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623 S.W.2d 408

Ex Parte Davila

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas

Decided November 4, 1981

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas · decided 1981-11-04

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“(1) The punishment assessed, (2) The nature of the offense, (3) The appellant’s work record, family ties, and length of residency, (4) The ability to make bond, (5) The prior criminal record of appellant, (6) The existence of other outstanding bonds, and (7) The appellant’s conformity with previous bond conditions.”

quoted by 2 later decisions, including Jackson v. State, Compian v. State

Relies on Mecom v. United States · Ex Parte Rodriguez · Herrera v. State

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1981-11-04

How this case has been cited

Cited by 26 later decisions — most recently February 2018 · most notably Ex Parte Brown (1998), Maldonado v. State (1999)

26 state decisions

1201981199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

OPINIONCLINTON, Judge.

¶1This is an appeal from an order entered in a habeas corpus proceeding seeking reduction of bail pending appeal.

¶2Appellant was convicted of the offense of delivery of heroin, and punishment was assessed at eight years in the Department of Corrections. Bail was set for this offense at $20,000.

¶3On July 2, 1981, the trial court conducted a hearing on appellant’s request for a reduction and reduced bail to $17,500. Petitioner’s background reveals that she is twenty seven years old, and the mother of four children.1 This is her first conviction.

¶4While she has been in jail in Lubbock County, her children have been with her parents in Mission. Petitioner has now resided in Lubbock County for the past two and a half years. Cosme Tijerina, appellant’s common law husband, was indicted as a codefendant on the original charge of delivery of heroin, but remains at large at the present time. Appellant said she has not been in touch with her husband since his arrest. Petitioner’s background further reveals that she owns no real estate, but does own furniture and a car worth approximately $2,000. At the hearing, appellant took the stand and testified that she had tried to make bail at $20,000, but could not. Appellant asserted that she could make bail if it was less than $10,000.

¶5The State offered the direct statement of Mary Ann Wiley, an assistant district attorney for the Lubbock County District Attorney’s Office. She stated that bond surrenders had been issued concerning Cosme Ti-jerina, who is a fugitive believed to be in Mexico. Further, Wiley stated that Tijeri-na had been indicted by the 237th District Court Grand Jury for bail jumping. By way of cross examination of petitioner, the State attempted to show that Tijerina had been in touch with appellant’s bail bondsman trying to secure her release.

¶6Rules for fixing the amount of bail are provided by Article 17.15,2 V.A.C. *410C.P. But after an accused has been found guilty and begins postverdict proceedings, they are modified somewhat and supplemented by additional relevant considerations reflected by the provisions of Article 44.04, V.A.C.C.P., “one of the most important” of which is the punishment assessed. Mayo v. State, 611 S.W.2d 442 (Tex.Cr.App.1981); Ex parte Pemberton, 577 S.W.2d 266 (Tex.Cr.App.1979). In the instant case, punishment was assessed at eight years, a term of years within the permissible range for bail under Article 44.04, supra. Other supportive data that the Court deems relevant includes: the nature of the offense, Mecom v. United States, 434 U.S. 1340, 98 S.Ct. 19, 54 L.Ed.2d 49 (1977); Ex parte Rodriquez, 595 S.W.2d 549 (Tex.Cr.App.1980); petitioner’s work record, family ties, and length of residency, Ex parte Ivey, 594 S.W.2d 98 (Tex.Cr.App.1980); ability to make the bond, Ex parte Rodriquez, supra; prior criminal record, Ex parte Thompson, 508 S.W.2d 624 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); conformity with previous bond conditions, Ex parte Brown, 561 S.W.2d 175 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); other outstanding bonds, Ex parte Cevallos, 537 S.W.2d 744 (Tex.Cr.App.1976).

¶7In summarizing the facts before us, we find: (1) petitioner was convicted of a nonviolent crime; (2) sentence was assessed at eight years; (3) petitioner has no prior criminal record; (4) petitioner has limited ability to make bail; and (5) petitioner has strong family ties.3

¶8The conditions imposed by the trial court require petitioner: (1) report to her adult probation officer by phone or in person twice daily at 9:30 a.m. and 4:00 p.m.; (2) not leave Lubbock County without the express written consent of the court; and, (3) report in person to her adult probation officer at 9:00 a.m. the first Monday each month. Such conditions are reasonable under Article 44.04(d), V.A.C.C.P. Estrada v. State, 594 S.W.2d 445 (Tex.Cr.App.1980).

¶9Applying the established criteria to these facts, we conclude that, given the reasonable conditions attached to it, bail is excessive by $5,000. Therefore, petitioner’s bail is reduced to $12,500.

¶10It is so ordered.

¶11. The ages of petitioner’s children are 7, 6, 2 and 1. There is testimony to the effect that the two year old is under a doctor’s care for a heart disease, but remains unhospitalized at the present time.

¶12. Bail should be set sufficiently high reasonably to assure appearances, but not be used as an instrument of oppression, and must be based on considerations of ability to make bail and the nature of the offense. The Court has stated, however, that the last mentioned factor has no application to the matter of setting bail after conviction. Ex parte Mendoza, 414 S.W.2d 666, 668 (Tex.Cr.App.1967). We need not determine today the continuing viability of that notion since, as indicated, the record tells too little about the circumstances surrounding the offense for us to interpret them one way or the other, though the indictment charges the delivery of heroin was “by constructive transfer.”

¶13. Mission is her hometown but appellant had her children with her in Lubbock before taking them to her parents in September 1980 apparently shortly before she was arrested. Still, appellant swore she had not been across the border after August 1980, the alleged date of her offense, did not have relatives in Mexico and had not been there in “a long time.”

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