622 SW2D 589 - Teaff v. Ritchey

How this case has been cited

Cited by 10 later decisions — most recently September 2003

10 state decisions

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

¶1ON MOTION FOR REHEARING

¶2Relying on Grost v. Grost, 561 S.W.2d 223 (Tex.Civ.App.-Tyler 1977, writ dism’d), Darnce’s surviving spouse contends in her motion for rehearing, that the insurance policies in question were not property divisible on divorce. She argues that the cash surrender value, if any, of each policy is the only property right that could have been awarded to Gilda.

¶3Mrs. Ritchey’s argument confuses valuation concepts and property concepts. As indicated by the Grostcase, a life insurance policy is usually valued at its cash surrender value when the estates of the parties are being valued in a divorce case. We are not concerned with valuations in this case, however. We are concerned with ownership of items that are property by specific statutory language. Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat.Ann. art. 23(1) (Vernon 1969).

¶4All points and arguments raised by Mrs. Ritchey and the other appellees in their motions for rehearing have been fully considered. We are not, however, persuaded to alter our conclusion. The motions for rehearing are overruled.