Barwin v. Reidy’s Empirical Analysis
1957
Citation profile
2 federal appellate · 65 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 67 later decisions — most recently June 2006 · most notably City of Santa Fe v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc. (1964), Estep v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance (1985)
2 federal appellate · 65 state decisions — followed in 13 states
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on In Re the Adoption of Holman · In re Adoption of a Minor · Wyness v. Crowley · Lee v. Thomas Et Ux · Rhodes v. Shirley
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 67 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“"Since adoption may be refused to petitioners who have the strongest endorsement of the parents, we think it follows that the office of the requirement of consent for adoption is to indicate the willingness of the parents that the natural relationship be swept away and a new one created in its stead. The giving of consent is indicative of the subjective state of mind of the parents expressive only of the individuals and binding no one unless the court shall choose to act thereon. It is up to the court to perform the objective acts of severing the natural relationship and creating an artificial status by judicial determination. As it may or may not decree adoption in favor of persons recommended by the natural parents, it seems most unlikely the legislature intended to impose as a condition to the exercise of the court's jurisdiction knowledge of the identity of petitioners in adoption on the part of the natural parents, because even when that circumstance exists, and possibly the further circumstance that the natural parents have investigated the qualifications of the petitioners and given them their unqualified approval, the court may still refuse to decree adoption, the selection of a foster parent being a judicial act and the responsibility being that of the court. * * * "We are of opinion the statutory requirements have been met and the lower court was vested with jurisdiction unless the execution of the consents in such manner violated the public policy of this state, ”
4 later decisions quote this exact passage“It is commonly the case that persons wishing to adopt a child will make provision with its mother, or 'mother and father, before birth of the child, to pay hospital and medical expenses in connection with the care of the mother and child. There is nothing in this practice inimical to public policy. Indeed, it is productive of the welfare of the child that the child and the mother have adequate medical attention which perhaps would not otherwise be provided. If it is permissible to agree to discharge prospective expenses, where is there harm in agreeing that debts already incurred for the same reason and as yet unpaid shall be paid by would-be adoptive parents? Of course the best practice would be for payment to be made directly from them to the creditors— that is, the hospital and doctor. But if payment is made to the natural parents for such purpose under the reasonable belief the money will be used by them to discharge such indebtedness, there is no wrong in law. That is all that happened concerning Sandra Annette, as far as the Barwins knew. There is a stipulation in the record between counsel for the Websters [natural parents] and the first attorney who represented the Barwins [adoptive parents] that the Websters represented to him that San dra Annette was born by Caesarean section, although it was not true. The Websters were advised by that attorney of the consequences attendant upon their execution of consents of this adoption. Other persons, too, talked with them about”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“"Duress in law books is defined to be an actual or threatened violence or restraint of a man's person, contrary to law, to compel him to enter into a contract or discharge one... . By duress in its more extended sense is meant that degree of severity, either threatened or impending or actually inflicted, which is sufficient to overcome the mind of a person of ordinary firmness... ."”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majoritye.g. Matter of Kira M.
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.