Volume 62 — New York Reports, Second Series

<p>POINTS OF COUNSEL</p> <p>I. Respondents failed to sustain their burden of proving that the memorandum is exempt from disclosure. CMatter of Westchester Rockland Newspapers v Kimball, 50 NY2d 575; Matter of Fink v Lefkowitz, 47 NY2d 567; Matter of Polansky v Regan, 81 AD2d 102; Matter of Miracle Mile Assoc, v Yudelson, 68 AD2d 176, 48 NY2d 706; Church of Scientology of N. Y. v State of New York, 46 NY2d 906.) II. The court below ignored facts demonstrating that the memorandum was postdecisional. III. The burden of proof is upon respondents.</p> <p>I. A memorandum which consists of the opinion of the writer, prepared to assist the agency in formulating a position, and which is only one of many considerations taken into account by the agency in regard to the issue, is not final agency policy or a final agency determination. It is not accessible under the Freedom of Information Law. (Renegotiation Bd. v Grumman Aircraft, 421 US 168; NLRB v Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 US 132; Matter of McAulay v Board ofEduc., 61 AD2d 1048, 48 NY2d 659; Matter of Sea Crest Constr. Corp. v Stubing, 82 AD2d 546; Matter of Marshall v State Bd. for Professional Med. Conduct, 73 AD2d 798, 49 NY2d 709; Matter of Sinicropi v County of Nassau, 76 AD2d 832, 51 NY2d 704; United States v Nixon, 418 US 683; Matter of Fink v Lefkowitz, 47 NY2d 567; Matter ofPolansky v Regan, 81 AD2d 102; Matter of Miracle Mile Assoc, v Yudelson, 68 AD2d 176, 48 NY2d 706.) II. The in camera inspection of the document by the court below was proper. (Horton u Smith, 51 NY2d 798; Matter of Gonzalez v State Liq. Auth., 30 NY2d 108; Cohen v Hallmark Cards, 45 NY2d 493; Judson v Central Vt. R. R. Co., 158 NY 597; Matter of Judicial Inquiry, 5 872; Matter of Association of Bar, 222 App Div 580; Jones v Maphey, 50 NY2d 971.) III. The record to which access is sought relates to collective bargaining negotiations which would be impaired by disclosure. (Matter of Murray v Troy Urban Renewal Agency, 84 AD2d 612, 56 NY2d 888; Coha-lan v Board ofEduc., 74 AD2d 812; Belmont Cent. School Dist. v Belmont Teachers Assn., 51 AD2d 653.)</p>

<p>POINTS OF COUNSEL</p> <p>I. A parent labor organization is not per se liable for the illegal acts of an affiliate. {Carbon Fuel Co. v Mine Workers, 444 US 212; Walters v Roadway Express, 400 F Supp 6, 557 F2d 521; Peabody Coal Co. v Local Union 1734, 543 F2d 10, 430 US 940; North Amer. Coal Corp. v Local Union 2262, 497 F2d 459; Villalba Co. v United Assn, of Journeymen, 413 F Supp 94 \Bacino v American Federation of Musicians, 407 F Supp 548; Rossi u Trans World Airlines, 350 F Supp 1263; Southern Ohio Coal Co. v United Mine Workers, 551 F2d 695; Federal Prescription Serv. v Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 527 F2d 269.) II. CSEA, Inc., did not act as the agent for the Rockland County Unit nor did the Rockland County Unit act as agent of CSEA, Inc. III. The record does not support the finding of the Supreme Court that CSEA, Inc., was involved in the alleged strike. (.Matter of Rothko, 84 Mise 2d 830, 56 AD2d 499, 43 NY2d 305; Welt v Beachcomber, Inc., 166 Mise 29; Federal Prescription Serv. v Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 527 F2d 269; Southern Ohio Coal Co. v United Mine Workers, 551 F2d 695.) IV. The court is without jurisdiction of the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc. (Bloom v Illinois, 391 US 194; Gompers v United States, 233 US 604; Gompers v Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 US 418; Ingraham v Maurer, 39 AD2d 258; Rankin v Shanker, 23 NY2d 111; Michaelson v United States, 266 US 42; Yorktown Cent. School Dist. v Yorktown Congress of Teachers, 42 AD2d 422; Matter of Hynes v Doe, 101 Mise 2d 350; Matter of Davis, 88 Mise 2d 938; Shakun v Shakun, 11 AD2d 724.)</p> <p>I. In reviewing this certified question of law, factual determinations are presumed in favor of respondent. (Hession v Sari Corp., 283 NY 262; Vogel v Edwards, 283 NY 118; Chase Watch Corp. v Heins, 284 NY 129; Grossman v Consolidated Edison Co., 294 NY 39; Epstein v National Transp. Co., 287 NY 456; Thomas v Morris, 286 NY 266; Matter of City of New York [Vernon Parkway], 285 NY 326.) II. CSEA, Inc., has both direct process service and notice of the temporary restraining order. III. CSEA, Inc., and its Rockland County Unit are in fact a single organization based upon its own constitution and by-laws. CMatter of Civil Serv. Employees Assn, v Helsby, 21 NY2d 541; Matter ofWestlrondequoit Teachers Assn, v Helsby, 35 NY2d 46.) IV. The fine imposed was proper, warranted and well within appellant’s financial ability to pay. (City of New York v De Lury, 23 NY2d 175; United States v Mine Workers, 330 US 258; County of Orange v Civil Serv. Employees Assn., 51 AD2d 1031; Matter of Board ofEduc. [.Lakeland Federation of Teachers], 59 AD2d 900; City of New York v Vizzini, 49 AD2d 833.)</p>

<p>POINTS OF COUNSEL</p> <p>I. RPAPL 753 (subd 4) nullified the Yellowstone injunction. (Mannis v Jillandrea Realty Co., 94 AD2d 676; Klausner v Frank, 95 AD2d 653; Wilen v Harridge House Assoc., 94 AD2d 123; Nunez v 164 Prospect Park West Corp., 92 AD2d 540; Ameurasia Int. Corp. v Finch Realty Co., 90 AD2d 760; Finger Lakes Racing Assn. vNew York State Racing & Wagering Bd., 58 AD2d 285, 45 NY2d 471.) II. The Civil Court is the proper forum for the adjudication of this landlord and tenant dispute. (Lun Far Co. v Aylesbury Assoc., 40 AD2d 794.)</p> <p>I. The court below properly affirmed the order of Special Term which enjoined the termination of plaintiff’s proprietary lease pending trial of the underlying declaratory judgment action. (First Nat. Stores v Yellowstone Shopping Center, 21 NY2d 630; Sag-son Co. v Weiss, 83 Mise 2d 806; Matter ofDitmas Apts, v Coster, 196 Mise 728; Ameurasia Int. Corp. v Finch Realty Co., 90 AD2d 760; Finley v Park Ten Assoc., 83 AD2d 537; 150 East 57th St. Assoc, v Fletcher, AD2d 947; Podolsky v Hoffman, 82 AD2d 763.) II. The enactment of chapter 870 of the Laws of 1982 (amdg RPAPL 753) does not preclude the issuance of a Yellowstone injunction where tenant is a shareholder of landlord-cooperative corporation and where the alleged breach is not curable within 10 days. (Klausner v Frank, 95 AD2d 653; Wilen v Harridge House Assoc., 94 AD2d 123; Mannis v Jillandrea Realty Co., 94 AD2d 676; Nunez v 164 Prospect Park West Corp., 92 AD2d 540; Jimerson Housing Co. v Butler, 102 Mise 2d 423; Matter of State Tax Comm, v Shor, 43 NY2d 151; Colby v Moyer, 113 Mise 2d 217.) III. Landlord’s failure to raise at Special Term the applicability of RPAPL 753 (subd 4) precludes it from asserting that provision as a defense on this appeal. (Lefkowitz v Lebensfeld, 51 NY2d 442; Unitron Graphics v Mergenthaler Linotype Co., 75 AD2d 783; Collucci u Col-lucci, 58 NY2d 834; Matter of County of Broome v Eroni-mous, 81 AD2d 984; Blue Grass Partners v Bruns, Norde-man, Rea & Co., 75 AD2d 791; Goodfarb v Freedman, 76 AD2d 565; Matter of Aramini v Board ofEduc., 71 AD2d 804; Matter of Battaglia v Schuler, 60 AD2d 759; Pi Lambda Phi Fraternity v Seneca Beta Corp., 54 AD2d 1127.)</p>

<p>POINTS OF COUNSEL</p> <p>I. The retroactive readjustment undertaken by respondents unfairly punishes appellant for respondents’ errors and frustrates the cost containment theory of the prospective reimbursement system. CMatter of Beekman-Downtown Hosp. v Whalen, 44 NY2d 124; Hurlbut v Whalen, 58 AD2d 311; Matter of Mayflower Nursing Home v Office of Health Systems Mgt., 59 NY2d 935; Matter of Sigety v Ingraham, 29 NY2d 110; Matter of Blue v Whalen, 57 AD2d 240; Matter of Kaye v Whalen, 56 AD2d 111, 44 NY2d 754, 439 US 922.) II. The facts at bar present a compelling case for invocation of an estoppel against the State. (Bender v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 38 NY2d 662; Public Improvements v Board ofEduc., 56 NY2d 850; Williams Press v State of New York, 37 NY2d 434; Community Health Servs. v Califano, 698 F2d 615; Matter of Sheppard-Pollack, Inc. v Tully, 64 AD2d 296; State of New York v McBride Transp., 56 Mise 2d 90; State of New York v New York Movers Tariff Bur., 48 Mise 2d 225; Schuster v Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 312 F2d 311; United States v Lazy FC Ranch, 481 F2d 985.)</p> <p>Petitioner should be required to repay the overpayment that it has received; its claim respondents are estopped from recovering such overpayment lacks merit. CMatter of Hamptons Hosp. & Med. Center v Moore, 52 NY2d 88; Matter of Gavigan v McCoy, 37 NY2d 548; Matter of Newcomb v New York State Teachers’ Retirement System, 36 NY2d 953; Williams Press v State of New York, 37 NY2d 434; Public Improvements v Board ofEduc., 56 NY2d 850; Granada Bldgs, v City of Kingston, 58 NY2d 705; Matter of Jamestown Lodge v Catherwood, 31 AD2d 981; Matter of Lee, 107 Mise 2d 928; Beth Israel v Berman, 114 Mise 2d 440, 92 AD2d 531; State of New York v Rockland County, 74 AD2d 921; Matter ofEbling v New York State Civ. Serv. Comm., 305 NY 221.)</p>

POINTS OF COUNSEL The Grand Jury proceeding was not “defective” due to the absence of an instruction by the prosecutor on the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance.

