621 So. 2d 263 - Diamond v. Aronov’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

11 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 11 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"[A] summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56, A.R.Civ.P. In reviewing a summary judgment, this court will apply the same standard applied by the trial court in granting the motion — i.e., this Court will review the record in a light most favorable to the nonmovant and will resolve all reasonable doubts against the movant. Rotham [Rothman] v. Gamma Alpha Chapter of Pi Kappa Alpha Fraternity , 599 So.2d 9 (Ala. 1992) (citing Fincher v. Robinson Brothers Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. , 583 So.2d 256 (Ala. 1991)). In determining whether there is a genuine issue of material fact, this Court is limited to a consideration of the factors that were before the trial court when it ruled on the summary judgment motion. Broadmoor Realty, Inc. v. First Nationwide Bank , 568 So.2d 779 (Ala. 1990). However, this Court's reasoning is not limited to that applied by the trial court. Hill v. Talladega College , 502 So.2d 735 (Ala. 1987). "Once the moving party makes a prima facie showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists, then the burden of going forward with evidence shifts to the nonmovant — who must demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Grider v. Grider , 555 So.2d 104 (Ala. 1989). . . . This action was filed after June 11, 1987; therefore, the nonmovant, . . . had to carry his burden by presenting 'substantial evidence' that created a genuine issue of material fa”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Fielder v. USX Corp. · Copeland v. Samford University

2. “"The mere pendency of discovery does not bar summary judgment. If the trial court from the evidence before it, or the appellate court from the record, can ascertain that the matter subject to production *Page 195 was crucial to the non-moving party's case ( Parrish v. Board of Commissioners of Alabama State Bar , 533 F.2d 942 (5th Cir. 1976)) or that the answers to the interrogatories were crucial to the non-moving party's case ( Noble v. McManus , 504 So.2d 248 (Ala. 1987)), then it is error for the trial court to grant summary judgment before the items have been produced or the answers given. However, the burden of showing that these items are crucial is upon the non-moving party. He can do so by complying with Rule 56(f), Ala.R.Civ.P., Water View Developments, Inc. v. Eureka, Inc. , 512 So.2d 916 (Ala. 1987). Rule 56(f) provides: 'Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just.' A pending motion to compel production ( Parrish , supra) and a motion to compel answers to interrogatories, which has been granted ( Noble , supra) when the evidence before the court clearly shows that the evidence sought is crucial to the non-moving party's case, have been held suf”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Stallworth v. AmSouth Bank of Alabama · Copeland v. Samford University

3. “a trial court has the discretion to consider a new legal argument in a post-judgment motion, but is not required to do so,”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Steele v. ROSENFELD, LLC