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← 621 So. 2d 1235 - Fulton v. Callahan

621 So. 2d 1235 - Fulton v. Callahan’s Empirical Analysis

1993

Citation profile

16
cited by 16 later decisions
2
states following
May 2014
most recently cited

14 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 16 later decisions — most recently May 2014

14 state decisions

80199320002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Leith v. State · Belcher v. Birmingham Trust National Bank · 565 So. 2d 38 - GREEN TREE ACCEPTANCE v. Standridge · Allman v. Beam · Weekley v. Horn

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 16 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “"Section 10-2A-71 provides that directors and managing officers owe a duty not to engage in unfair insider dealings for the purpose of buying shareholder stock at less than real value. The statute constitutes a more specific statutory expression of the general fiduciary duty owed by directors and officers to shareholders under other provisions of the Alabama Business Corporation Act. As in an action alleging breach of fiduciary duty, the only relevant facts under § 10-2A-71, for purposes of sufficiency, are the defendant's intent and conduct and the damage incurred by the plaintiff. Thus, even if substantial evidence existed from which a jury could reasonably find that Callahan was indeed aware of all the facts relevant to the value of his stock, he could still recover if the defendants' conduct was otherwise actionable."”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. “In our disposition of this issue, we emphasize the special considerations presented by the fact that Callahan was a minority shareholder in a closely held corporation. Callahan's position in the circumstances of this case illustrates the unique vulnerability of minority shareholders in closely held corporations, especially in buy-out negotiations, when often there is no real market for their shares. Because of the limited marketability of their shares and the right of the majority shareholders to control corporate decision-making in closely held corporations, minority shareholders are restricted in their ability to realize the value of their investment, whether it be in the form of salary, dividends, or proceeds from a sale of their stock. Callahan depended, as minority shareholders generally do, on the [majority's] treating him fairly.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  3. “"(1) A defendant who is a president, director, or managing officer, irrespective of title, (2) An act or a declaration or statement, in writing or otherwise, (3) Intent to depreciate the value of the corporation's stock or bonds, with the further intent to enable the director or officer defendant, or another person, to buy the corporation's stock or bonds at less than their real value, and (4) damage. The measure of damages is the difference between the real and the depreciated value of the stock at the time the defendant perpetrates the wrongfully depreciating act."”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.