Jimenez v. Wood County’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

9 federal appellate · 1 district ·

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 27 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[t]he determination of a fees award is a two-step process. First the court calculates the "lodestar[,]" which is equal to the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the prevailing hourly rate in the community for similar work. The court should exclude all time that is excessive, duplicative, or inadequately documented. Once the lodestar amount is calculated, the court can adjust it based on the twelve factors set forth in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc. , 488 F.2d 714 , 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974) [, abrogated on other grounds by Blanchard v. Bergeron , 489 U.S. 87 , 109 S.Ct. 939 , 103 L.Ed.2d 67 (1989) ].”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Tony Smith v. Hubert Acevedo · Gilmore v. Audubon Nature Inst., Inc.

2. “[T]he classification of a crime as a misdemeanor has been treated by other circuits as a relevant or even determinative factor in ascertaining whether there is a reasonable suspicion requirement. See Roberts v. Rhode Island, 239 F.3d 107 , 112 (1st Cir.2001) (“[W]hen the inmate has been charged with only a misdemeanor involving minor offenses or traffic violations, crimes not generally associated with weapons or contraband, courts have required that officers have a reasonable suspicion that the individual inmate is concealing contraband.”); Weber v. Dell, 804 F.2d 796 , 804 (2d Cir.1986) (“We conclude that a reasonable suspicion that an accused misdemeanant or other minor offender is concealing weapons or other contraband— suspicion based on the particular traits of the offender, the arrest and/or the crime charged — is necessary before subjecting the arrestee to the indignities of a strip/body cavity search.”). In other settings, as well, misdemeanors have historically been considered minor offenses. 11 In Stewart, we cited the applicability of the challenged policy to individuals arrested for misdemeanors in support of our conclusion that the challenged policy was unconstitutional because it applied to minor offenders when no reasonable suspicion existed that they might possess weapons or contraband. See Stewart v. Lubbock Cnty., Tex., 767 F.2d 153 , 156 (5th Cir.1985) (noting that “the detainees were arrestees awaiting bond on misdemeanor or traffic violation charges”). In”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Jimenez v. Wood County

3. “[A] panel of this court can only overrule a prior panel decision if such overruling is unequivocally directed by controlling Supreme Court precedent.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 2 . See Munn, 924 F.2d at 575 (”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Fair v. Allen