidence of the justness of the claim agreed or offered to be compromised. Parties sued, or against whom a claim is preferred, may purchase their peace, or otherwise compromise such claim; and if in such negotiation they make no admission of fact material to the maintenance of the claim asserted, such offer or promise can not be received in evidence that the claim made was just. — 1 Brick. Dig. 838, §§ 479, 480, 481; Courtland v. Tarlton, 8 Ala. 532; Ex parte Grantland, 29 Ala. 69.

¶4Reversed and remanded.

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