Godin v. Schencks’s Empirical Analysis
629 F.3d 79 · 2010
Citation profile
24 federal appellate · 29 district · 6 state decisions
Relationships
Applies 15 U.S.C. § 78U (§ 21d of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934) · 28 U.S.C. § 1343 · 28 U.S.C. § 1367 · 28 U.S.C. § 2072 · 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act))
Relies on Ashcroft v. Iqbal · Erie Co v. Tompkins · United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs · Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp. · Hanna v. Plumer
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 78 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“Applying this converse summary-judgment-like standard makes the special motion to dismiss unlike other primary procedural mechanisms for early disposition of claims.... If the party with the burden on the dispositive motion (the party seeking dismissal or [summary judgment]) fails to meet it, the result is trial. However, when applying the special motion to dismiss, pursuant to our precedent interpreting [Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute], if the party with the burden at step two (the nonmoving party, generally the plaintiff) fails to meet its burden, the result is no trial and dismissal of the action.... To avoid an unconstitutional application of the law, as our rules of statutory interpretation require us to do, [Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute] must be construed, consistent with usual motion-to-dismiss practice, to permit courts to infer that the allegations in a plaintiffs complaint and factual statements in any affidavits responding to a special motion to dismiss are true. This standard, consistent with other dispositive motion practice, requires only that the nonmoving party provide prima facie evidence to support its burden of showing that the moving party’s petitioning activity was devoid of any reasonable factual support or any arguable basis in law ....”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage“Inherent in Rule 56 is that a fact-finder’s evaluation of material factual disputes is not required. But Section 556 [the Maine statute] serves the entirely distinct function of protecting those specific defendants that have been targeted with litigation on the basis of their protected speech. When applicable, Section 556 requires a court to consider whether the defendant’s conduct had a reasonable basis in fact or law, and whether that conduct caused actual injury. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 cannot be said to control those issues.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence“general federal procedures governing all categories of cases,”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.