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62 Ala. 26

Lucas v. State

Supreme Court of Alabama

Decided December 15, 1878

Supreme Court of Alabama · decided 1878-12-15

Tried before Hon. John Henderson. The appellant, Matt Lucas, was convicted of tbe larceny of a horse. One Jones, a witness for the State, testified that he was in Eockford, Coosa county, Alabama, and early in the morning saw the defendant ride into that place on a fine mare ; that he suspected the horse was stolen, and he asked defendant where he was going, to which defendant replied that he was going to Col. Glidden’s Iron Works in Talladega county.

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1878-12-15

How this case has been cited

Cited by 3 later decisions — most recently January 1972

3 state decisions

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Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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STONE, J.

¶1The controlling inquiry in this case, as presented by the record, is, the county in which the trade was made. One witness testifies it took place in Talladega county, the other in Coosa. This raised a question for decision by the jury. If the trade was made in Coosa, and Jones took possession of the horse, under the trade, in that county, then the horse was under his control, although it was agreed the defendant should accompany him to the town of Talladega, to be there paid the residue of the purchase price. On the other hand, if only a temporary exchange of horses took place in Coosa county, each riding the other’s horse, to be re-exchanged at pleasure, and in this condition they entered Talladega county, then Lucas, the defendant, can be convicted, if the charge be otherwise made out, although he may not have had the actual custody of the horse in Talladega county. In the case last supposed, Jones would be but the agent or instrument of Lucas in carrying the property into the county, and the guilty act would be properly chargeable to Lucas. Several of the rulings of the Circuit Court are not reconcilable with these views. We need not particularize. — 1 Bish. Cr. Law, § 137, et seq.

¶2Reversed and remanded. Let the prisoner remain in custody until discharged by due course of law.

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