¶1This appeal is from the denial of plaintiff’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Plaintiff contends that the trial court’s failure to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law at his probation revocation proceedings resulted in a denial of due process. Plaintiff further contends that his subsequent acquittal of the charge which was the reason for the revocation of his probation should render the revocation invalid.
¶2Plaintiff was convicted of aggravated robbery on January 16, 1978. On September 15 of that year he was sentenced to a term of imprisonment from five years to life. The execution of the sentence was stayed and plaintiff was placed on probation. A condition of the probation was that plaintiff was to have no weapons in his possession.
¶3In May of 1979 plaintiff was arrested for obscene conduct and subsequently charged with possession of a dangerous weapon in violation of § 76-10-503, Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended. A probation revocation proceeding was held in which plaintiff was found in violation of the conditions of his probation. The court ordered plaintiff committed to the Utah State Prison to serve his original sentence. No written findings of fact or conclusions of law were made, but a transcript of the proceedings was made.
¶4Plaintiff asserts Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, required the trial court to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law at the probation revocation proceedings and that the court’s failure to do so made it impossible for him to prepare and present a proper appeal from the order. See Rucker v. Dalton, Utah, 598 P.2d 1336 (1979).
¶5A writ of habeas corpus is not an available remedy on the facts alleged in the *693petition. The appropriate procedure was for plaintiff to appeal the probation revocation order. A habeas corpus proceeding is not intended as a substitute for an appeal, Gentry v. Smith, Utah, 600 P.2d 1007 (1979), and will not lie in the absence of a claim of fundamental unfairness in the trial or a substantial and prejudicial denial of a person’s constitutional rights. See Chess v. Smith, Utah, 617 P.2d 341 (1980); Rammell v. Smith, Utah, 560 P.2d 1108 (1977); Johnson v. Turner, 24 Utah 2d 439, 473 P.2d 901 (1970); Brown v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 96, 440 P.2d 968 (1968). Plaintiff’s claim that it was error not to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law does not rise to that level, especially in view of the fact that a transcript of the proceedings was made.
¶6The judgment of the trial court dismissing the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is affirmed.
¶7. Plaintiff’s additional contention that his acquittal of the criminal charge by a jury should conclusively determine his continued right to probation is not properly before this Court. Nevertheless, the decision of the lower court denying the petition despite the subsequent acquittal of the very charge which resulted in his probation revocation is not inconsistent with cases holding that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not required in parole or probation revocation proceedings. Adams v. Ross, Alaska, 551 P.2d 948 (1976); In re Coughlin, 16 Cal.3d 52, 127 Cal.Rptr. 337, 545 P.2d 249 (1976); People v. Williams, 66 Mich.App. 67, 238 N.W.2d 407 (1975); Ewing v. Wyrick, Mo., 535 S.W.2d 442 (1976); State v. Case, 189 Neb. 493, 203 N.W.2d 492 (1973); State v. Brusenhan, 78 N.M. 764, 438 P.2d 174 (1968); People v. Carter, 43 A.D.2d 655, 349 N.Y.2d 813 (1973); State v. Hewett, 270 N.C. 348, 154 S.E.2d 476 (1967); Thompson v. State, 198 Tenn. 267, 279 S.W.2d 261 (1955); Kelly v. State, Tex.Crim., 483 S.W.2d 467 (1972); and Slayton v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 357, 38 S.E.2d 479 (1946).
¶8. We are aware of the due process requirements set forth in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973), for probation revocation proceedings, yet find the requirement for written findings inapplicable in the instant case. First, the standards set forth in Gagnonwere addressed to administrative revocation proceedings which required no transcript, no judicial moderator, and no counsel, as opposed to the instant circumstance of a judicial proceeding with probationer being represented by counsel and a transcript being maintained. Numerous cases have refused to require formal written findings of fact separate and distinct from the transcript maintained in judicial revocation proceedings. People v. Scott, 34 Cal.App.3d 702, 110 Cal.Rptr. 402 (1973); State v. Jaworski, 194 Neb. 645, 234 N.W.2d 221 (1975); State v. Fortier, 20 Or.App. 613, 533 P.2d 187 (1975); State v. Myers, 86 Wash.2d 419, 545 P.2d 538 (1976). Second, the only issue in the instant hearing was whether the gun found in the police car in which the probationer had been transported belonged to the probationer. Although no express finding appeared in writing, the transcript, in which many statements by the judge appear, reveals the judge’s thought process and the conclusions he drew from the evidence. An entry of formal findings of fact and conclusions of law would add nothing in the instant case.