Stastny v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co.’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

61 federal appellate · 21 district · 2 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 140 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “). . Both o£ these theories must be kept in mind when considering the class certification question, because “ ‘to answer the procedural questions [of Rule 23]... in effect requires answering the substantive question whether, under either of the available theories, there exists the requisite”

   5 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Stambaugh v. Kansas Department of Corrections · Abram v. United Parcel Service of America, Inc.

2. ““As is now well recognized, the class action commonality criteria are, in general, more easily met when a disparate impact rather than a disparate treatment theory underlies a class claim. The disparate impact ‘pattern or practice’ is typically based upon an objective standard applied evenly and automatically to affected employees: an intelligence or aptitude test, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 , 91 S.Ct. 849 , 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971); an educational requirement, id.; a physical requirement, e.g., Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir.1969). Both the existence and the ‘common reach’ of such objectively applied patterns or practices are likely to be indisputable from the outset, so that no real commonality problems for class action maintenance ever arise in this regard. On the other hand, the disparate treatment pattern or practice must be one based upon a specific intent to discriminate against an entire group, to treat it as a group less favorably simply because of its sex (or other impermissible reason). The greater intrinsic difficulty in establishing the existence and common reach of such a subjectively based practice is obvious. See Hauck v. Xerox Corp., 78 F.R.D. 375 , 378 (E.D.Pa.1978). In the instant case, it is clear that plaintiffs’ ultimate reliance would of necessity have been upon showing a pattern of disparate treatment. There is no suggestion in the record of a Griggs-type objectively imposed practice having discriminatory d”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond · Lott v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co.

3. “(i) the nature of the alleged unlawful employment practice genuinely had a class-wide impact; (ii) employment practices affecting the class were uniform or diverse, given factors such as size of the work force, number of plants involved; range of employment conditions, occupations, and work activities; geographic dispersion of the employees and extent of intra-com-pany employee transfers; (iii) members’ treatment would be likely to involve common questions; (iv) relevant employment and personnel policies and practices were centralized and uniform; and (v) similar conditions prevailed throughout the time period covered by the allegations.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Bacon v. Honda of America Manufacturing, Inc. · Miller v. Baltimore Gas & Electric Co.