Williams v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

12 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 12 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““Evans and its progeny should be overruled, even if ‘without the owner’s effective consent' is somehow a ‘sub-element’ of robbery, because we failed to perceive that requiring a jury to find that appellant ‘then and there intentionally and knowingly threatened or placed [complainant] in fear of imminent bodily injury or death’ rendered a factual finding to her lack of effective consent immaterial.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Releford v. State · Woods v. State

2. ““did then and there unlawfully, while in the course of committing theft of property owned by PAULA CAGLE, hereafter styled the Complainant, and with intent to obtain and maintain control of the property, intentionally and knowingly threaten and place the Complainant in fear of imminent bodily injury and death, by using and exhibiting a deadly weapon, namely, a knife.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Hill v. State · Woods v. State

3. ““In the instant case the terms ‘theft’ and ‘while in the course of committing theft’ were properly defined in the definitional portion of the charge. However, the court’s charge did not require the jury to find that the robbery occurred while in the course of committing theft as defined in the charge in order to convict; rather, the court attempted to set out the component parts of that element. Nevertheless, as noted above, the court omitted an essential part of the element when it did not require the jury to find that appellant took or attempted to take the property without the owner’s effective consent. “A jury charge which authorizes á conviction without requiring the jury to find all of the elements of the offense charged is fundamentally defective. Thompson v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 574 S.W.2d 103 ; West v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 572 S.W.2d 712 . We likewise hold that when in applying the law to the facts, a trial court charges a jury on the component parts of an element of the offense rather than the element itself, the charge must require the jury to find all of the parts of that element in order to convict. The jury charge in the instant case did not so require and is fundamentally defective.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Woods v. State