<p>POINTS OF COUNSEL</p> <p>The court’s decision to suppress certain evidence was improper. (.People v Berrios, 28 NY2d 361; People v Malinsky, 15 NY2d 86; People v Petro, 54 NY2d 759; People v Delgado, 79 AD2d 976; People v Jones, 80 AD2d 876; People v Green, 87 AD2d 892; People v Lypka, 36 NY2d 210; People v Havelka, 45 NY2d 636; Whiteley v Warden, 401 US 560; People v Horowitz, 21 NY2d 55.)</p> <p>The court below was correct in deciding that the People failed to come forward with probable cause for respondent’s arrest where the only witnesses at the suppression hearing was a police officer who had relied solely on radio communications from another officer. {People v Havelka, 45 NY2d 636; People v Lypka, 36 NY2d 210; Whiteley v Warden, 401 US 560; People v Horowitz, 21 NY2d 55; People v Landy, 59 NY2d 369; People v Calderon, 88 AD2d 604; People v Green, 87 AD2d 892; People v Delgado, 79 AD2d 976, 53 NY2d 706; People v Ward, 95 AD2d 233; People v Bouton, 50 NY2d 130.)</p>

<p>POINTS OF COUNSEL</p> <p>I. .Petitioner failed to demonstrate that the rates allowed in the proceeding under review were unjust or unreasonable. CMatter of St. Lawrence Gas Co. v Public Serv. Comm., 42 NY2d 461; Power Comm, v Hope Gas Co., 320 US 591; Matter of New York Tel. Co. v Public Serv. Comm., 64 AD2d 232, 46 NY2d 710; West Ohio Gas Co. v Commission [No. 1], 294 US 63; Matter of Long Is. Light. Co. v Maltbie, 249 App Div 918; Matter of City of New York v Public Serv. Comm., 17 AD2d 581, 13 NY2d 594; Banton v Belt Line Ry., 268 US 413.) II. The Commission’s disallowance of the revised operator work times was reasonable and lawful. v Federal Power Comm., 425 US 662; Matter of Long Is. Water Corp. v Public Serv. Comm., 49 AD2d 392; Matter of National Fuel Gas Distr. Corp. v Public Serv. Comm., 90 AD2d 605; Matter of New York State Council of Retail Merchants v Public Serv. Comm., 45 NY2d 661.)</p> <p>I. The court below did not err when it held that the Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously by ignoring the Federal scheme for separating interstate and intrastate costs. (North Carolina Utilities Comm, v Federal Communications Comm., 552 F2d 1036, 434 US 874; New York Tel. Co. v Federal Communications Comm., 631 F2d 1059; Matter of New York Tel. Co. v Public Serv. Comm., 77 AD2d 332, 52 NY2d 1072, 53 NY2d 605, 838; Matter of New York Tel. Co. v Public Serv. Comm., 309 NY 569; City of New York v United States, 346 F Supp 151; Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 US 352; Smith v Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 282 US 133; Matter of Sapolin Paints v Tully, 55 AD2d 759, 44 NY2d 865; Matter of Lefrak Forest Hills Corp. v Galvin, 40 AD2d 211, 32 NY2d 796, cert den sub nom. Baum v Lefrak Forest Hills Corp., 414 US 1004; Matter of Italian Sons & Daughters v Common Council of Buffalo, 89 AD2d 822.) II. The court below did not err when it rejected the request by Commission counsel to sustain the Commission’s arbitrary and capricious determination on grounds not adopted or relied on by the Commission. (New York Tel. Co. v Public Serv. Comm., 29 NY2d 164; Matter of New York Tel. Co. v Public Serv. Comm., 309 NY 569; Matter of Cohalan v Gioia, 88 AD2d 722; Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp. v Public Serv. Comm., 64 AD2d 345, 47 NY2d 800, 51 NY2d 823, 450 US 961; Matter of New York Tel. Co. v Public Serv. Comm., 77 AD2d 332, 52 NY2d 1072, 53 NY2d 838; Matter of New York Tel. Co. v Public Serv. Comm., 64 AD2d 232, 46 NY2d 710; Matter of Pavilion Natural Gas Co. v Public Serv. Comm., 56 AD2d 413; Matter of New Rochelle Water Co. v Public Seru. Comm,., 38 AD2d 375, 31 NY2d 397; Matter of New York Edison Co. u Maltbie, 244 App Div 436; Matter of St. Lawrence Gas Co. v Public Serv. Comm., 42 NY2d 461.)</p>

The United States Constitution precludes compelling a Bahamian bank from defending an action in New York, based on quasi-in-rem jurisdiction, where the only contact such bank has with New York is the maintenance of a correspondent account.

A party may properly employ the Freedom of Information Law to examine public records even if it anticipates, or is actually engaged in, litigation with the public agency. (.Matter of John P. v Whalen, 54 NY2d 89; Matter of Burke v Yudelson, 51 AD2d 673; Matter of D’Alessandro u Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., 56 AD2d 762; Arzuaga v New York City Tr. Auth., 73 AD2d 518; Brady & Co. v City of New York, 84 AD2d 113.) II.

The 1975 New York City Charter was primarily intended to empower local Community Boards. The City acted unlawfully by failing to submit the selection of this site for capital expenditures to Uniform Land Use Review Procedures. (Matter of Industrial Comr. v Five Corners Tavern, 47 NY2d 639.) II.

POINTS OF COUNSEL The District Attorney’s failure to advise the court, the defense and the Grand Jury, once he had learned that the indictment as to appellant Pelchat was based entirely on false, misleading and legally insufficient evidence and that the officers who. witnessed the commission of the crimes charged had in fact not seen Mr. Pelchat commit any crime, violated appellant’s constitutional and statutory rights and requires that his guilty plea be vacated and the…

<p>POINTS OF COUNSEL</p> <p>Application of the “neutral principles of law” approach requires affir-mance of the trial court judgment. (Pres.byterian Church v Hull Church, 393 US 440; Maryland & Va. Churches v Sharpsburg Church, 393 US 367; Avitzur v Avitzur, 58 NY2d 108; Matter of First Presbyt. Soc., 106 NY 251; Westminister Presbyt. Church v Trustees of Presbytery, 211 NY 214; Matter of Presbytery of Albany [Second United Presbyt. Church], 35 AD2d 252, 28 NY2d 722, 404 US 803; Trustees of Dartmouth Coll, v Woodward, 4 Wheat [17 US] 518; People ex rel. Sturges v Keese, 27 Hun 483; Jones v Wolf, 443 US 595.)</p> <p>I. This is an ecclesiastical controversy and not a property dispute. (Presbyterian Church v Hull Church, 393 US 440; Jones v Wolf, 443 US 595.) II. Plaintiffs are under control of defendants and do not enjoy any independent corporate existence. III. The majority opinion of the court below properly applied the principles of settling church disputes in the government of the United Presbyterian Church in the United States of America. ('Watson v Jones, 13 Wall [80 US] 679; Serbian Orthodox Diocese v Milivojevich, 426 US 696; Trustees of Presbytery v Westminister Presbyt. Church, 222 NY 305; Matter of Presbytery of Albany, 63 Mise 2d 791, 35 AD2d 252, 28 NY2d 772, 404 US 803; Knight v Presbytery of Western N. Y., 26 AD2d 19,18 NY2d 868.) IV. The reliance by plaintiffs on section 24 of the Religious Corporations Law to create an exception to the general rule of deference to the authority of the church is erroneous. (Conklin v State of New York, 284 App Div 193; Westminister Presbyt. Church v Trustees of Presbytery, 211 NY 214.) V. Under the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court of the United States in Jones v Wolf (443 US 595), the property of the First Presbyterian Church should presently be under the control of defendants. (Watson v Jones, 13 Wall [80 US] 679; Kedroffv St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 US 94; Kreshik v St. Nicholas Church, 363 US 190; Presbyterian Church v Hull Church, 393 US 440; Serbian Orthodox Diocese v Milivojevich, 426 US 696; Maryland & Va. Churches v Sharpsburg Church, 393 US 367.)</p>

<p>POINTS OF COUNSEL</p> <p>I. Appellant was denied due process by the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury that the complainant’s screwdriver, which defense witnesses saw him use as a weapon, was a dangerous instrument under those circumstances. {People v Almond, 37 AD2d 571.) II. Appellant was denied due process by the trial court’s jury instructions which expressly disassociated the justification defense from the count charging criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree and by the court’s refusal to relate justification to that crime. {People v Hunter, 61 AD2d 990.) III. Appellant was denied due process by the trial court’s supplemental jury instructions, which strongly suggested that the People did not have the burden of proving the absence of justification beyond a reasonable doubt. {Sandstrom v Montana, 442 US 510; Mullaney v Wilbur, 421 US 684; People v Newman, 46 NY2d 126; People v Steele, 26 NY2d 526; People v Malloy, 55 NY2d 296; Arroyo v Jones, 685 F2d 35; Bollenbach u United States, 326 US 607; People v McNair, 48 AD2d 860.) IV. Appellant was denied due process by the trial court’s refusal to give a “missing witness” charge with respect to the prosecution’s failure to call a key witness. {Noce v Kaufman, 2 NY2d 347; People v Brown, 34 NY2d 658; People u Rodriguez, 38 NY2d 95.)</p> <p>I. Defendant’s guilt was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. {People v Gruttola, 43 NY2d 116; Jackson v Virginia, 443 US 307; People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620.) II. The court’s charge to the jury was proper in all respects. {People v Pena, 50 NY2d 400; People v Almond, 37 AD2d 571; United States v Wallace Co., 336 US 793; People v Pendergraft, 50 AD2d 531; People v Qualls, 55 NY2d 733; People v Moore, 59 AD2d 602; People v Malloy, 55 NY2d 296; People v Arcar-ola, 96 AD2d 1081.) III. The trial court properly refused to give a missing witness charge regarding Carmen Rivera. {People v Stridiron, 33 NY2d 287; People v Buckler, 39 NY2d 895; People v Josan, 92 AD2d 902.)</p>

<p>POINTS OF COUNSEL</p> <p>called finding of fact of a suicidal ideation on April 5 is erroneous as a matter of law. (Somersall v New York Tel. Co., 52 NY2d 157; Blum v Fresh Grown Preserve Corp., 292 NY 241; Noce u Kaufman, 2 NY2d 347; Fiederlein v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 80 AD2d 821, 56 NY2d 573.) II. The medical judgment rule governs negligence and medical malpractice claims relating to the level of supervision of psychiatric patients. (Topel v Long Is. Jewish Med. Center, 55 NY2d 682; Mossman v Albany Med. Center, 34 AD2d 263; Fiederlein v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 56 NY2d 573; Koenigsmark v State of New York, 80 AD2d 707, 55 NY2d 928; Hirsh v State of New York, 8 NY2d 125; Holtfoth v Rochester Gen. Hosp., 304 NY 27; Sheehan v North Country Community Hosp., 273 NY 163; Flanagan v Mount Eden Gen. Hosp., 24 NY2d 427; Hendrickson v Hodkin, 276 NY 252; Dillon v Rocka-way Beach Hosp., 284 NY 176.) III. Subtraction of collateral source payments is required, both in medical malpractice actions and in negligence actions claiming improper delivery of medical services. (Coyne v Campbell, 11 NY2d 372; Healy v Rennert, 9 NY2d 202; Drinkwater v Dinsmore, 80 NY 390; Rutzen v Monroe County Long Term Care Program, 104 Mise 2d 1000.)</p> <p>I. This court should not review questions of fact decided by the Court of Claims and affirmed by the court below. (Mangold v Neuman, 57 NY2d 627; Howard v Murray, 38 NY2d 695; 67 Wall St. Co. v Franklin Nat. Bank, 37 NY2d 245; Pfohl v Wipperman, 34 NY2d 597; Láveme v Incorporated Vil. of Laurel Hollow, 18 NY2d 635, 386 US 682; Matter of Farrell v Drew, 19 NY2d 486; Gutin v Mascali & Sons, 11 NY2d 97; Goehle v Town ofSmithtown, 55 NY2d 995; Felt v Olson, 51 NY2d 977; Electrolux Corp. v Val-Worth, Inc., 6 NY2d 556.) II. The lower courts’ determination of negligence is amply supported by the record and should be affirmed. (Topel u Long Is. Jewish Med. Center, 55 NY2d 682; Hirsh v State of New York, 8 NY2d 125; Comiskey v State of New York, 71 AD2d 699; Liddie v State of New York, 190 Mise 347; Zophy v State of New York, 27 AD2d 414; Collins v State of New York, 23 AD2d 898,17 NY2d 542; Callahan v State of New York, 179 Mise 781, 266 App Div 1054; Brown v State of New York, 84 AD2d 644; Cohen v State of New York, 51 AD2d 494, 41 NY2d 1086; Wright v State of New York, 31 AD2d 421.) III. The decision of the Court of Claims, as affirmed by the court below, is not in conflict with decisions of this court. {Topel v Long Is. Jewish Med. Center, 55 NY2d 682; Fieder-lein v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 80 AD2d 821, 56 NY2d 573; Koenigsmark v State of New York, 80 AD2d 707, 55 NY2d 928; Cohen v State of New York, 51 AD2d 494; Bell v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 90 AD2d 270; Centeno u City of New York, 48 AD2d 812, 40 NY2d 932.) IV. The collateral source rule should not be overturned or modified. {Healy v Rennert, 9 NY2d 202; Silinsky v State-Wide Ins. Co., 30 AD2d 1; Cady v City of New York, 19 AD2d 822, 14 NY2d 660; Castleberry v Hudson Val. Asphalt Corp., 60 AD2d 878; Luddy v State of New York, 50 Mise 2d 992; Eichel v New York Cent. R.R. Co., 375 US 253; New York State Thruway Auth. v Civetta Constr. Corp., 62 AD2d 530; Hale v State of New York, 53 AD2d 1025; Twitchell v MacKay, 78 AD2d 125; Gioia v State of New York, 22 AD2d 181.)</p>

