¶1I concur in affirming the judgment, but do not think the statute of limitations, as pleaded, constituted any defense. The right acquired by adverse oocupaney was simply an equity, and if it had been properly pleaded as such, it would, in my judgment, have barred a recovery by the plaintiff.
62 Mo. 216
Miller v. Dunn
Decided January 15, 1876
Supreme Court of Missouri · decided 1876-01-15
<p>1. limitations — State statute no lar prior to issue of U. S. patent. — Under the decision of Gibson vs. Chouteau (13 Wal., 92) possession for theperiod named in the State statute of limitations is no bar until the legal title passes out of the United States. (McElhinney vs. Eicke, 61 Mo., 829.)</p> <p>Per Hough, J.</p> <p>2. Adverse possession-Right of simply an equity-Effect of, when so pleaded.-The right of adverse occupancy in such case was simply an equity, and if properly pleaded would bar a recovery.</p> <p>On Motion for Rehearing.</p> <p>3. Spanish and territorial law — Ante-nuptial contract — Spanish law of “arras” —Common law. — A conveyance of land in the territory of Louisiana, made in ISOS, by an American inhabitant, in contemplation of marriage, which deed in no wise conformed to the Spanish or civil law', and contained nothing in its terms to indicate a reference to the Spanish law of amis, would be held to be governed by the common law, or at least so much of it as had, by positive statutes, been introduced into the territory; and, accordingly, by the statute of descents and distributions, would not be held as conveying only one-tenth part of the donor’s property.</p> <p>4. New Madrid certificate — Read-right confirmation — Location of — Minutes of old hoard and recorder Bates — Place of record prima facie proof of location, etc., etc. — Suit involving the title to land obtained under a new Madrid certificate developed the facts that au original application, made in 1806, to the first board of commissioners, for a head or settlement right, merely bounded the land by natural objects, and it was shown to adjoin a confirmation proved to be for land which was in the district of New Madrid in 1804. The minutes of the old board and of recorder Bates showed that the head-right confirmation was in Cape Girardeau. But a subsequent deed made in 1808, conveying the same grant, was recorded in New Madrid, and by the law then in force it could only be recorded in the district where the land was situated ; and the deed itself recited that both parties resided in Cape Girardeau. The New Madrid certificate was issued for the same tract. The territorial sub-division into districts in 1804 and 1808 w-as not shown in evidence. Held, that prima facie the record of the deed in New Madrid districts showed that in 1808 the land was embraced therein, and this conclusion was greatly sirengiliened by tbe recital showing that while both parties resided in Cape Girardeau, they proceeded to New Madrid to procure its record ; that as the New Madrid certificate could not issue for land in Cape Girardeau, the minutes of the board and of the commissioner, locating the land in Cape Girardeau, should be held tobe a mistake, and that it devolved on the party so claiming to prove aliimde, that In point of fact the district of New Madrid did not in 1808 embrace the tract.</p>
Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know
Decided 1876-01-15
How this case has been cited
Cited by 10 later decisions — most recently June 1900
10 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
View the full empirical analysis of this case →