Jeter v. Astrue’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

1 federal appellate · 7 district ·

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 16 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “a perverse incentive to delay proceedings or expend unnecessary hours”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Ringel v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. · 806 F. Supp. 2d 272 - Siraco v. Astrue

2. “The Gisbrecht Court began by explicitly rejecting the application of the "lodestar method to calculate fees under § 406(b)," Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 798 , 122 S.Ct. 1817 , and then concluded by stating that "[i]f the benefits [resulting from the contingency fee] are large in comparison to the amount of time counsel spent on the case, a downward adjustment is similarly in order [to] ... disallow windfalls for lawyers." Id. at 808, 122 S.Ct. 1817 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). We are not surprised that many of our lower courts have interpreted this as a contradictory mandate: lower courts must not employ the lodestar method to determine whether the hourly rate is excessively high and the fee thus unreasonable, but if the hourly rate is excessively high, then lower courts may declare the fee to be a windfall and, ultimately, unreasonable.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Ringel v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.

3. “By beginning with the lodestar calculation, the district courts plainly failed to respect the “primacy of lawful attorney-client fee agreements.” Lawful attorney-client contingent fee agreements do not result in “enhancements” that modify a lodestar fee that might otherwise be too low. Rather, they are the “primary means” by which fees are determined. The district courts’ methodology in these cases under-emphasizes the contingent-fee agreements, contravening the Supreme Court’s instruction that the agreements be the primary means for determining the fee.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 806 F. Supp. 2d 272 - Siraco v. Astrue