Und.er the Fourth Amendment and section 12 of article I of the New York State Constitution, the police, without a warrant and in the absence of exigent circumstances, may not enter a private dwelling to arrest its occupant solely because the occupant has opened his door in response to a neighbor’s knock.

Appellant’s admissions and the shotgun seized from his car should have been suppressed as the products of an illegal seizure. (People v Cantor, 36 NY2d 106; Brown v Illinois, 422 US 590; People v De Bour, 40 NY2d 210; People v Sobotker, 43 NY2d 559; People v Ingle, 36 NY2d 413; People v Rodney P. [Anonymous], 21 NY2d 1; People v Carrasquillo, 54 NY2d 248; People v Duncan, 75 AD2d 823; People v Engle, 74 AD2d 583; People v Taylor, 76 AD2d 892.) II.

<p>POINTS OF COUNSEL</p> <p>I. The “Shield Law” of the State of New York is not a barrier to the disclosure ordered by the trial court. (.People v Monroe, 82 Mise 2d 850; Matter of Andrews v Andreoli, 92 Mise 2d 410; People v Zagarino, 97 Mise 2d 181; Branzburg v Hayes, 408 US 665; New York Times Co. v Sullivan, 376 US 254; People v Cruz, 48 NY2d 419; People v Iannaccone, 112 Mise 2d 1057; People v Le Grand, 67 AD2d 446; Matter of Back [Beni Broadcasting}, 101 Mise 2d 490; Matter of Wolf v People, 69 Mise 2d 256, 39 AD2d 864.) II. The sanctions imposed by the court below were appropriate since defendants-respondents willfully violated an order for pretrial discovery crucial to plaintiffs-appellants’ cause of action. (Matter of Porter, 64 Mise 2d 1016; Katz v Travelers Ind. Co., 39 AD2d 516; Electorque Assoc, v Ar-verne Houses, 73 AD2d 682; Katz v Katz, 68 AD2d 536; Rodriguez v Sklar, 56 AD2d 537; Rosenberg v Trachtman, 103 Mise 2d 472; Bycel v Freeman, 95 Mise 2d 270; Feingold v Walworth Bros., 238 NY 446; People v Henriques & Co., 267 NY 398; Chapadeau v Utica Observer-Dispatch, 38 NY2d 196.)</p> <p>I. The court should direct the entry of an order dismissing the complaint. (New York Times Co. v Sullivan, 376 US 254; James v Gannett Co., 40 NY2d 415; Rinaldi v Holt, Reinhart & Winston, 42 NY2d 369; Orr v Lynch, 60 AD2d 949, 45 NY2d 903; Trails West v Wolff, 32 NY2d 207; Greenberg v CBS, Inc., 69 AD2d 693; Kadish v Dressner, 86 AD2d 622; Di Lorenzo v New York News, 78 AD2d 669; Brown v Johnson Newspapers Corp., 84 AD2d 636.) II. The Shield Law of the State of New York is a barrier to disclosure. (Hennigan v Buffalo Courier Express Co., 85 AD2d 924; Matter of Superior Ct. ofN.J. [Jascalevich], 63 AD2d 903; Matter of Wolf v People, 69 Mise 2d 256, 39 AD2d 864; People v Marahan, 81 Mise 2d 637; People v Le Grand, 67 AD2d 446; People v Fischer, 41 AD2d 687.) III. Assuming, arguendo that New York State Shield Law does not apply, the balance of interests test protects respondent from disclosure. (Branzburg v Hayes, 408 US 665; Garland v Torre, 259 F2d 545, 358 US 910; Cervantes v Time, Inc., 464 F2d 986, 409 US 1125; Shultz v Readers Digest Assn., 468 F Supp 551; Schwartz v Time, Inc., 71 Mise 2d 769.) IV. The ultimate and severe sanctions imposed by Special Term were improper and an abuse of discretion. (Feingold v Walworth Bros., 238 NY 446; People v Henriques & Co., 267 NY 398; Láveme v Incorporated Vil. of Laurel Hollow, 18 NY2d 635.)</p>

POINTS OF COUNSEL The courts of this State lack subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate claims based on alleged breaches of duty by trustees of an employee benefit plan covered by ERISA. (Alessi v Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 US 504; Nach-man Corp. v Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 US 359; Malone v White Motor Corp., 435 US 497, 444 US 911; Hotel & Rest. Employees & Bartenders Int. Union v Dan-zinger, 709 F2d 815; Stone & Webster Eng.

Since the Attorney-General’s office lacks jurisdiction pursuant to section 399-n of article 26-A of the General Business Law to conduct a general, “in-house,” criminal investigation into the possible acceptance of unlawful gratuities by box office employees of the sports arena, the subpoenas issued to the individual appellants herein must be quashed. (People v Boulet, 88 Mise 2d 353; Matter of District Attorney of Suffolk County, 58 NY2d 436.) II.

Appellant was improperly adjudicated a persistent violent felony offender (a) on the basis of two prior violent felony convictions obtained on the same date, a sentencing which would be impermissible under the discretionary sentencing scheme for persistent felons, and (b) because the 1978 persistent violent felony offender statute (Penal Law, § 70.08) is unconstitutional as applied to appellant because it ex post facto classifies his pre-1978 offenses as “violent felonies”.

Since there are no ambiguities and uncertainties as to meaning of the insurance policy, Travelers is entitled to have its contract of insurance enforced without a construction contrary to its express terms. (Gertner u Glens Falls Ins. Co., 193 App Div 836, 233 NY 568; Jacobs v Maryland Cas. Co., 198 App Div 470, 234 NY 622; Breed v Insurance Co. of North Amer., 46 NY2d 351; Johnson v Travelers Ins. Co., 269 NY 401; Warren v Postal Life Ins.

Section 79-h of the Civil Rights Law permits reporter Beach, to withhold the identity of his news source from the Grand Jury under the facts of the instant case, (jHennigan v Buffalo Courier Express Co., 85 AD2d 924; Greenburg v CBS Inc., 69 AD2d 693; People [Fischer] Dan, 41 AD2d 687, 32 NY2d 613; People v Monroe, 82 Mise 2d 850; Hammelburger v Foursom Inn Corp., 54 NY2d 580; Burns Jackson Miller Summit & Spitzer v Lindner, 59 NY2d 314; People v lannaccone, 112 Mise 2d…

<p>POINTS OF COUNSEL</p> <p>I. There is no legal precedent, in case law or statute, for what the Town Board did in this case. {Board of Supervisors v Bowen, 4 Lans 24; Matter of Town Bd. v Zoning Bd., 7 Mise 2d 210; Bowman v Squillace, 74 AD2d 887; Matter ofBachety v Volz, 65 Mise 2d 176, 39 AD2d 842; Town of Greece v Smith, 256 App Div 886; Matter ofAndgar Assoc, v Board of Zoning Appeals, 30 AD2d 672, 22 NY2d 648; Blumberg v Town of North Hempstead, 114 Mise 2d 8; Jaffe v Burns, 64 AD2d 692.) II. Under the circumstances of this case, the Zoning Board was authorized to employ its own counsel. (Cahn v Town of Huntington, 29 NY2d 451; Hanna v Rewkowski, 81 Mise 2d 498; Judson v City of Niagara Falls, 140 App Div 62, 204 NY 630.)</p> <p>I. The Town Board alone had the power to settle this proceeding. (Berean v Town of Lloyd, 3 AD2d 585; Cahn v Town of Huntington, 29 NY2d 451; Matter ofWeinstock v Long, 29 Mise 2d 795; Matter of Levy v Board of Stds. & Appeals, 267 NY 347; Matter of Clark v Board of Zoning-Appeals, 301 NY 86; Matter of Mirschel v Weissenberger, 277 App Div 1039.) II. The Town Board not only had the power but the duty to consider settlement of the proceeding. {Matter of Foster v Saylor, 85 AD2d 876.) III. The Zoning Board had no authority to retain counsel or to defend this proceeding contrary to the wishes of the Town Board. {Matter of Fleischmann v Graves, 235 NY 84; Matter ofHiscox v Holmes, 239 App Div 602; Judson v City of Niagara Falls, 140 App Div 62; Blumberg v Town of North Hempstead, 114 Mise 2d 8; Matter of Weinstock v Long, 29 Mise 2d 795.)</p> <p>I. The Zoning Board and its counsel had notice of the Town Board’s actions. {Matter ofWeinstock v Long, 29 Mise 2d 795; Matter ofKovorsky v Housing & Dev. Admin., 31 NY2d 184; Matter of Overhill Bldg. Co. v Delany, 28 NY2d 449; Adee u Arnow, 91 Hun 329; Cahn v Town of Huntington, 29 NY2d 451.) II. The Town Board had authority to withdraw the appeal since it alone has the authority to control the progress of litigation. (Blumberg u Town of North Hempstead, 114 Mise 2d 8; Cahn u Town of Huntington, 29 NY2d 451; Matter ofWeinstock v Long, 29 Mise 2d 795.) III. The Zoning Board of Appeals was not authorized to engage counsel either expressly or impliedly. (Cahn v Town of Huntington, 29 NY2d 451.)</p>

