McPeters v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

1 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 1 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““The Speedy Trial Act provides that the court shall set aside an indictment, information, or complaint ‘if the State is not ready for trial’ within certain time limits. It has been held that the Act addresses itself to prosecutorial delay rather than the judicial process as a whole. See Barfield v. State, 586 S.W.2d 538 (Tex.Cr.App.1979); Ordunez v. Bean, 579 S.W.2d 911 (Tex.Cr.App.1979) (concurring opinion by Clinton, J.). As a result, the Court of Criminal Appeals has concluded that the overcrowding of a trial court’s docket is an ‘exceptional circumstance’ which justifies tolling the time period under the Speedy Trial Act. Barfield v. State, supra; Ordunez v. Bean, supra. We find this analysis controlling. * * * This delay was occasioned by the procedures of the sheriff’s department, and was in no way attributable to the prosecutor’s failure to proceed on the merits of the case. We hold that this delay was an ‘exceptional circumstance’ within the terms of section 4(10) of the Speedy Trial Act that tolled the statute from June 4, 1979 to August 8th, 1979. * * * Accordingly, we hold that the delay in processing appellant’s bond in the sheriff’s department justified the delay in bringing appellant to trial. No error is shown.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Lyles v. State