Thompson v. Runnel’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

4 federal appellate ·

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 8 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “The majority chooses to ignore this principle on the ground that, on appeal, the government did not argue that Seibert was inapplicable under AEDPA. Thompson, 621 F.3d at 1015-16 n. 7. But this does not change § 2254(d)(l)’s statutory mandate that the federal court cannot grant habeas relief unless the state court's decision is contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent, which the Supreme Court defines as “the governing legal principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision.” Andrade, 538 U.S. at 71-72 , 123 S.Ct. 1166 . Although we may deny a petitioner's writ in light of Supreme Court precedent decided after the relevant date, see Smith v. Spisak, -U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 676 , 680-81, 175 L.Ed.2d 595 (2010); Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264 , 288, 290-91, 128 S.Ct. 1029 , 169 L.Ed.2d 859 (2008), the Supreme Court has never held that a reviewing court may ignore the statutory command of § 2254(d) and grant habeas relief when the state court’s decision was consistent with then-applicable Supreme Court precedent.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Thompson v. Runnels

2. “The California Court of Appeals, in the last reasoned state court decision on Thompson’s Miranda claim, did not apply the rule announced in Seibert. Rather, based on its reading of Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 , 105 S.Ct. 1285 , 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985), the state appellate court ruled that “so long as the earlier [unwarned confession] was not involuntary due to police coercion, [a] subsequent voluntary, warned statement is admissible.” The state court assumed, therefore, that deliberately delayed Miranda warnings are always effective absent actual police coercion. Because this “ ‘rule ... contradicts the governing law set forth [by the Supreme Court]’ ” in Seibert, see Rios v. Garcia, 390 F.3d 1082 , 1084 (9th Cir.2004) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 , 405-06, 120 S.Ct. 1495 , 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000)), the state court’s decision was “contrary to ... clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(1).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. Thompson v. Runnels

3. “This Court notes that Petitioner does not cite to the record or present any evidence in support of his assertion that the inspectors in this case deliberately withheld their Miranda advisement until Petitioner had incriminated himself. Moreover, unlike the defendant in Seibert, Petitioner was not under arrest at the time of questioning by the inspectors. There is no evidence in the record concerning an official police policy of deliberately withholding Miranda warnings until a suspect has confessed. In contrast to the police officers in Seibert, the inspectors here did not testify that' they withheld Miranda warnings until after Petitioner confessed. Under these circumstances, the state appellate court's analysis under Elstad was not an unreasonable application of the law.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. Thompson v. Runnels