¶1dissenting:
¶2I dissent and would hold that the affidavit upon which the search warrant was issued did not contain information sufficient to establish the reliability of the anonymous informer. The majority attempts to distinguish the affidavit in this case from that in People v. Parker, 42 Ill. 2d 42, but the alleged distinction will' not withstand examination.
¶3In Parker, “The verified complaints for the warrants recited that the complainant, Kenneth Metcalf, a State narcotics inspector, ‘has been informed by an informant who has previously given information to said complainant which proved to be true’ that Lawrence Parker had a quantity of marijuana stored in his desk at his place of employment and at his home which the informer had personally observed. They further recited that the informer had purchased samples of this marijuana from Lawrence Parker in recent months which had been turned over to the complainant, subjected to analysis and proved to be marijuana.” (42 Ill. 2d 42, 43-44.) Here the complaint recited:
“4. That said confidential informant is trustworthy as an informer because of the following facts.
A. Said informant has furnished affiant with information on four prior occasions which information has resulted in four purchases of marijuana or dangerous drugs and that arrests are pending on these four purchases.
B. Said informant told affiant that on November 16, 1971, at or about 7:00 P.M., said informant saw marijuana in said automobile and Jimmie D’ Thomas told informant that the substance was marijuana; said informant told affiant that on numerous occasions in the past he has seen Jimmie D. Thomas with marijuana in said automobile.” Slip Opinion, p. 1.
¶4In Parker, the substances turned over to the complainant by the informer were “subjected to analysis and proved to be marijuana,” but here it is not indicated in what manner the complainant learned, or that he in fact knew, that the substances purchased were “marijuana or dangerous drugs.” One can only speculate as to what is meant by “arrests are pending on these four purchases.”
¶5The majority, for what reason is not clear, cites People v. McNeil, 52 Ill. 2d 409. McNeil, rather than supporting the majority’s position, points up an additional weakness. In McNeil, the court stated that “In appraising the present affidavit the issuing judge was entitled to take into account the fact that the dominant feature of the present situation was the imperative necessity for quick action. The warrant was issued at 3:40 P.M. The affidavit stated that the armed robbery of the fur store had occurred earlier that day. The circumstances related by the informer, if true, established that he had been inside the apartment in question after the robbery had taken place, and had there seen and identified the proceeds of the robbery. As a practical matter, the informer probably identified himself completely by the information which he gave to Officer Lopez, unless it is assumed that a large number of men had visited the apartment between the time of the robbery (which occurred at 12 noon on the day the affidavit was signed — see People v. McNeil(1968), 99 Ill. App. 2d 273, 275), and the time of the issuance of the warrant. All of these circumstances, in our opinion, tend to indicate the trustworthiness of the affidavit.” (52 Ill. 2d 409, 413-14.) Here the informant allegedly supplied the information on November 16, 1971, and the search warrant was not obtained until November 19, 1971. Clearly there was no “imperative necessity for quick action.” The affidavit failed to meet the test of Aguilar, and no amount of “commonsense and realistic” interpretation serves to supply its deficiencies.