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625 F.2d 809

Docket No. 80-1116.

Mosby v. Mabry

Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals

Submitted June 12, 1980.

Decided July 18, 1980.

Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals · decided 1980-07-18

Cited by 2 later decisions — most recently April 1981

1 federal appellate ·

3 counsel of record

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)

Relies on Frisbie v. Collins · DeLyra v. United States · United States v. Louisiana

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Opinion by (per_curiam) · Decided 1980-07-18

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1*810John L. Kearney, Pine Bluff, Ark., argued, for appellant.

¶2Roger Dean Mosby, pro se.

¶3Jack W. Dickerson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Little Rock, Ark., argued, Steve Clark, Atty. Gen. and Jack W. Dickerson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Little Rock, Ark., on brief, for appel-lee.

¶4Before LAY, Chief Judge, STEPHENSON, Circuit Judge, and HANSON,* Senior District Judge.

¶6PER CURIAM.

¶7Petitioner appeals from the district court’s1 denial of petitioner’s requested ha-beas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. We affirm the district court.

¶8Petitioner primarily advances two arguments on appeal: (1) unlawful extradition and (2) deprivation of right to counsel through the admission of testimony by a state witness.2

¶9Petitioner was arrested in New Orleans, Louisiana, in 1968, on state charges of vagrancy and public intoxication. He waived extradition and voluntarily returned with officials to Arkansas when he was told that he was wanted in Arkansas only for parole violation and assault with intent' to kill. Upon returning, petitioner was charged with first degree murder. Petitioner is now serving a life sentence for that crime.

¶10Petitioner argues that he was lured into the state of Arkansas by fraud and deceit and that the murder charge was pending against him at the time of the extradition request. Petitioner contends that this fraud voids the subsequent conviction.3

¶11Even assuming petitioner’s alleged facts to be true, he is still not entitled to habeas relief. Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 522, 72 S.Ct. 509, 511, 96 L.Ed.2d 541 (1952) (“the power of a court to try a person for a crime is not impaired by the fact that he was brought within the court’s jurisdiction by reason of a ‘forcible abduction.’ ’’); Konigsberg v. Ciccone, 417 F.2d 161, 164 and 164 n. 1 (8th Cir. 1969), cert denied, 397 U.S. 963, 90 S.Ct. 996, 25 L.Ed.2d 255 (1970); Hunt v. Eyman, 405 F.2d 384 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1020, 89 S.Ct. 1644, 23 L.Ed.2d 46 (1969) (improper extradition does not entitle appellant to a writ of habeas corpus).

¶12There is also a dispute over testimony by the state’s chief witness, police offi*811cer Tudor, who testified that petitioner had made an oral confession to him after being fully advised of his “Miranda ” rights.

¶13Petitioner makes some rather novel arguments in regard to this testimony, and concludes by alleging that there was a violation of appellant’s right to counsel through the introduction of “impressions” of an alleged unwritten statement made while appellant was without an attorney during custodial interrogation.

¶14While the testimony of Tudor and the testimony of petitioner conflict, the only issue is one of credibility. There was no error in allowing the testimony. See, Mosby v. State, 489 S.W.2d 799, 801 (Ark.1973).

¶15We have reviewed all of petitioner’s arguments and find no error by the district court. The district court is affirmed.

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