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← 628 F.2d 848 - Werner v. Upjohn Co.

Werner v. Upjohn Co.’s Empirical Analysis

628 F.2d 848 · 1980

Citation profile

181
cited by 181 later decisions
18
states following
June 2017
most recently cited

98 federal appellate · 12 district · 36 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 181 later decisions — most recently June 2017 · most notably McEwen v. City of Norman (1991), 13 Cal. 4th 1104 - Carlin v. Superior Court (1996)

98 federal appellate · 12 district · 36 state decisions — followed in 18 states

9901980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Columbia Co v. Hawthorne · 13 Cal. 3d 113 - Ault v. International Harvester Co. · Smith v. E R Squibb & Sons, Inc · Robbins v. Farmers Union Grain Terminal Ass'n

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 181 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““Plaintiff argues that a fundamental distinction exists between negligence and strict liability since in a negligence action it is the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct which is in issue while in a strict liability case the issue is whether the product is unreasonably dangerous. Thus, the argument goes, in a negligence action the focus is on the defendant while in strict liability the focus is on the product. We concede the obvious distinction between negligence and strict liability, but we do not believe that this distinction should produce a different result. The rationale behind Rule 407 is that people in general would be less likely to take subsequent remedial measures if their repairs or improvements would be used against them in a lawsuit arising out of a prior accident. By excluding this evidence defendants are encouraged to make such improvements. It is difficult to understand why this policy should apply any differently where the complaint is based on strict liability as well as negligence. From a defendant’s point of view it is the fact that the evidence may be used against him which will inhibit subsequent repairs or improvement. It makes no difference to the defendant on what theory the evidence is admitted; his inclination to make subsequent improvements will be similarly repressed. The reasoning behind this asserted distinction we believe to be hypertechnical, for the suit is against the manufacturer, not against the product.” 628 F.2d at 857 .”
    7 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. ““The distinction between negligence and strict liability lessens considerably in failure to warn cases. Under a negligence theory the issue is whether the defendant exercised due care in formulating and updating the warning, while under a strict liability theory the issue is whether the lack of a proper warning made the product unreasonably dangerous. Though phrased differently the issue under either theory is essentially the same: Was the warning adequate?””
    5 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. ““The defendant argues that we should adopt the rule of some courts, that the rule against admitting evidence of subsequent remedial measures not apply in product liability cases. See Ault v. Int’l Harvester, [citations omitted]. We are not persuaded. The court assumes that the product is defective, and thus overlooks the situation where the product is not defective but could be made better. A manufacturer who undertakes precautionary measures in this setting will face the risk of liability for an injury caused by the earlier nondefective version of the product based on evidence of his subsequent act which made the product safer but in no way supports an inference that the initial version of the product was defective. Furthermore, if the rationale of Ault were applied in federal courts it might effectively override Rule 407 since its reasoning that evidence of subsequent precautionary measures is admissible in product liability cases might apply with equal force to a negligence cause of action. However, Congress, in enacting Rule 407, has chosen to exclude such evidence as proof of negligence and the Ault court offers no basis for distinguishing between the two theories. Smyth v. Upjohn Company, Inc., 529 F.2d 803 (2nd Cir.1975) rejects the holding of Ault as do we. [footnote omitted.] Our conclusion is supported by the close similarity between negligence and strict liability. The elements of both are the same with the exception that in negligence plaintiff must show a breach ”
    4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.