In Re Oliver L. North (Clair E. George Fee Application)’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 district · 9 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 21 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offence and the guilt of the offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the offence.... [I]f granted after conviction, [a pardon] removes the penalties and disabilities, and restores him to all his civil rights; it makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Sang Man Shin v. State · 887 So. 2d 1268 - RJL v. State

2. “[O]n the basis of long-held traditional views on the effect of a pardon, covering diverse periods and sources from Bracton and Blackstone to Professor Williston, from seventeenth century English cases to those in contemporary courts of Great Britain and the British Commonwealth, from 1915 teachings of the Supreme Court, and the 1975 analysis of the Court of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit, we conclude that the Presidential pardon of 1977 does not eliminate Noonan's 1968 conviction and does not "create any factual fiction" that Noonan's conviction had not occurred to justify expunction of his criminal court record. Poena tolli potest, culpa perennis erit (The punishment can be removed, but the crime remains). BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1040 (5th ed.1979).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 791 So. 2d 1238 - Randall v. Florida Dept. of Law Enforcement

3. “Garland was a lawyer who had served as an official in the Confederacy. At the end of the war, the President pardoned him, but an Act of Congress excluded him from practicing before the Supreme Court. Nevertheless, the Court admitted him. It did not rest its judgment on the theory that the pardon blotted out Garland's guilt. This expansive view of the effect of a pardon turned out to be dictum. The Court held that Garland's exclusion was punishment, which the pardon barred. .... Garland's dictum was implicitly rejected in Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79 , 35 S.Ct. 267 , 59 L.Ed. 476 (1915), which recognized that the acceptance of a pardon implies a confession of guilt.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 887 So. 2d 1268 - RJL v. State