Gebhart v. Gaughan’s Empirical Analysis
621 F.3d 1206 · 2010
Citation profile
4 federal appellate · 3 district ·
Relationships
Applies 11 U.S.C. § 522 · 11 U.S.C. § 541 · 11 U.S.C. § 554 · 11 U.S.C. § 704 · 11 U.S.C. § 727 · 28 U.S.C. § 158
Relies on Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz · Owen v. Owen · Schwab v. Reilly · Hyman v. Plotkin · Cannon v. Hawaii Corp. ex rel. Goss
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 33 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“the statute permitting the debtor to claim a particular exemption does not allow the debtor to exempt the entire property interest, but instead permits exemption of an interest in the property up to a particular dollar amount, “what is removed from the estate is an interest in the property equal to the value of the exemption claimed at filing.””
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“[The debtor’s] argument assumes that a claim to exempt the full value of the equipment would, if unopposed, entitle her to the equipment itself as opposed to a payment equal to the equipment’s full value. That assumption is at least ques tionable. Section 541 is clear that title to the equipment passed to Reilly’s estate at the commencement of her case, and § 522(d)(5) and (6) are equally clear that her reclamation right is limited to exempting an interest in the equipment, not the equipment itself. Accordingly, it is far from obvious that the Code would “entitle” Reilly to clear title in the equipment even if she claimed as exempt a “full” or “100%” interest in it (which she did not). Of course, it is likely that a trustee who fails to object to such a claim would have little incentive to do anything but pass title in the asset to the debtor. But that does not establish the statutory entitlement Reilly claims.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“[T]his court's past position on postpetition appreciation is based not solely on the California statute defining exempt property but also on 11 U.S.C. § 541 (a)(6) (including as property of the estate '[p]roceeds, product, offspring, rents, or profits of or from property of the estate ...'), which is equally applicable to the [non-California] cases at issue here.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majoritye.g. Wilson v. Rigby
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.