<p>POINTS OF COUNSEL</p> <p>I. Defendant’s guilt was proved beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v Butler, 86 AD2d 811, 57 NY2d 664.) II. Read realistically and in a commonsense manner, CPL 300.50 (subd 1) provides that the failure to object to the submission of a lesser offense waives any claim that the offense submitted was not necessarily included in the offense charged. (People v Henderson, 41 NY2d 233; Zappone v Home Ins. Co., 55 NY2d 131; People v Stevenson, 31 NY2d 108; People ex rel. Wachowicz v Martin, 293 NY 361; People ex rel. Tanner v Vincent, 44 AD2d 170, 36 NY2d 773; People v Foster, 19 NY2d 150; People v Legacy, 4 AD2d 453; People v Dekle, 56 NY2d 835; People ex rel. Prince v Brophy, 273 NY 90.) III. Since defendant conceded, and the evidence established, his guilt of petit larceny, the court below erred in not modifying the conviction by reducing it to petit larceny, a lesser included offense of both robbery and grand larceny. (.People v Holmes, 52 NY2d 976; People v Mayo, 48 NY2d 245; People v Dlugash, 41 NY2d 725.)</p> <p>I. Respondent’s conviction for grand larceny in the third degree was secured in violation of due process where (a) it was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the complainant’s money was taken from his person, a necessary element of grand larceny in the third degree; and (b) the decision to acquit respondent of the robbery counts in the indictment and to convict him of grand larceny in the third degree was repugnant and without a rational basis. (<Jackson v Virginia, 443 US 307; Matter ofWinship, 397 US 358; People v Haymes, 34 NY2d 639; People v Garcia, 72 AD2d 356, 52 NY2d 716; People v Pugh, 36 AD2d 845, 29 NY2d 909, 406 US 921; People v Carhonell, 40 NY2d 948; United States v Maybury, 274 F2d 899; People v Tucker, 55 NY2d 1; United States v Wilson, 342 F2d 43.) II. The court below correctly concluded that the waiver provision of CPL 300.50 (subd 1) does not apply to the improper submission of a noninclu-sory offense since subject matter jurisdiction may not be waived by a defendant. (.People v Glover, 57 NY2d 61; People ex rel. Gray v Tekben, 68 AD2d 176, 57 NY2d 651; People v Fischer, 94 AD2d 706; People v Camilloni, 92 AD2d 745; People v Panuccio, 90 AD2d 507; People v Harper, 37 NY2d 96; People v Nicometi, 12 NY2d 428; Matter of Hogan v Supreme Ct. ofN. Y., 295 NY 92; Matter of Morhous v Supreme Ct. ofN. Y., 293 NY 131; People ex rel. Keitt v McMann, 18 NY2d 257.) III. The court below did not abuse the broad discretion afforded it under CPL 470.15 by reversing respondent’s conviction and ordering the dismissal of the indictment. {People v Holmes, 52 NY2d 976; People v Mayo, 48 NY2d 245.)</p> <p>Appellant was deprived of his right to due process of law when the court erroneously convicted him of reckless assault with a dangerous instrument, since this crime is not a lesser included offense of reckless manslaughter. (Russell v United States, 369 US 749; People v Moyer, 27 NY2d 252; People v Acevedo, 40 NY2d 701; People v Graham, 44 NY2d 768; People v Green, 56 NY2d 427.)</p> <p>I. Appellant’s guilt of assault in the second degree was established beyond a reasonable doubt. {People v Rumaner, 45 AD2d 290; People v Cwikla, 46 NY2d 434; People v Ozarowski, 38 NY2d 481; People v Carter, 53 NY2d 113.) II. The new interpretation of “lesser included offense,” as announced in People v Glover, should not be applied retroactively. {People v Green, 56 NY2d 427; People v Glover, 57 NY2d 61; People ex rel. Gray v Tekben, 68 AD2d 176, 57 NY2d 651; People v Cionek, 35 NY2d 924; People v Hayes, 35 NY2d 907\ People v Warren, 43 NY2d 852; People v Lett, 39 NY2d 966; People v Johnson, 39 NY2d 364; People v Lee, 39 NY2d 388; People v Grier, 37 NY2d 847; People v Stanfield, 36 NY2d 467; People v Rivers, 59 AD2d 847.) III. Appellant’s failure to object to the submission of assault in the second degree as a lesser included offense of manslaughter in the second degree precludes any claim that the submitted offense was not necessarily included in the charged offense.</p> <p>The trial court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction to convict appellant of a crime for which he was not indicted and which was not a lesser included offense of the counts charged could not be waived by appellant’s request for submission of the noninclusory offense. {People ex rel. Gray v Tekben, 68 AD2d 176, 57 NY2d 651; People v Davis, 96 AD2d 748; People v Fischer, 94 AD2d 706; Cancemi v People, 18 NY 128; People v Patterson, 39 NY2d 288, affd sub nom. Patterson v New York, 432 US 197; Matter of Simonson v Cahn, 27 NY2d 1; People v Miles, 289 NY 360; People ex rel. Battista v Christian, 249 NY 314; People v Miguel, 53 NY2d 920; Cox v Katz, 22 NY2d 903.)</p>

<p>POINTS OF COUNSEL</p> <p>I. The record discloses that appellant did not knowingly and intelligently waive his Miranda rights. (.Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; Johnson v Zerbst, 304 US 458; People v Lux, 29 NY2d 848; People v Tigner, 48 AD2d 762; People v Chaffee, 42 AD2d 172; People v White, 85 AD2d 787.) II. Under the totality of the circumstances the confessions were involuntary. (.Rogers v Richmond, 365 US 534; People v Bay, 76 AD2d 592; Bram v United States, 168 US 532; United States v Goray-ska, 482 F Supp 576; Hutto v Ross, 429 US 28; People v Phillips, 42 NY 200; People v Valletutti, 297 NY 226; People v Helstrom, 50 AD2d 685; People v Boykins, 81 AD2d 922; Blackburn v Alabama, 361 US 199.)</p> <p>I. The court should not set aside as a matter of law, the factual finding, affirmed by the court below, that defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. {People v Harrell, 59 NY2d 620; People v Young, 48 NY2d 955; People v Love, 57 NY2d 998; People v Montanez, 90 AD2d 476; People v Morales, 62 AD2d 946; People v Brundige, 43 AD2d 1009; People v Bruce, 62 AD2d 1073; United States v Isom, 588 F2d 858; People v Kelly, 67 AD2d 1009; People v Wofford, 46 NY2d 962.) II. An examination of the totality of the circumstances establishes that defendant’s statements were voluntary; their admission did not offend, as a matter of law, due process. {People v Leonard, 59 AD2d 1; Rogers v Richmond, 365 US 534; Clewis v Texas, 386 US 707; People v Anderson, 42 NY2d 35; People v Bay, 76 AD2d 592, 54 NY2d 808; Bram v United States, 168 US 532; People v Taylor, 87 AD2d 771, 57 NY2d 729; People v Calhoun, 78 AD2d 658; United States ex rel. Graham v Mancusi, 457 F2d 463; People v Brown, 63 AD2d 584.) III. Defendant’s statements should not be deemed untrustworthy merely because the facts recounted therein do not precisely accord with all the evidence ultimately adduced at trial; moreover, this issue has not been preserved for the court’s review. {People v Schompert, 19 NY2d 300, 389 US 874.)</p>

<p>POINTS OF COUNSEL</p> <p>I. The May 12 and September 23, 1977 orders of attachment obtained by Ford Motor Credit Company validly attached personal and real property of Mary I. Hickey. {Zenith Bathing Pavilion v Fair Oaks S. S. Corp., 240 NY 307; Cohn v Children's Furniture Corp., 133 Mise 151; Rehill v Rehill, 202 Mise 865; Empire State Collateral Co. v Cassell Custards, 29 Mise 2d 505; Potter v Rowland, 8 NY 448; Mechanics Exch. Sav. Bank v Chesterfield, 34 AD2d 111.) II. The Hoehns, as privies of Mary I. Hickey, are estopped from collaterally attacking the validity of the orders of attachment. {Schwartz v Public Administrator, 24 NY2d 65; Downey v Seib, 185 NY 427; Hojverhill v International Ry. Co., 217 App Div 521, 244 NY 582; St. Louis Baptist Temple v Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 605 F2d 1169; Matter of News-day, Inc. v Ross, 80 AD2d 1.) III. Even if the vacatur of the attachment by the court below is affirmed, strict construction of CPLR article 62 requires a determination that respondents are not entitled to damages. {Valentine Dolls v McMillan, 25 Mise 2d 551.) IV. The court below properly reversed Special Term’s award of damages to the Hoehns for emotional trauma, because the record failed to support a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. {Miller v Stern, 262 App Div 5; Lichter v Interwoven Stocking Co., 234 App Div 204; Silverman v Ufa Eastern Div. Distr., 135 Mise 814; Hauser v Bartow, 273 NY 370.) V. If CPLR 6212 (subd [e]) is construed as allowing damages for emotional distress caused by a wrongful attachment, the Hoehns must prove that their claim meets the elements of a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, or in the alternative, that Ford acted with actual or legal malice. VI. The dicta in Cullen v Nassau County Civ. Serv. Comm. (53 NY2d 429), which permits an award of damages for emotional distress without requiring plaintiff to prove that defendant acted with intent, is inapplicable to the instant case. {Matter of Imperial Diner v State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 52 NY2d 72; York Inst, of Technology v State Div. of Human Rights, 40 NY2d 316; Gaynor v Rockefeller, 15 NY2d 120; Valentine Dolls v McMillan, 25 Mise 2d 551.)</p> <p>I. The May 12, 1977, order of attachment granted by Judge Robert J. Sise was jurisdictionally defective to attach any property then owned by Mary I. Hickey individually. {Zenith Bathing Pavilion vFair Oaks S. S. Corp., 240 NY 307; Packer v Caesars World, 54 AD2d 676; AMF Inc. v Algo Distrs., 48 AD2d 352.) II. The purported levy against this real property performed by the Sheriff on September 9, 1977, and filed on that day by the Sheriff in the Albany County Clerk’s office became invalid by failure to obtain a confirming order. {Nemetsky v Banque de Developpement de la Republique du Niger, 64 AD2d 694.) III. The decision and order of the lower court is based on a material mistake of fact. IV. The Sise order and the levy upon the Sise order are invalid against Mary Hickey on the ground that the statute upon which it appears to be based was unconstitutional. {Sugar v Curtis Circulation Co., 383 F Supp 643; AMF Inc. v Algo Distrs., 48 AD2d 352.) V. The issue of collateral estoppel is not properly before this court. {Flagg v Nichols, 307 NY 96; Slater v Gallman, 38 NY2d 1; Rice v Ritz Assoc., 58 NY2d 923; Troy Auto. Exch. v Home Ins. Co., 221 NY 58; People u Rodriguez y Paz, 58 NY2d 327; Gramatan Home Investors Co. v Lopez, 46 NY2d 481; Schwartz v Public Administrators, 24 NY2d 65; Capital Tel. Co. v Pattersonville Tel. Co., 56 NY2d 11.) VI. Cross appellants are entitled to the damages awarded by the trial court. {Fischer v Maloney, 43 NY2d 553; Murphy v American Home Prods. Corp., 58 NY2d 293; Mitchell v Grant Co., 416 US 600; Cullen v Nassau County Civ. Serv. Comm., 53 NY2d 492.)</p> <p>I. There was no allegation sufficient to sustain attachment of the realty of Mary I. Hickey. {Zenith Bathing Pavilion v Fair Oaks S. S. Corp., 240 NY 307; Trigo Hnos. v Premium Wholesale Groceries, 424 F Supp 1118; MacMillan, Inc. v Hafner, 42 AD2d 533; AMF Inc. v Algo Distrs., 48 AD2d 352.) II. The ex parte May 12, 1977 order of attachment and notice was never properly served upon Mary I. Hickey. {Shapiro v Loft, Inc., 142 Mise 144.) III. The notice of attachment of the real property filed September 9,1977 based upon the May 12,1977 order was invalid. {Carey v Sugar, 425 US 73; Trigo Hnos. v Premium Wholesale Groceries, 424 F Supp 1118.) IV. The attachment of the realty of codefendant, Mary I. Hickey, was jurisdic-tionally defective and is subject to collateral attack. {Steuben County Bank v Alberger, 75 NY 179, 83 NY 274.) V. The award of attorneys’ fees to respondents Hoehn and State Bank was proper.</p>

