Williams v. State’s Empirical Analysis
1991
Citation profile
28 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 29 later decisions — most recently March 2010 · most notably 629 So. 2d 6 - Hallford v. State (1993), 629 So. 2d 14 - State v. Tarver (1993)
28 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Miranda v. State of Arizona Vignera · Anderson v. City of Bessemer City · Ohio v. Roberts · Chambers v. Mississippi · Pointer v. Texas
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 29 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“" '[E]ven when the trial judge adopts proposed findings verbatim, the findings are those of the court and may be reversed only if clearly erroneous.' Anderson v. Bessemer City, North Carolina , 470 U.S. 564 , 572 , 105 S.Ct. 1504 , 1511 , 84 L.Ed.2d 518 , 527 (1985). See also United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co. , 376 U.S. 651 , 84 S.Ct. 1044 , 12 L.Ed.2d 12 (1964) (verbatim findings are not to be summarily rejected and will stand if supported by the evidence); Weeks v. State , 568 So.2d 864 (Ala.Cr.App. 1989), cert. denied, Weeks v. Alabama , 498 U.S. 882 , 111 S.Ct. 230 , 112 L.Ed.2d 184 (1990) (issue discussed in dicta); Morrison v. State , 551 So.2d 435 (Ala.Cr.App. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 911 , 110 S.Ct. 1938 , 109 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990) (trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law were not clearly erroneous and adoption of findings and conclusions was proper)."”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage“"McWilliams asserts that the guilt-phase and penalty-phase jury instruction on reasonable doubt violated his right to due process. In his introductory remarks to the guilt-phase jury, the trial court said: "`The burden of proof in a criminal case is beyond a reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty. Now, don't get confused by those things. Those are synonymous: whatever is beyond a reasonable doubt is also to a moral certainty. Jurists and courts have had trouble for years in defining reasonable doubt. And the easiest definitions I have been able to find are very similar, but they say this: a reasonable doubt is a doubt for which a reason can be given. A reasonable doubt is a doubt for which there is a reason. The doubt which would justify an acquittal must be an actual substantial doubt, not just a possible doubt. It can't be a doubt based on guesswork or speculation or a capricious doubt. A reasonable doubt is a fair doubt based upon reason and common sense and arising from the state of the evidence. A reasonable doubt may arise not only from the evidence produced, but also from the lack of evidence. The burden is on the prosecution to prove the Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of every essential element of the crime charged here.' "Similarly, in its guilt-phase jury instruction, the trial court charged the jury as follows: "`The state must prove by the evidence the Defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The doubt which would justify an acquittal must be an”
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. Stewart v. State““ ‘The admission of hearsay evidence against a defendant implicates the sixth amendment because the defendant cannot confront the out of court declarant.’ Twentieth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure 79 Geo.L.J. 957, 1068 (1991). [Emphasis added in Williams.] “ ‘The Confrontation Clause operates in two separate ways to restrict the range of admissible hearsay. First, in conformance with the Framers’ preference for face-to-face accusation, the Sixth Amendment establishes a rule of necessity. In the usual case ... the prosecution must either produce, or demonstrate the unavailability of, the declarant whose statement it wishes to use against the defendant. See Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 , 92 S.Ct. 2308 , 33 L.Ed.2d 293 (1972); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 , 88 S.Ct. 1318 , 20 L.Ed.2d 255 (1968). See also Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458 , 20 S.Ct. 993 , 44 L.Ed. 1150 (1900); California v. Green, 399 U.S. [149], at 161-162, 165,167 n. 16, 90 S.Ct. [1930], at 1936-1937,1938, 1939, n. 16. “ ‘The second aspect operates once a witness is shown to be unavailable. Reflecting its underlying purpose to augment accuracy in the factfinding process by ensuring the defendant an effective means to test adverse evidence, the Clause countenances only hearsay marked with such trustworthiness that “there is no material departure from the reason of the general rule.” (citation omitted).’ “Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 , 100 S.Ct. 2531 [2538], 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980). See also United St”
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. M.M. v. State
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.