Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Grays’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

44 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 44 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““Art. 6082. Any joint owner or claimant of any real estate or of any interest therein or of any mineral, coal, petroleum, or gas lands, whether held in fee or by lease or otherwise, may compel a partition thereof between the other joint owners or claimants thereof in the manner provided in this chapter.” “Art. 6083. Such joint owner or claimant may file his petition in the district court of the county in which the real estate, or any part thereof, sought to be partitioned, ⅛-situated, which petition shall state: “1. The names and residence, if known, of each of the other joint owners, or joint-claimants, of such property. “2. The share or interest which the plaintiff and the other joint owners, or joint claimants, of same own or claim so far as-known to the plaintiff. “3. The land sought to be partitioned shall be so described as that the same may be distinguished from any other and the-estimated value thereof stated.” “Art. 6086. Upon the hearing of the-cause, the court shall determine the share or interest of each of the joint owners or claimants in the real estate sought to be-divided, and all questions of law or equity affecting the title to such land which may-arise.” “Art. 1995. No person who is an inhabitant of this State shall be sued out of the county in which he has his domicile except in the following cases : * * * * * “13. Partition. — Suits for the partition: of land or other property may be brought, in the county where such land or other-property, or a part ther”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Pena v. Sling · Pena v. Sling

2. ““Art. 2007. A plea of privilege to be sued in the county of one’s residence shall be sufficient if it be in writing and sworn to, and shall' state that the party claiming such privilege was not, at the institution of such suit, nor at the time of the service of process thereon, nor at the time of filing such plea, a resident of the county in which such suit was instituted and shall state the county of his residence at the time of such plea, and that ‘no exception to exclusive venue in the county of one’s residence provided by law exists in said cause’; and such plea of privilege when filed shall be prima facie proof of the defendant’s right to change of venue. If the plaintiff desires to controvert the plea of privilege, he shall within five days after appearance day file a controverting plea under oath, setting out specifically the fact or facts relied upon to confer venue of such cause on the court where the cause is pending.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Pena v. Sling · Pena v. Sling

3. ““1. That in actions involving title to real estate Subdivision 14 is imperative and dominant. “2. That even if an action took the form of a partition suit, if in fact a question concerning the title to real estate became injected into the case by defendant’s plea of privilege, the venue was governed by Subdivision 14 and not by Subdivision 13. * * “3. Even though the action was in form of a partition suit, if the defendant in his plea of privilege injected a question affecting the title to land, the burden was upon the plaintiff to plead and prove that the suit was in fact only a partition suit, and that a suit for the recovery of lands or damages thereto, or to remove incum-brances upon the title to land, or to quiet the title to land, or to prevent or stay waste on land, was not involved.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Hawkins v. Gilger