<p>POINTS OF COUNSEL</p> <p>I. Defendant’s right to counsel had attached before his statement was taken. (.Matter of Ella B., 30 NY2d 352; Matter of Vance A., 105 Mise 2d 254; People v Steele, 113 Mise 2d 658; Matter of Madeline G. v David R., 95 Mise 2d 273; Matter of Marilyn H., 106 Mise 2d 972; Matter of Shalom S., 88 AD2d 936; People v Settles, 46 NY2d 154; People v Blake, 35 NY2d 331; Kirby v Illinois, 406 US 682; People v Skinner, 52 NY2d 24.) II. Under the circumstances of this case, defendant did not voluntarily and intelligently waive his right to counsel. CMiranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; People v Woodard, 64 AD2d 517.)</p> <p>I. The right to counsel did not indelibly attach and the statement was properly deemed admissible. {People v Hobson, 39 NY2d 479; People v Arthur, 22 NY2d 325; People v Donovan, 13 NY2d 148; People v Cunningham, 49 NY2d 203; People v Skinner, 52 NY2d 24; People v Hopkins, 58 NY2d 1079; People v Johnson, 55 NY2d 931; People v Claudio, 59 NY2d 556; People v Settles, 46 NY2d 154; People v Wilson, 56 NY2d 692.) II. Defendant’s statement was a result of his knowing and voluntary waiver of his rights. {People v Hopkins, 58 NY2d 1079; People v Anderson, 42 NY2d 35; Clewis v Texas, 386 US 707; People v Leonard, 59 AD2d 1; People v Buxton, 44 NY2d 33; Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; People v Swift, 32 AD2d 183, 396 US 1018; People v Campbell, 81 AD2d 300; North Carolina v Butler, 441 US 369; People v Norris, 75 AD2d 650.)</p>

<p>POINTS OF COUNSEL</p> <p>I. The report of violation of parole was correctly received into evidence under the business records exception to the hearsay rule. {Palmer v Hoffman, 318 US 109; Morrissey v Brewer, 408 US 471; People v Foster, 27 NY2d 47.) II. The record of the final revocation hearing contained sufficient evidence to support the finding that respondent violated his parole.</p> <p>I. The report of violation of parole is an accusatory instrument and cannot be characterized as a business record. {Morrissey v Brewer, 408 US 471; Lichtenstein u Montefiore Hosp. & Med. Center, 56 AD2d 281.) II. There was insufficient evidence to sustain any violation of parole. {People ex rel. Wallace v State of New York, 70 AD2d 781; People ex rel. Warren v Mancusi, 40 AD2d 279; Morrissey v Brewer, 408 US 471; People ex rel. Gambino v Warden, 43 AD2d 400; People ex rel. Walker v Hammock, 78 AD2d 369; People ex rel. Gaskin v Smith, 55 AD2d 1004.)</p>

<p>POINTS OF COUNSEL</p> <p>I. The courts below erred in holding that Document Nos. 17, 93, 95, 99, 102, 103, 104 and 152, created and/or executed by petitioners and given to an attorney for the purpose of obtaining legal advice, are not within the scope of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. (Schmer-ber v California, 384 US 757; Fisher u United States, 425 US 391; Beilis v United States, 417 US 85; United States v White, 322 US 694; Boyd u United States, 116 US 616; Matter of Vanderbilt [Rosner — Hickey], 57 NY2d 66; United States v Davis, 636 F2d 1028, 454 US 862; Wilson v United States, 221 US 361; Matter of Katz, 623 F2d 122.) II. Document Nos. 36, 98, 121 and 148 are immune from compelled disclosure under the attorney-client privilege. (Upjohn Co. v United States, 449 US 383; Matter of Priest v Hennessy, 51 NY2d 62; Matter of Horowitz, 482 F2d 72,414 US 867,1052; United States v Kovel, 296 F2d 918; Matter of Jacqueline F., 47 NY2d 215; People v Beige, 59 AD2d 307; Matter of Vanderbilt [Rosner — Hickey], 57 MY2d 66.)</p> <p>I. The courts below correctly ruled that Document Nos. 17, 93, 95, 99, 102, 103, 104 and 152 must be produced. Document No. 93 would not even have been privileged by the Fifth Amendment in an appellant’s hands, and all of the documents were transferred to the attorney outside the scope of the attorney-client privilege. (Fisher v United States, 425 US 391; Matter of Vanderbilt [Rosner — Hickey], 57 NY2d 66; United States v White, 322 US 694; Matter of Jacqueline F., 47 NY2d 215; Matter of Priest v Hennessy, 51 NY2d 62; Rosseau v Bleau, 131 NY 177; People v Beige, 59 AD2d 307; Finn v Morgan, 46 AD2d 229; United States v McDonald, 313 F2d 832; Matter of Levin-sky, 23 AD2d 25.) II. The court below correctly ruled that Document Nos. 36, 98,121 and 148 must be produced; none of these documents is protected by the attorney-client privilege. (People v Burrows, 46 NY2d 957; Matter of Priest v Hennessy, 51 NY2d 62; United States v Kovel, 296 F2d 918.)</p>

POINTS OF COUNSEL Section 45 of the Judiciary Law requires that Commission records requested by a Grand Jury’s subpoena duces tecum remain confidential and not be provided to the Grand Jury.

<p>POINTS OF COUNSEL</p> <p>I. Plaintiff should be required to meet the liability standards articulated in Chapadeau v Utica Observer-Dispatch. (New York Times Co. v Sullivan, 376 US 254; Curtis Pub. Co. v Butts, 388 US 130; St.Amant v Thompson, 390 US 727; Trails West v Wolff, 32 NY2d 207; Rosenbloom v Metromedia, 403 US 29; Gertz v Robert Welch, Inc., 418 US 323; Chapadeau v Utica Observer-Dispatch, 38 NY2d 196; Cottom v Meredith Corp., 65 AD2d 165; Campo Lindo v New York Post Corp., 65 AD2d 650; Greenberg v CBS Inc., 69 AD2d 693.) II. Defendants’ investigation was sufficient to entitle them to summary judgment dismissing the claim for compensatory damages. (Long Is. Cent. Sta. v New York Tel. Co., 54 AD2d 893; Matter of Coniber v Hults, 15 AD2d 252; Warren v New York Tel. Co., 70 Mise 2d 794; Hong Kong Export Credit Ins. Corp. v Dun & Bradstreet, 414 F Supp 153; Robart v Post-Standard, 74 AD2d 963, 52 NY2d 843; Carlucci v Poughkeepsie Newspapers, 88 AD2d 608, 57 NY2d 883; Campo Lindo v New York Post Corp., 65 AD2d 650; Ithaca Coll, v Yale Daily News Pub. Co., 105 Mise 2d 793, 85 AD2d 817; Trails West u Wolff, 32 NY2d 207; Droner v Schapp, 34 AD2d 823.) III. Because there is no evidence of actual malice, the claim for punitive damages should be dismissed. (Gertz v Robert Welch, Inc., 418 US 323; New York Times Co. v Sullivan, 376 US 254; Ithaca Coll, v Yale Daily News Pub. Co., 105 Mise 2d 793; Buckley v Littell, 539 F2d 882,429 US 1062; Orr v Lynch, 60 AD2d 949,45 NY2d 903; Droner v Schapp, 34 AD2d 823; Roche v Hearst Corp., 72 AD2d 245, 53 NY2d 767; Malerba v Newsday, Inc., 64 AD2d 623.) IV. The article is not reasonably capable of defaming plaintiff. {James v Gannett Co., 40 NY2d 415; Tracy v Newsday, Inc., 5 NY2d 134; Smith v Staten Is. Advance Co., 194 Mise 299; El Meson Español v NYM Corp., 521 F2d 737; Ladany v Morrow & Co., 465 F Supp 870; Korry v International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 444 F Supp 193.) V. Summary judgment is an appropriate remedy in cases like the one in bar. {Fischer v Brockway Co., 14 AD2d 632; Holy Spirit Assn, v Harper & Row, 101 Mise 2d 30; Karaduman v Newsday, Inc., 51 NY2d 531; Guitar v Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 396 F Supp 1042, 538 F2d 309; DeLuca v New York News, 109 Mise 2d 341; Ithaca Coll, v Yale Daily News Pub. Co., 105 Mise 2d 793; Yiamouyiannis v Consumers Union, 619 F2d 932, 449 US 839; Roche v Hearst Corp., 53 NY2d 767; Robart v Post-Standard, 52 NY2d 843.)</p> <p>I. The moving papers are insufficient to warrant the granting of summary judgment. {Executive Securities Corp. v Gray, 67 AD2d 860; Stainless, Inc. v Employers’ Fire Ins. Co., 69 AD2d 27, 49 NY2d 924; Friends of Animals v Associated Fur Mfrs., 46 NY2d 1065; Columbia Programming Unlimited v Columbia Broadcasting Systems, 50 AD2d 351; Greenberg v Man-Ion Realty, 43 AD2d 968.) II. Plaintiff has raised questions of fact which should be determined after trial. (.Hutchinson v Proxmire, 443 US 111; Wolston v Reader’s Digest Assn., 443 US 157; Karaduman v Newsday, Inc., 51 NY2d 531; Hong Kong Export Credit Ins. Corp. v Dun & Bradstreet, 414 F Supp 153; St. Amant v Thompson, 390 US 727; Di Lorenzo v New York News, 81 AD2d 844; Greenberg v CBS Inc., 69 AD2d 693; Russo v Padouano, 84 AD2d 925; Cottom v Meredith Corp., 65 AD2d 165.) III. The published statement is libelous. (Hogan u Herald Co., 84 AD2d 470, 58 NY2d 630; Mencher v Chesley, 297 NY 94; Rinaldi v Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 42 NY2d 369, 434 US 969; Julian v American Business Consultants, 2 NY2d 1; James v Gan-nett Co., 40 NY2d 415; Tracy u Newsday, Inc., 5 NY2d 134; Cassidy v Gannett Co., 173 Mise 634; November v Time Inc., 13 NY2d 175; Schermerhorn v Rosenberg, 73 AD2d 276.) IV. The defamatory statements are not protected by a constitutional privilege. (.Rupert v Sellers, 65 AD2d 473; Chaplinsky v New Hampshire, 315 US 568; James v Gan-nett Co., 40 NY2d 415.) V. The rule set forth in Chapadeau v Utica Observer-Dispatch does not apply in this case. 0Chapadeau v Utica Observer-Dispatch, 38 NY2d 196; Trails West v Wolff, 32 NY2d 207; Cottom v Meredith Corp., 65 AD2d 165; Karaduman v Newsday, Inc., 51 NY2d 531.) VI. Publication by appellants was negligent. (Gertz v Robert Welch, Inc., 418 US 323; Mink v Keim, 291 NY 300; Andre v Pomeroy, 35 NY2d 361; Hoggard v Otis Elevator Co., 52 Mise 2d 704, 28 AD2d 1207; Morris v Troy Sav. Bank, 32 AD2d 237, 28 NY2d 619; Chapadeau v Utica Observer-Dispatch, 38 NY2d 196; Havas v Victory Paper Stock Co., 49 NY2d 381; St. Amant v Thompson, 390 US 727.) VII. Respondent is entitled to a judgment for punitive damages based upon appellants reckless disregard for the truth. (Vasquez v O’Brien, 85 AD2d 791; Di Lorenzo v New York News, 81 AD2d 844.) VIII. The facts in the present case differ substantially from those cases cited by appellants.</p> <p>I. The court below should have applied the Chapadeau gross irresponsibility standard. (Chapa-deau v Utica Observer-Dispatch, 38 NY2d 196; James v Gannett Co., 40 NY2d 415; Gertz v Robert Welch, Inc., 418 US 323; Karaduman v Newsday, Inc., 51 NY2d 531; Washington Post Co. v Keogh, 365 F2d 965, 385 US 1011; Rinaldi v Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 42 NY2d 369, 434 US 969; Gregoire v Biddle, ill F2d 579; Columbia Broadcasting v Democratic Committee, 412 US 94; Miami Herald Pub. Co. v Tornillo, 418 US 241; Rosenbloom v Metrome-dia, 403 US 29.) II. The punitive damages claim should have been dismissed. (Gertz u Robert Welch, Inc., 418 US 323; New York Times Co. v Sullivan, 376 US 254; Reliance Ins. Co. v Barron’s, 442 F Supp 1341; St. Amant v Thompson, 390 US 727; Carson v Allied News Co., 529 F2d 206; Bruno v New York News, 89 AD2d 260.) III. Summary judgment is the appropriate method of disposition where constitutional privilege applies. {Martin Marietta Corp. v Evening Star Newspaper Co., 417 F Supp 947; Bon Air Hotel v Time, Inc., 426 F2d 858; Trails West v Wolff, 32 NY2d 207; Rinaldi v Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 42 NY2d 369, 434 US 969; Hutchinson v Proxmire, 443 US 111; Yiamouyiannis v Consumers Union, 619 F2d 932, 449 US 839; Schultz v Newsweek, Inc., 668 F2d 911; National Nutritional Foods Assn, v Whelan, 492 F Supp 374; Steaks Unlimited v Deaner, 623 F2d 264; Church of Scientology v Siegelman, 475 F Supp 950, 481 F Supp 866.)</p>

