Smith v. Smith’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

5 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 5 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"In our view, the majority rule better serves the underlying rationale for the presumption as expressed in duPont [ v. American Life Insurance Co. , 41 Del. Ch. 33 , 187 A.2d 421 (1963)] — the avoidance of vexatious litigation 'as a matter of policy.' duPont , 187 A.2d at 423 . As one court noted: 'the existence of narrow strips of land distinct in ownership from the adjoining territory would create a prolific source of litigation.' Cuneo v. Champlin Refining Co. , 178 Okla. 198 , 62 P.2d 82 (1936). The fact that the origin of these narrow parcels lies in former highway or public use rather than in railroad use does not lessen their potential for controversy. Moreover, as is suggested in the present dispute, the conversion of abandoned railroad rights of way to vehicular roadways would impose upon the adjacent property owners the prospect of exposure to a more onerous and higher volume of traffic than that contemplated by a branch line railroad right of way. Without ownership of the underlying fee, an adjacent property owner would be required to accept a change in easement which places a different burden upon the adjacent property. Rio Bravo Oil Co. v. Weed , 121 Tex. 427 , 50 S.W.2d 1080 (1932). "As a practical matter when one acquires property adjacent to a right of way, the potential for abandonment of the right of way exists. The grantor, may, of course, reserve to himself that entitlement, analogous to a future interest, by expressing such intention in the grant. Where t”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Ex Parte Jones

2. “A majority of the jurisdictions which have considered this issue appear to have adopted the rule that a grantee in a private conveyance of property bounded by or abutting a railroad right of way, the fee to which belongs to the abutting owners, is presumed to take the fee to the centerline of the right of way. 12 Am.Jur.2d. Boundaries § 54.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Ex Parte Jones

3. “The presumption has been upheld in favor of adjacent property grantees even where a deed description, by metes and bounds, extended the grant only to the boundary of the abandoned railroad right of way.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Ex Parte Jones