State v. Jones’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

6 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 6 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Q. Okay. You know, I was in law enforcement for about six or seven years.... You’re around people in law enforcement and you do get sort of a slant, don’t you? It’s hard not to. A. That’s the only side that you see. Q. Sure. Sure, ffiid you’ve got a lot of friends that are in law enforcement, make arrests every day, and you would like to think | {¡they’re doing their job properly, that they’re not out [there] busting people who don’t deserve to be busted. A. Right. Q. So you do get a one-sided picture, don’t you? A. Right. Q. Do you feel that it may have an effect on you? That everything else being equal, if you were sitting on this jury, that you might tend to lean towards the State’s favor because you know so many people that are in law enforcement and all? A. In all honesty, I would say, yes, it could. Q. Okay. And that’s what I’m asking. A. I mean, I think it would be foolish to say, oh, no. Q. And not withstanding (sic) the fact that the judge would read you a bunch of instructions and would tell you what the law is, you feel, even knowing the law, that just because of your situation, you do feel like you might lean towards the State’s favor, wouldn’t you? A. Yes.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Lindsey

2. “While the trial judge is accorded broad discretion in ruling on challenges for cause, this Court has cautioned that "[a] challenge for cause should be granted, even when a prospective juror declares his ability to remain impartial, if the juror's responses as a whole reveal facts from which bias, prejudice or inability to render judgment according to law may be reasonably implied." [Citations omitted]. In this case, [the juror] never expressly stated that she could put aside her acquaintanceship with the police officers, and it was not reasonable for the trial court to accept assurances that she would judge the case impartially on the evidence at trial from a juror who began with the premise that the police officers directly involved in the arrest and questioning of the defendant were telling the truth.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Mathis

3. “She very honestly and candidly, from the beginning to the end of her examination and rehabilitation, never “expressly” stated she would or could put this bias aside. As far as she would commit was to say she would “do her best” to give defendant a fair and impartial trial. This was not sufficient because Bishop, after expressing reservations about her impartiality, at no time during the attempted rehabilitation by the trial court and the State, ever expressly assured the court she could be fair and impartial and give defendant a fair trial. See State v. Williams, 458 So.2d 1315, 1335 (La.App. 1st Cir.1984), writ denied, 463 So.2d 1317 (La.1985). Defendant was entitled to completely neutral jurors. Bishop tried to tell everyone that she was not positive she could be.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Lindsey