The decision of the court below did not conform to the decision of the Family Court. II. The particular facts, in the case at bar, require a finding that subdivision (e) of section 1039 of the Family Court Act is constitutional. (Matter of Gary A., 60 AD2d 927; Matter of Spieluogel v Ford, 1 NY2d 558; United States v Caroline Prods.

The Manhattan & Bronx Surface Transit Operating Authority, a public benefit corporation, is not a civil division of the State, and, therefore, is not covered by section 6 of article V of the New York Constitution. (People ex rel.

Defendant’s guilt was proven beyond a reasonable doubt by overwhelming evidence. (.People v Johnson, 57 NY2d 969.) II. The court below erred as a matter of law when it reversed defendant’s conviction and ordered a new trial based upon its disapproval of the lower court’s alibi instructions; the charge, as given, properly informed the jury of the People’s burden of proof with regard to alibi.

<p>POINTS OF COUNSEL</p> <p>I. The execution of a general release does not extinguish Transamerica Insurance Company’s right of subrogation. 0Safeco Ins. Co. v Jamaica Water Supply Co., 83 AD2d 427; Cahill v Regan, 5 NY2d 292; Ocean Acc. & Guar. Corp. v Hooker Electrochemical Co., 240 NY 37; Simon v Simon, 274 App Div 447; Farnham v Farnham, 204 App Div 573; Record v Royal Globe Ins. Co., 83 AD2d 154; Camden Fire Ins. Assn, v Bleem, 132 Mise 22; Rives v Bartlett, 215 NY 33.) II. Defendant-respondent’s subrogation rights were not impaired. (Matter of Celona v Royal Globe Ins. Co., 85 AD2d 635; Royal Globe Ins. Co. v Connolly, 54 AD2d 1117; Montgomery v Daniels, 38 NY2d 41; Government Employees Ins. Co. v Halfpenny, 103 Mise 2d 128; Scinta v Kaz-mierezak, 59 AD2d 313; Record v Royal Globe Ins. Co., 83 AD2d 154; Safeco Ins. Co. v Jamaica Water Supply Co., 83 AD2d 427; Hyde v North Riv. Ins. Co., 92 AD2d 1001; United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v Stuyvesant Ins. Co., 61 AD2d 1122.) III. Execution of a general release by the insured does not bar this insurer’s recovery for first-party benefits since the insurer has a separate cause of action for first-party benefits independent of subrogation rights retained by a subrogor. (Safeco Ins. Co. v Jamaica Water Supply Co., 83 AD2d 427.) IV. The subrogation clause at bar is vague and ambiguous and, as a matter of law, must be construed against defendant-respondent Transamerica Insurance Company. v Kazmierczak, 59 AD2d 313; Janneck v Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 162 NY 574•, Dwight v Germania Life Ins. Co., 103 NY 341; Kenyon v Knights Templar & Masonic Mut. Aid Assn., 122 NY 247; Hartford Acc. & Ind. Co. v Wesolowski, 33 NY2d 169; Stainless, Inc. v Employers’ Fire Ins. Co., 69 AD2d 27, 49 NY2d 924; Johnson v Travelers Ins. Co., 269 NY 401; Perth Amboy Drydock Co. v New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 26 AD2d 517; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Bush, 46 AD2d 958; Lewis v Ocean Acc. & Guar. Corp., 224 NY 18.) V. The courts below erred in not granting plaintiff-appellant’s motion for summary judgment. (Yates v Cohoes Mem. Hosp., 64 AD2d 726; Central School Dist. No. 2 v Cohen, 60 Mise 2d 337.)</p> <p>I. No rights accrue to Transamerica by virtue of subdivision 2 of section 673 of the Insurance Law. {Country-Wide Ins. Co. v 3-M Prod. Sales, 96 AD2d 569; Royal Globe Ins. Co. v Connolly, 54 AD2d 1117; Safeco Co. v Jamaica Water Supply Co., 83 AD2d 427; Mitchell v New York Hosp., 61 NY2d 208.) II. Appellant has breached his contract with Transamerica. {Davies v Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 99 Mise 2d 899; Narus v Pixley, 88 Mise 2d 885; Loucks v Standard Oil Co., 224 NY 99; Intercontinental Hotels Corp. v Golden, 15 NY2d 9; Phillips v Transamerica Ins. Co., 107 Mise 2d 162; Security Mut. Ins. Co. v Acker-Fitzsimons Cprp., 31 NY2d 436; Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v Schulman, 70 AD2d 792, 48 NY2d 608; Record v Royal Globe Ins. Co., 83 AD2d 154; Matter of Price v State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 91 AD2d 1084.)</p>

<p>POINTS OF COUNSEL</p> <p>The warrantless search of a closed bag found in appellant’s car, conducted without any cause to believe the car or bag contained contraband, violated appellant’s State constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures since it exceeded the scope of a proper inventory search. (People v Roman, 53 NY2d 39; South Dakota v Opperman, 428 US 364; People v Belton, 55 NY2d 49; People v Farrell, 89 AD2d 987; United States v Ross, 456 US 798; Almeida-Sanchez v United States, 413 US 266; Coolidge v New Hampshire, 403 US 443; People v Etoll, 51 NY2d 840; People v Fitzpatrick, 32 NY2d 499; People v Sciacca, 57 AD2d 846, 45 NY2d 122.)</p> <p>I. Appellant was proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v Benzinger, 36 NY2d 29.) II. The examination of a paper bag found dangling from a wire under the dashboard of appellant’s automobile during a valid inventory search was reasonable and therefore proper. (People v Sullivan, 29 NY2d 69; People v Tutt, 38 NY2d 1011; People v Cedeno, 52 NY2d 847; People v Farrell, 59 NY2d 686; People v Butler, 58 NY2d 1056; People v Harrison, 57 NY2d 470; People v Perel, 34 NY2d 462; South Dakota v Opperman, 428 US 364; People v Roman, 53 NY2d 39; Arkansas v Sanders, 442 US 753.)</p>

POINTS OF COUNSEL The reversal of the suppression order by the court below was incorrect since there was no justification for either frisking appellant or breaking into his locked glove compartment.

The Appellate Division should not have given the wife an additional $20,031.77 from the husband’s Thrift Fund after the Supreme Court, upon carefully reviewing all of the facts and circumstances of the case, gave the wife nothing from said Thrift Fund. (.Rodgers v Rodgers, 98 AD2d 386; Arnold v Arnold, 52 AD2d 546; McKay v McKay, 78 AD2d 676; Jolis v Jolis, 111 Mise 2d 965; Damiano v Damiano, 94 AD2d 132; Majauskas v Majauskas, 110 Mise 2d 323.) II.

The trial court erred by failing to dismiss the information on the ground that the order banishing appellant from the State University of New York at Binghamton (SUNY-Binghamton) campus was unlawful because SUNY-Binghamton does not have the power to issue such an order and because such an order violates appellant’s constitutional right to travel freely.

The New York State Department of Environmental Conservation has exclusive jurisdiction over the freshwater wetlands area of which appellant’s property constitutes a part. II. Appellant’s property does not constitute part of freshwater wetlands and, therefore, appellant was not required to obtain a permit at any time. III. Respondents failed to comply with the act because they did not file a proper map designating the freshwater wetlands in the Town of New Castle.

Executive Order No. 53 and the implementing regulations promulgated by the Bureau of Labor Services are in all respects legal. This court should accordingly direct that a judgment be entered so declaring.

<p>POINTS OF COUNSEL</p> <p>I. Under the “totality of factors”, the tenant has violated a substantial obligation of the tenancy. {Matter of Park East Land Corp. v Finkelstein, 299 NY 70; Park WestMgt. Corp. u Mitchell, 47 NY2d 316; CopartInds. v Consolidated Edison Co., 41 NY2d 564; Rumiche Corp. v Eisenreich, 40 NY2d 174; Pollack v Greene Constr. Corp., 40 AD2d 996, 32 NY2d 720.) II. The covenant to use a premises for only residential purposes constitutes a substantial obligation of the tenancy, which the tenant has violated by engaging in a business use involving traffic flow. (930 Fifth Corp. v King, 40 AD2d 140, 31 NY2d 1046; East Riv. Housing Corp. v Matonis, 34 AD2d 937; Matter of Park East Land Corp. v Finkelstein, 299 NY 70; Park West Mgt. Corp. v Mitchell, 47 NY2d 316.)</p> <p>I. As a matter of law, a residential use clause does not prohibit nonresidential uses which do not injure the property or alter its residential character. (Matter of Park East Land Corp. v Finkelstein, 299 NY 70; Nissen v Wang, 105 Mise 2d 251; 420 East 80th Co. v Chin, 115 Mise 2d 195; Bell v Gitlitz, 65 Mise 2d 998; Vittorio Props, v Alprin, 67 Mise 2d 439; Phillipse Towers v Ortega, 61 Mise 2d 539; Schnibbe v Glenz, 245 NY 388.) II. Sound public policy supports a functional test for determining the application of the restrictive covenant in this case. (Park West Mgt. Corp. v Mitchell, 47 NY2d 316.) III. Landlord’s “bargain theory”, its “totality of factors” test and section 53 of the Rent Stabilization Code do not support landlord’s position. (Park West Mgt. Corp. v Mitchell, 47 NY2d 316; Matter of Park East Land Corp. v Finkelstein, 299 NY 70; Nissen v Wang, 105 Mise 2d 251; Vittorio Props, v Alprin, 67 Mise 2d 439; Bell v Gitlitz, 65 Mise 2d 998.) IV. Restrictive covenants in leases are disfavored and are always to be strictly construed against the landlord. (Nor-rington v Wright, 115 US 188; Helgar Corp. v Warner’s Features, 222 NY 449; O’Meara Co. v National Park Bank, 239 NY 386; Jacob & Youngs vKent, 230 NY 239; Vittorio Props, v Alprin, 67 Mise 2d 439.) V. In the absence of a showing of “actual harm” to the demised premises by tenant’s minimal use of residence to conduct counseling sessions, tenant cannot be evicted from her residence. (Matter of Park East Land Corp. v Finkelstein, 299 NY 70; Vittorio Props, v Alprin, 67 Mise 2d 439; Bell v Gitlitz, 65 Mise 2d 998; 420 East 80th Co. v Chin, 115 Mise 2d 195; Piankay Realties v Romano, 271 App Div 104, 296 NY 920; 930 Fifth Corp. v King, 40 AD2d 140, 31 NY2d 1046; East Riv. Housing Corp. v Matonis, 34 AD2d 937; Nissen v Wang, 105 Mise 2d 251; Rumiche Corp. v Eisenreich, 40 NY2d 174; Souveran Fabrics v Virginia Fibre Corp., 32 AD2d 753; Matter of Wilco Props. Corp. v Department of Environmental Conservation, 39 AD2d 6.)</p>

