Willis v. Barksdale’s Empirical Analysis
1985
Citation profile
3 federal appellate · 3 state decisions
Relationships
Applies 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act))
Relies on Bell v. Wolfish · Parratt v. Taylor · Hudson v. Palmer · Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co. · Youngberg v. Romeo Ex Rel. Romeo
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 9 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“Tennessee common law imposes upon the sheriff and his chief jailer a duty to treat prisoners “kindly and humanely.” Hale v. Johnston, 140 Tenn. 182 , 203 S.W. 949 (1918); State ex rel. Morris v. National Surety Co., 162 Tenn. 547 , 39 S.W.2d 581 (1931). Tennessee statutory law imposes upon them, in impressive breadth and detail, a multitude of mandatory duties designed to promote the inmate’s welfare. By contrast, Tennessee does not impose upon the sheriff or his jailer any statutory duties directly and immediately related to the medical care of inmates. In fact, Tennessee expressly assigns those duties to others. For example, T.C.A. Section 41-4-115(a) states that “[t]he county legislative bodies shall alone have the power, and it shall be their duty, to provide medical attendance upon all prisoners ...” Furthermore, T.C.A. Section 41-4-116(c)(2) permits the county legislative body to appoint jail inspectors whose “duties” include the making of “rules and regulations for the preservation of the health and decorum of the prisoners ...” Finally, T.C.A. Section 41-4-140(a)(l) directs the Tennessee Corrections Institute to “establish minimum standards ... for the safekeeping, health and welfare of inmates.” Tennessee law, therefore, did not require defendants to ferret out and address the unique medical needs of each individual prisoner. Tennessee law permitted them to rely upon the county’s medical personnel to treat prisoners’ medical problems properly. True, it might have bee”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“Here, defendant Coop, as chief jailer, had a duty derived from the constitution, from Tennessee statutory law, and from Tennessee common law, to maintain reasonably safe conditions. Implicit in that duty is some responsibility to confront prisoners’ basic medical needs. Towards that end, defendant Coop ordered certain measures to minimize the heat wave’s impact on the prisoners’ health. Yet Coop’s duty did not extend to developing procedures to discover the special medical needs of individual inmates. Tennessee by statute specifically delegates to others the duty to address inmates’ specific medical problems. Further, health department employees, not Coop, had direct responsibility for providing medical care, including administering medications, to particular inmates. It was their duty to discover the medical needs of particular inmates and to advise jail administrators of those needs. Absent evidence to the contrary, defendant Coop constitutionally could operate on the assumption that those responsible for providing medical care to particular inmates were discharging that duty properly and that they would communicate to him their professional judgment about medical needs of prisoners requiring his action.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“In Willis, the court recognized that: The sheriff is an official popularly elected by county residents who has the statutory responsibility for safekeeping all prisoners within the jail. T.C.A. Sections 8-8-201 and 41-4-101.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.