620 So. 2d 709 - Ex Parte Johnson’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

106 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 108 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “the general question of whether the Miranda warnings were given does not adequately establish whether the warnings were properly given and understood by the defendant.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Carlton v. State · 725 So. 2d 1063 - Price v. State.

2. ““In this case, there is no indication that the police repeatedly arranged confrontations between Johnson and [the witness]; the mere fact that [the witness] was shown Johnson’s picture and also saw him in the line-up does not establish any impropriety in the identification process. Under Alabama law, it is not error to have a defendant participate in both a photographic array and a line-up, even though he may be the only common participant in the two procedures. Nicholes v. State, 409 So.2d 454 (Ala.Crim.App.1981).... Moreover, the record indicates that the individuals in the photographic array and the line-up were physically similar to Johnson. The officer in charge of choosing the individuals for the line-up testified at trial that he took special care to locate participants who resembled Johnson, so that it would be as difficult as possible for [the witness] to distinguish Johnson. Because these pretrial identifying procedures did not make [the witness’s] identification of Johnson inevitable, the Court of Criminal Appeals correctly held that the pretrial identification procedures were not impermissibly suggestive and that [the witness’s] identification testimony was properly presented to the jury for its consideration. We are not, therefore, required to further examine the totality of the circumstances to determine whether there was a substantial likelihood of misidentification.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 67 So. 3d 936 - Dotch v. State

3. “To sustain a conviction under § 13A-5-40 (a)(2), the State must prove beyond reasonable doubt (1) a `robbery in the first degree or an attempt thereof,' as defined by § 13A-8-41 ; (2) a murder as defined by § 13A-6-2 (a)(1); and (3) that the murder was committed `during' the robbery or attempted robbery, i.e., that the murder was committed `in the course of or in connection with the commission of, or in the immediate flight from the commission of' the robbery or attempted robbery in the first degree. § 13A-5-39 (2); Hallford v. State , 548 So.2d 526 (Ala.Cr.App. 1988), affirmed , 548 So.2d 547 (Ala.), cert. denied , 493 U.S. 945 . . . (1989). The intentional killing must take place during the course of the robbery in question; however, the taking of the property of the victim need not occur before the killing. Hallford . . . . The fact that the murder victim was dead when the property was taken would not prevent a finding of robbery, if the murder and the taking of property formed a continuous chain of logically related events. Hallford . The question whether the defendant had the intent to kill at the time of the taking is usually a jury issue, and the jury may infer from the facts and circumstances that a robbery began when the accused attacked the victim and that the capital offense was consummated when the accused took the robbery victim's property and fled. Hallford .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 867 So. 2d 1153 - Kabat v. State