<p>APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL</p>

<p>POINTS OF COUNSEL</p> <p>I. The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal. II. The court below incorrectly upheld the dismissal of the complaint as untimely. (Murphy v American Home Prods. Corp., 58 NY2d 293; Cheselka v Eastern Air Lines, 93 Mise 2d 219; Matter of State Dept, of Correctional Servs. v State Div. of Human Rights, 88 AD2d 1061.) III. The courts below incorrectly dismissed appellant’s cause of action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (Bowen v State Bd. of Social Welfare, 55 AD2d 235, 45 NY2d 402; City of Schenectady v State Div. of Human Rights, 37 NY2d 421; Board ofEduc. v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 42 AD2d 49, 35 NY2d 673; Matter of Board Educ. v Carter, 14 NY2d 138; State Div. of Human Rights v State Dept, of Mental Hygiene, 85 AD2d 915; Matter of Silverman v Comptroller of State ofN. Y., 40 AD2d 225.)</p> <p>Civil actions against the State in the Supreme Court alleging wrongful termination or refusal to hire and demanding restoration with back pay, are subject to the time limitations of CPLR 217. Monetary damages, other than recovery of lost wages and expenses, are not recoverable against the State in such action. CMurphy u American Home Prods. Corp., 58 NY2d 293; Cheselka v Eastern Air Lines, 93 Mise 2d 219; Matter of State Dept, of Correctional Serus. v State Div. of Human Rights, 88 AD2d 1061; State Div. of Human Rights v State Dept, of Mental Hygiene, 85 AD2d 915; State Div. of Human Rights v Commissioner of State Dept, of Civ. Serv., 57 AD2d 699; Schaffer v Evans, 86 AD2d 708, 57 NY2d 992; Bank of N. Y. v Tully, 84 AD2d 704; Seidelman v State of New York, 202 Mise 817; Matter ofSchatzel v Connelie, 91 AD2d 1123; Matter of Miller v Ravitch, 60 NY2d 527.)</p> <p>I. The court below erred in upholding dismissal of the complaint as untimely. {Murphy v American Home Prods. Corp., 58 NY2d 293; Matter of Board of Higher Edue. v Carter, 14 NY2d 138; Matter of Burke v Sugarman, 35 NY2d 39.) II. The court below erred in concluding that discrimination by the State in barring or discharging a worker from employment is privately actionable only under CPLR article 78. {Matter of Board of Higher Edue. v Carter, 14 NY2d 138; Murphy v American Home Prods. Corp., 58 NY2d 293; Alexander v Gardner-Denver Co., 415 US 36.) III. The court below erred in holding Supreme Court to lack jurisdiction over the complaint. {State Div. of Human Rights v State Dept, of Correctional Servs., 90 AD2d 51.)</p>

<p>POINTS OF COUNSEL</p> <p>I. Because article 14 of the Retirement and Social Security Law was enacted for a limited duration, no contractual benefits were established under the New York State Constitution (art V, § 7). (Matter of Central School Dist. No. 2 u New York State Teachers’ Retirement System, 23 NY2d 213; Cook v City of Binghamton, 48 NY2d 323; Camardo v Board ofEduc., 79 AD2d 864; Patterson v Carey, 41 NY2d 714; United States Trust Co. v New Jersey, 431 US 1; Birnbaum v New York State Teachers Retirement System, 5 NY2d 1; Roddy v Valentine, 268 NY 228; Kleinfeldt v New York City Employees’ Retirement System, 36 NY2d 95; Connor v City of New York, 5 NY2d 285; Gorman v City of New York, 280 App Div 39.) II. The statutory restriction on the withdrawal of member contributions is not, in any event, an over-all impairment of contractual benefits. The net effect of article 15 is an improvement of pension benefits for Tier III members. {Dunn v City of New York, 7 NY2d 232; Michael v Bellamy, 80 AD2d 147; Heath v New York State Teachers’ Retirement Bd., 79 AD2d 838.) III. The order appealed from lacks support either in decisional authority or rational analysis. IV. Members in Tier III who elected to remain in service after September 1, 1983, the effective date of article 15 of the Retirement and Social Security Law, have no contractual right in the future to withdraw contributions made after that date, except upon reaching age 62 or earlier death. {Birnbaum v New York State Teachers Retirement System, 5 NY2d 1; Matter of Central School Dist. No. 2 v New York State Teachers’ Retirement System, 23 NY2d 213.)</p> <p>I. The new Tier III legislation (Retirement and Social Security Law, § 613, subd c) violates section 7 of article V of the New York State Constitution which prohibits diminution of pension rights. {Roddy v Valentine, 268 NY 228; Birnbaum v New York State Teachers Retirement System, 5 NY2d 1; Matter of Day v Mruk, 307 NY 349; Kleinfeldt v New York City Employees’ Retirement System, 36 NY2d 95; Matter of Ayman v Teachers’ Retirement Bd., 9 NY2d 119; Kranker v Levitt, 30 NY2d 574; Matter of Dormer v New York City Employees’ Retirement System, 33 NY2d 413; Matter ofMenna u New York City Employees’ Retirement System, 110 Mise 2d 1065; Matter of Carroll vNew York City Employees’ Retirement System, 101 Mise 2d 938; Matter of Rosenthal v New York State Employees’ Retirement System, 89 Mise 2d 616.) II. The new Tier III legislation violates section 10 of article I of the Constitution of the United States which prohibits a State from passing a law impairing the obligation of contracts. {Allied Structural Steel Co. v Spannaus, 438 US 234; United States Trust Co. v New Jersey, 431 US 1.) III. The new Tier III legislation violates section 6 of article I of the New York State Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution both of which prohibit the deprivation of life, liberty or property without due process of law. (Patterson v Carey, 41 NY2d 714.) IV. The new Tier III legislation violates section 7 of article I of the New York State Constitution which prohibits the taking of property without just compensation. V. The mandate for the refund of contributions made by original Tier III employees resulting from the unconstitutionality of the new Tier III legislation must not be limited to contributions made prior to the effective date of the statute.</p> <p>I. The 1983 Tier III legislation has impaired and diminished plaintiffs’ benefits in violation of section 7 of article V of the New York State Constitution. {Roddy v Valentine, 268 NY 228; Birnbaum v New York State Teachers Retirement System, 5 NY2d 1; Kleinfeldt v New York City Employees’ Retirement System, 36 NY2d 95; Kranker v Levitt, 30 NY2d 574; Matter of Weber v Levitt, 41 AD2d 452, 34 NY2d 797; Matter ofColler v State Univ. ofN. Y., 80 AD2d 166.) II. The contractual rights and benefits of Tier III employees who joined the State retirement system prior to September 1, 1983 are fixed and permanent notwithstanding the alleged temporary nature of the conferring statute. {Matter of Central School Dist. No. 2 v New York State Teachers’ Retirement System, 23 NY2d 213.) III. The 1983 Tier III amendments violate section 10 of article I of the United States Constitution which prohibits a State from passing a law impairing the obligations of contracts. (Bim-baum v New York State Teachers Retirement System, 5 NY2d 1; United States Trust Co. v New Jersey, 431 US 1.) IV. Subdivision c of section 613 and subdivision c of section 606 of the Retirement and Social Security Law violate the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and section 7 of article 1 of the New York State Constitution.</p> <p>I. The enactment of subdivision c of section 613 of the Retirement and Social Security Law diminishes and impairs the retirement benefits guaranteed to members who joined a public retirement system on or after July 1, 1976 and before September 1, 1983 and is violative of section 7 of article V of the New York State Constitution. (Roddy v Valentine, 268 NY 228; Matter of Day v Mruk, 307 NY 349; Birnbaum v New York State Teachers Retirement System, 5 NY2d 1; Kranker v Levitt, 30 NY2d 574; Matter of Donner v New York City Employees’ Retirement System, 33 NY2d 413; Matter of Weber v Levitt, 34 NY2d 797; Kleinfeldt v New York City Employees’ Retirement System, 36 NY2d 95; Matter of Central School Dist. No. 2 v New York State Teachers’ Retirement System, 23 NY2d 213; Mutterperl v Levitt, 89 Mise 2d 428.) II. The application of subdivision c of section 613 of the Retirement and Social Security Law to members who joined a public retirement system on or after July 1, 1976 and before September 1, 1983 constitutes an impairment of contract in violation of section 10 of article I of the United States Constitution and further constitutes a taking without just compensation and due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and sections 6 and 7 of article I of the New York State Constitution. {Home Bldg. & Loan Assn, v Blaisdell, 290 US 398; United States Trust Co. v New Jersey, 431 US 1; Allied Structural Steel Co. v Spannaus, 438 US 234; Bennett v County of Nassau, 47 NY2d 535; West v Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 295 US 662; Patterson v Carey, 41 NY2d 714; Matter of City of New York [Brookfield Refrig. Corp.], 58 NY2d 532.)</p>

