United States v. Glynn’s Empirical Analysis
627 F.2d 39 · 1980
Citation profile
20 federal appellate · 2 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 23 later decisions — most recently May 2001
20 federal appellate · 2 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (Hobbs Act)
Relies on Stirone v. United States · Barrett v. United States · Amperex Electronic Corp. v. New York Racing Assn., Inc. · Gerry v. United States · Rodriguez v. United States
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 23 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“I am unable to comprehend how the assets of the Supreme Electric Company could have been depleted when the payoffs made in Count I, $100.00, and in Count II, $125.00, were furnished by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Count IV presents the same situation; Lee Roy Harper, the owner of Harper’s Electric Company, made a payoff of $250.00 to the defendant with FBI funds. The argument is made that Hobbs Act jurisdiction exists because they charge an attempt to affect commerce in contrast to actual impact; therefore, the source of the bribe money is irrelevant. The argument, although superficially plausible is, in truth, both untenable and illusory. First, the facts are that more than a mere attempt was made to extort money from the contractors named in Counts I, II, and IV. The bribery negotiations between the contractors and the defendant were not frustrated or aborted; they culminated in actual payments of bribes. Even if it could be said that the initial negotiations constituted an attempt, they eventually merged into a completed transaction, the transfer of money. But even viewing the facts as portraying only an attempt to affect commerce, as the Government asks us to do, the argument still fails. This is because any attempt to affect commerce was an impossibility when the monies offered and delivered to the defendant were Government funds rather than assets of the contractors. Conceptually, the transactions were illusory insofar as their having any possibility, let alone ”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent“(a) Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires so to do ... shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. (b) As used in this section- ****** (2) The term “extortion” means the obtaining of property from another with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right. (3) The term “commerce” means commerce within the District of Columbia, or any Territory or Possession of the United States; all commerce between any point in a State, Territory, Possession, or the District of Columbia and any point outside thereof;. all commerce between points within the same State through any place outside such State; and all other commerce over which the United States has jurisdiction.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“[the Hobbs] Act speaks in broad language, manifesting a purpose to use all the constitutional power Congress has to punish interference with interstate commerce by extortion ....”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.