United States v. Cole’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

27 federal appellate · 22 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 62 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““The officer’s pat-down of appellant cannot be justified by appellant’s mere presence on the premises during the execution of the warrant. ‘[A] person’s mere propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal activity does not, without more, give rise to probable cause to search that person.’ Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 , 100 S.Ct. 338, 342 , 62 L.Ed.2d 238, 245 (1979). Mere presence neither obviates nor satisfies the requirement of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), that specific articulable facts support an inference that the suspect might be armed and dangerous. Ybarra, supra, 444 U.S. at 92 , 100 S.Ct. at 343 , 62 L.Ed.2d at 246-47 . See also U.S. v. Tharpe, 536 F.2d 1098, 1100 (5th Cir.1976) (en banc). “Nor does the fact that the officers testified that they had previously received information of an undisclosed nature about appellant constitute reason to search under Terry . Without knowledge of the content of that information the court cannot assess the reasonableness of the inference of dangerousness. The exceptions to the requirement of a warrant are narrow and jealously guarded, and ‘ “the burden is on those seeking the exemption to show the need for it.” ’ Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 760 , 99 S.Ct. 2586, 2591 , 61 L.Ed.2d 235, 242 (1979), quoting U.S. v. Jeffers, 343 U.S. 48 , 51, 72 S.Ct. 93, 95 , 96 L.Ed. 59 , 64 (1951). This burden was not met by testimony that the officers involved had prior information about”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Lippert v. State · Daniel Leveto

2. “A different result might be in order if [the appellant] and his truck, were not observed arriving by the officers as all parties converged on the scene, and in this respect Napoli 5 neither controls nor was wrongly decided. For purposes of construing the scope of a premises search warrant, it is much more reasonable to regard a car which is discovered for the first time already on the premises to be searched as a part of the premises, subject to search. The allegations in support of the issuance of a warrant might well justify the magistrate reasonably to intend, and the policeman reasonably to understand the magistrate to mean, a description of “premises” to include anything at the described location which is under the control or direction of the person whose effects are to be searched which might serve as a hiding place for the contraband sought. But this reasoning cannot apply to an outsider who shows up during the course of a search.... To say in effect that the warrant’s use of the word “premises” alone suffices as a determination by the magistrate, resting on probable cause, that the warrant extend to any and all visitors found on the premises, is to stretch the word beyond its normal meaning, or, as discussed above, its reasonable interpretation. The use of the word “premises” alone does not, and should not, include visitors or their vehicles caught in the act of visiting.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Wheeler v. State

3. “In [Napoli], this court held that a warrant to search “premises3 known as” a particular address and described as a residential dwelling conferred authority to search a camper parked in the driveway. Here the warrant referred to “premises described as” a family dwelling, “being the rear apartment” of a particular address. There is no significant difference in the terms of the two warrants. Under Napoli , therefore, appellant’s truck, parked in a carport attached to the rear apartment, was within the scope of the warrant.[ ] The officers were thus authorized to search the truck, limited only by the nature of what they were searching for. See Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649 , 100 S.Ct. 2395 , 65 L.Ed.2d 410 (1980); Hams v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 152 , 67 S.Ct. 1098 , 91 L.Ed. 1399 (1947). Both the hat (in which the gun was found) and the attached case (in which the silencer was found) might have contained drugs. The officers thus did not exceed the scope of the warrant in searching those items. The convictions on counts one through four, based on the pen gun and the silencer, must be affirmed.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. United States v. Lisbon