<p>POINTS OF COUNSEL</p> <p>The master license is not subject to the competitive bidding requirements of subdivision 1 of section 1209 of the Public Authorities Law. (.Matter ofExley v Village ofEndi-cott, 51 NY2d 426; Matter of New York City Ch. v Fabber, 73 Mise 2d 859, 41 AD2d 821; BusTop Shelters v City of New York, 99 Mise 2d 198; Matter of Signacon Controls v Mulroy, 32 NY2d 410; Albion Ind. Center v Town of Albion, 62 AD2d 478; Jered Contr. Corp. v New York City Tr. Auth., 22 NY2d 187; Admiral Realty Co. v City of New York, 206 NY 110.)</p> <p>I. The agreement at issue is not a “contract for public work” within the meaning of section 1209 of the Public Authorities Law, but an agreement otherwise characterized in the law and authorized by subdivision 2 of section 1202 and section 1204 of the Public Authorities Law. (New York City Tr. Auth. v Loos, 2 Mise 2d 733; New York City Tr. Auth. v Quill, 48 Mise 2d 940; Matter of Subway-Surface Supervisors Assn, v New York City Tr. Auth., 56 AD2d 53; Collins v Manhattan & Bronx Surface Tr. Operating Auth., 116 Mise 2d 6; Matter of Andrews v O’Grady, 44 Mise 2d 28; Weiner u Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 55 NY2d 175; Leeds v Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 117 Mise 2d 329; Civil Serv. Forum v New York City Tr. Auth., 3 Mise 2d 346; Clark v Young, 18 AD2d 653; Madden v Queens County Jockey Club, 296 NY 249.) II. If the agreement at issue were a “contract for public work” within the meaning of section 1209 of the Public Authorities Law, it would fall under the “special skill or training” exception to that provision, and bidding would not be required. {Jered Contr. Corp. v New York City Tr. Auth., 22 NY2d 187; Matter ofDugro, 50 NY2d 513; Depot Constr. Corp. v City of New York, 46 NY2d 859; Matter of Marino v Town of Ramapo, 68 Mise 2d 44; Harlem Gas-Light Co. v City of New York, 33 NY 309; Williams v Bryant, 53 AD2d 229; Albion Ind. Center v Town of Albion, 62 AD2d 478, 45 NY2d 710; Marine Midland Trust v Village ofWaverly, 42 Mise 2d 704, 21 AD2d 753; People ex rel. Smith v Flagg, 17 NY2d 584.)</p> <p>I. The master license is subject to the competitive bidding requirements of subdivision 1 of section 1209 of the Public Authorities Law. {Matter of Exley v Village ofEndicott, 51 NY2d 426; BusTop Shelters v City of New York, 99 Mise 2d 198; Matter of Signacon Controls v Mulroy, 32 NY2d 410; Matter ofHauger v Earl, 275 App Div 437.) II. The need for flexibility cannot justify excepting the master license from the requirements of competitive bidding. {Matter ofExley v Village ofEndicott, 51 NY2d 426; Jered Contr. Corp. v New York City Tr. Auth., 22 NY2d 187; Matter of Signacon Controls v Mulroy, 32 NY2d 410; Matter of Carr v New York State Bd. of Elections, 40 NY2d 556; Matter ofDe Peyster, 210 NY 216; Lawrence Constr. Corp. v State of New York, 293 NY 634; People v Olah, 300 NY 96.) III. The master license does not fall under the “special skill or training” exception to the competitive bidding laws. {Lefkowitz v Lebensfeld, 51 NY2d 442; Matter of State of New York v Avco Fin. Serv., 50 NY2d 383; Rogers v Dorchester Assoc., 32 NY2d 553; Matter of Burroughs Corp. v New York State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., 91 AD2d 1078; American Totalisator Co. v Western Regional Off-Track Betting Corp., 44 AD2d 750.)</p> <p>The total character of the arrangement entered into by the Authority and Kapoor is a license to operate newsstand concessions in several subway stations. Therefore, the fact that the license agreement contains the requirement that Kapoor maintain and repair existing concession stands and also install some new ones, does not transform the license into a “public work” which is subject to the competitive bidding laws. (.Matter of Exley v Village of Endicott, 51 NY2d 426; Trustees of Southampton v Jessup, 162 NY 122; Pajak u Pajak, 56 NY2d 394; Matter ofSignacon Controls v Mulroy, 32 NY2d 410; BusTop Shelters v City of New York, 99 Mise 2d 198.)</p>

The Algerian Accords, by which the United States, in the exercise of its powers over foreign affairs, assured Iran of the availability of a United States judicial forum for the adjudication of its claims against the Shah, preclude the dismissal of this action. {Dames & Moore v Regan, 453 US 654; United States v Belmont, 301 US 324; United States v Pink, 315 US 203; Itel Corp. v M/S Victoria U, 710 F2d 199; Itek Corp. v First Nat.

Plaintiff-respondent had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues in the unemployment insurance proceedings which are determinative of the first, second, third, sixth and seventh causes of action and summary judgment should have been granted to defendant. {Schwartz v Public Administrator, 24 NY2d 65; Vavolizza v Krieger, 39 AD2d 446; Read v Sacco, 49 AD2d 471; Bernstein v Birch Wathen School, 71 AD2d 129, 51 NY2d 932; Drier v Randforce Amusement Corp., 14 Mise 2d…

The State of New York has the same proprietary liability as a private landlord for injuries sustained by its negligence in operation, management and control of its building.

POINTS OF COUNSEL The court below erred in dismissing the information before trial, since it had no basis for finding that the loss of the People’s evidence was prejudicial to defendants.

POINTS OF COUNSEL An alleged failure of hospital security which causes the unexplained disappearance of an infant from a hospital nursery does not create a direct duty on the part of the hospital to the parents of the infant so as to allow the parents to recover for their mental distress. (Palsgraf v LongIs.R.R. Co., 248 NY 339; Pulka v Edelman, 40 NY2d 781; Tobin v Grossman, 24 NY2d 609; Lafferty v Manhasset Med. Center Hosp., 54 NY2d 277; Rainnie v Community Mem.

The court below erred in upholding HPD’s interpretation and application of the statutory requirement of under-utilization in an unlawfully restrictive manner. (Kurcsics v Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 49 NY2d 451; Matter of Harbolic v Berger, 43 NY2d 102; Matter ofRosenbluthvFinkelstein, 300 NY 402; People v Marrero, 71 AD2d 346.) II.

<p>POINTS OF COUNSEL</p> <p>I. The Food Pageant jury verdict alone should not preclude litigation of the issue of Con Edison’s culpability. (Gilberg v Barbieri, 53 NY2d 285; Schwartz u Public Administrator, 24 NY2d 65; Read v Sacco, 49 AD2d 471; Berner v British Commonwealth Pacific Airlines, 346 F2d 532, 382 US 983; Parklane Hosiery Co. v Shore, 439 US 322; Hardy v Johns-Mancille Sales Corp., 681 F2d 334; Crawford v Ranger Ins. Co., 653 F2d 1248; Young v United States, 518 F Supp 921; Grill v United States, 516 F Supp 15, affd sub nom. United States v Solomon, 697 F2d 300; Zdanok v Glidden Co., 327 F2d 944, 377 US 934.) II. Con Edison is not legally responsible to its customers for consequences beyond physical injury to a customer’s property or person that directly results from the service interruption and is necessarily contemplated by Con Edison’s tariff obligation to endeavor to provide uninterrupted service. (Ventricelli v Kinney System Rent A Car, 45 NY2d 950; Pulka v Edelman, 40 NY2d 781; Danielenko v Kinney Rent A Car, 57 NY2d 198; Matter ofTMI Litigation Governmental Entities Claims, 544 Supp 853; City of New York v Pullman, Inc., 662 F2d 910, cert den sub nom. Rockwell Int. Corp. v City of New York, 454 US 1164; United States v Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R. Co., 547 F2d 1101; New York State Thruway Auth. v Civetta Constr. Corp., 62 AD2d 530; Kornblut v Chevron Oil Co., 62 AD2d 831, 48 NY2d 853; Bright v Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 463 F2d 240; Burns Jackson Miller Summit & Spitzer v Lindner, 59 NY2d 314.)</p> <p>I. Plaintiffs are third-party beneficiaries of the service agreement. Moreover, there was neither authority nor motive for making it for the benefit of other than designated customers. (Moch Co. v Rensselaer Water Co., 247 NY 160; Kornblut v Chevron Oil Co., 62 AD2d 831, 48 NY2d 853; Drake v Drake, 89 AD2d 207; Goodman-Marks Assoc, v Westbury Post Assoc., 70 AD2d 145.) II. Con Edison has not sustained its burden of establishing warrant to preclude the application of the judicial policy of collateral estoppel. (Food Pageant v Consolidated Edison Co., 54 NY2d 167; B.R. DeWitt, Inc. v Hall, 19 NY2d 141; Hart v American Airlines, 61 Mise 2d 41; Shaid v Consolidated Edison Co., 95 AD2d 610; Freedman v Chemical Constr. Corp., 43 NY2d 260; Schwartz v Public Administrator, 24 NY2d 65.) III. There is no question of fact regarding plaintiffs’ asserted status as third-party beneficiaries of the service agreement. (American Express Co. v United States Lines, 76 AD2d 428.) IV. The damage issues present questions of fact. (Glanzer v Shepard, 233 NY 236; White v Guárante, 43 NY2d 356; Zucker-man v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557; Pulka v Edelman, 40 NY2d 781; Nallan v Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 50 NY2d 507; Loeser v Hale Gardens, 73 AD2d 187; Kornblut v Chevron Oil Co., 62 AD2d 831; Seagroatt Floral Co. vNew York Tel. Co., 76 AD2d 1038; Stone v Schenectady Ry. Co., 99 App Div 44; Curry v Norwood Elec. Light & Power Co., 125 Mise 279.)</p>

<p>POINTS OF COUNSEL</p> <p>Appellant has become disabled as a result of an accidental injury received in city service. {Matter of Lichtenstein v Board of Trustees, 57 NY2d 1010; Matter of Menna v New York City Employees’ Retirement System, 59 NY2d 696; Matter of Valentin v Board of Trustees, 59 NY2d 702; Matter of Shannon v Board of Trustees, 59 NY2d 852; Matter of Schussler v Codd, 59 NY2d 698; Matter of McManus v McGuire, 59 NY2d 853.)</p> <p>I. The denial of petitioner-appellant’s application for accident disability retirement was arbitrary and capricious since petitioner-appellant was disabled as the result of an accidental injury sustained in city service within the meaning of section B18-43.0 of the Administrative Code of the City of New York. {Matter ofDrayson v Board of Trustees, 37 AD2d 378, 32 NY2d 852; Matter of Schweitzer v Codd, 63 AD2d 66; Matter of Walsh v Codd, 68 AD2d 805; Johnson Corp. v Indemnity Ins. Co., 6 AD2d 97, 7 NY2d 222; Matter of Lichtenstein v Board of Trustees, 57 NY2d 1010; Matter of Menna v New York City Employees’ Retirement System, 91 AD2d 537; Matter of Schussler v Codd, 91 AD2d 890; Matter ofCardone v Codd, 91 AD2d 909; Matter of Shannon v Board of Trustees, 92 AD2d 528.) II. The denial of petitioner-appellant’s application for accident disability retirement by respondents was arbitrary and capricious. Respondent erroneously based its determination on a finding that since petitioner-appellant’s service-connected injury was not related to crime control, it was not an accident within the meaning of section B 18-43.0 of the Administrative Code. Since this interpretation is devoid of statutory foundation, it must be set aside and the judgment below must be reversed. (Uniformed Firefighters Assn, v Beek-man, 52 NY2d 463.)</p> <p>The injury which caused petitioners’ disability did not, as a matter of law, constitute an accident for the purposes of accident disability retirement under section B18-43.0 of the Administrative Code. Accordingly the determination by the Board of Trustees of the Police Pension Fund to deny their applications for accident disability retirement and to retire them on half pay for ordinary disability should not be set aside. (.Matter of Canfora v Board of Trustees, 60 NY2d 347; Matter of Lichtenstein v Board of Trustees, 57 NY2d 1010; Matter of Valentin u Board of Trustees, 91 AD2d 916, 59 NY2d 702; Matter of Shannon v Board of Trustees, 92 AD2d 528, 59 NY2d 852; Matter of Del Grosso v McGuire, 113 Mise 2d 440, 93 AD2d 1002, 59 NY2d 606; Matter of Menna v New York City Employees’ Retirement System, 91 AD2d 537; Matter of Covel v New York State Employees’ Retirement System, 84 AD2d 902, 55 NY2d 606; Matter of Cavarretta u Regan, 86 AD2d 706; Matter of Anguish v Regan, 80 AD2d 695.)</p>

POINTS OF COUNSEL Defendant-appellant, absentee landlord, should not be held liable to plaintiff, who was a guest of a tenant in exclusive possession and control of the demised premises, for injuries sustained by plaintiff guest when he was bitten by the tenant’s dog.

The provision of section 343 of the General Business Law authorizing a criminal prosecution for noncompliance with a subpoena without good or reasonable cause is constitutionally valid, even if applied to a person who has commenced a motion to quash or modify.

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