621 So. 2d 996 - Scarbrough v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

11 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 11 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “'Again and again in precisely the present context, the [Supreme] Court has told us that where police officers are objectively doing what they are legally authorized to do — as in arresting [the defendant] pursuant to the valid warrant outstanding against him and interrogating him without coercion after reading him repeated Miranda warnings — the results of their investigations are not to be called in question on the basis of any *Page 1023 subjective intent with which they acted. . . . " '. . . The relevant principle of the Supreme Court is likewise: so long as police do no more than they are objectively authorized and legally permitted to do, their motives in doing so are irrelevant and hence not subject to inquiry. . . . The correct rule is that, while a showing of objectively reasonable good faith on the part of the police officers will ordinarily redeem honest errors and prevent the application of the exclusionary rule, in a case where the officers have taken no action except what the law objectively allows[,] their subjective motives in doing so are not even relevant to the suppression inquiry. And the reason lies in the purpose of that rule: to deter unlawful actions by police. Where nothing has been done that is objectively unlawful, the exclusionary rule has no application and the intent with which they acted is of no consequence.' ". . . . United States v. Causey , 834 F.2d 1179 , 1184-85 (5th Cir. 1987) (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. 662 So. 2d 920 - Webster v. State · 768 So. 2d 981 - Mason v. State

2. “"It is well established that '[a]n arrest may not be used as a pretext to search for evidence.' United States v. Lefkowitz , 285 U.S. 452 , 467 , 52 S.Ct. 420 , 424 , 76 L.Ed. 877 (1932). A pretextual arrest has been defined as 'the use of some minor offense, typically a traffic violation, as a tool for obtaining evidence or statements relating to a greater offense for which the police lack the required probable cause or reasonable suspicion otherwise to obtain.' Jonas, Pretest Searches and the Fourth Amendment: Unconstitutional Abuses of Power , 137 U.Pa.L.R. 1791, 1792 n. 5 (1989). "This case does not involve a 'fabricated' pretext, for here, if the motivation of the police is not considered, the appellant's arrest was legal because it was pursuant to a warrant. See Butterfoss, Solving the Pretext Puzzle: The Importance of Ulterior Motives and Fabrications in the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment Pretext Doctrine , 79 Ky. L.J. 1 , 5-6 (1990-91); Jonas, 137 U.Pa.L.R. at 1802-03. This is not a case where there was no probable cause or any judicial authorization to arrest the appellant for any offense. Furthermore, this case involves the execution of a preexisting arrest warrant and not a traffic stop following surveillance of the suspect. See Salken, The General Warrant of the Twentieth Century? A Fourth Amendment Solution to Unchecked Discretion to Arrest for Traffic Offenses , 62 Temp.L.Q. 221 (1989)."”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 621 So. 2d 353 - Aultman v. State · 677 So. 2d 1174 - Hutcherson v. State

3. “`Again and again in precisely the present context, the [Supreme] Court has told us that where police officers are objectively doing what they are legally authorized to do — as in arresting [the defendant] pursuant to the valid warrant outstanding against him and interrogating him without coercion after reading him repeated Miranda warnings — the results of their investigations are not to be called in question on the basis of any subjective intent with which they acted . . . .”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. 662 So. 2d 920 - Webster v. State · 768 So. 2d 981 - Mason v. State