New Mexico Natural Gas Antitrust Litigation State of New Mexico Department of Finance and Administration v. Southern Union Company’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

1 federal appellate · 11 district · 2 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 30 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “In view of the statutory requirement that interests must be substantially affected before recusal is required, we believe Congress did not intend to require disqualification in all eases in which the judge might benefit as a member of the general public. We realize that recusal would be required by the statute if the judge owned even one share of stock in a .party to the litigation. But an interest shared by the judge in common with the public is distinguishable for at least two reasons. First, the policy to promote public confidence in the impartiality of the judicial system is not served to as great an extent by disqualifying a judge who would receive only such a benefit. It is not simply a question of de minimis effect; a personal benefit or detriment shared in common with the community at large is perceived to have a different psychological effect on a judge than would a benefit or detriment not so shared. Second, practical problems abound if recusal is required whenever a judge benefits simply as a member of the common populace. There is much litigation today that can have far-reaching effects on large segments of the nation. For instance, an antitrust suit against a major oil company could reduce gasoline prices within the entire United States, and hence affect the transportation costs of every judge. The ratemaking proceedings of public utility commissions throughout the nation are reviewed by the courts in the states involved, where most of the reviewing judges are cu”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Booth v. I.R.S. · Alaska Oil Co. v. State of Alaska

2. “The statute differentiates between two kinds of interests. If the judge has a direct ownership, legal or equitable, then disqualification is required regardless of the size of the interest, unless one of the specified exceptions applies. On the other hand, an interest not entailing direct ownership falls under “other interest,” and requires disqualification only if the litigation could substantially affect it.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. In Re Cement & Concrete Antitrust Litigation · Keeton v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.

3. “We agree with the Fourth Circuit’s determination that a remote, contingent benefit, such as a possible beneficial effect on future utility bills is not a ‘financial interest’ within the meaning of the statute. It is an ‘other interest,’ requiring disqualification under a ‘substantially affected’ test. See In re Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 539 F.2d 357 (4th Cir.1976). We find Judge Bratton’s interest here to be too insubstantial to require recusal.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Sollenbarger v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co.