Commonwealth v. Elliott’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

26 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 26 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “It is well settled that, during the penalty phase, where the presumption of innocence no longer applies, a prosecutor is afforded reasonable latitude and may properly comment on the evidence with oratorical flair. Comments by a prosecutor do not constitute reversible error unless their unavoidable effect was to prejudice the jury, forming in their minds a fixed bias and hostility toward the defendant such that they could not weigh the evidence objectively and render a trae penalty determination. * * * [R]emarks made by a prosecutor must be evaluated in the context in which they occur. Furthermore [in closing argument], the prosecutor may fairly respond to points made in the defense closing. [[Image here]] [Wjithin reasonable bounds enforced by the trial court, a prosecutor may employ oratorical license and impassioned argument in arguing for the death penalty. While reference to irrelevant matters should be avoided, we note that murder victims are not simply props or irrelevancies in a murder prosecution, and innocuous references to victims and their families are not necessarily prejudicial.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Commonwealth v. Mason, L., Aplt

2. “Because Elliott did not include in his PCRA petition the claim alleging trial counsel’s ineffectiveness for failing to meet with him prior to trial, and did not obtain permission to amend his petition to include the same, the issue is waived. See Commonwealth v. Porter, 613 Pa. 510 , 35 A.3d 4, 14 (2012) (holding that a PCRA petitioner may not raise new claims by merely supplementing a pending PCRA petition without court authorization because to do so would “wrongly subvert the time limitation and serial petition restrictions of the PCRA”); Pa.R.Crim.P. 902(B) (providing that the "[fjailure to state such a ground [for relief] in the [PCRA] petition shall preclude the defendant from raising that ground in any proceeding for post-conviction collateral relief”).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Commonwealth v. Mason, L., Aplt

3. “Brooks expressly required that counsel representing a defendant in a capital murder trial conduct a substantive, face-to-face consultation with the defendant prior to trial, and held that a failure to do so amounted to ineffectiveness of counsel warranting the grant of a new trial.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 2016 Pa. Super. 176 - Commonwealth v. Brown