Volume 63 — Connecticut Reports

Suit for an injunction against the filling of a sluice-way by the defendants ; brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and heard before Thayer, J. Facts found and judgment rendered for the defendants, and appeal by the plaintiffs. The case is stated in the opinion. 1. For more than fifty years the water-way in question has existed, twenty feet wide, and over three hundred feet in length, and in it the water was six feet deep at ordinary high tide.

Action for an injury through tlie negligence of the defendant company; brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County. The defendants suffered a default, and the case was heard in damages before Thayer, J. Facts found and damages assessed at seven hundred dollars, and appeal by the defendants. The case is fully stated in the opinion. 1. The defendant was not guilty of negligence in law.

<p>It is a serious question whether the towns should not he required to conform strictly to the statute in the valuation of property for taxation.</p> <p>Where assessors adopt any other rule and on appeal it is claimed that the property has been assessed beyond the value that should have been given it under the rule, there would be no practical difficulty in reducing the valuation to a proper amount.</p> <p>But where the grievance is merely that the property has been valued higher than other like property, a reduction of the valuation to conform it to the undervaluations might do wrong to other taxpayers, while a raising of the valuation in the other cases could not be done because the parties would not be before the court.</p> <p>Where a comparison is made of the valuation of the property in question with that of other property, the other property should be similar in kind and near, and the methods of estimating the value should be the same in both cases.</p> <p>On an appeal taken by a wife with her husband, the husband prosecuting the appeal after her death, testified that a piece of land of seven acres, assessed at $2S0, was worth only $105. Held that the town could show that the wife, about the time of the assessment, asked $75 an acre for the land.</p> <p>The granting or refusing a continuance of a case is a matter of discretion that cannot be reviewed on error.</p>

Action to recover for the death of the plaintiff’s intestate through a defect of a bridge of the defendant town; brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County, and tried to the jury, on a general denial, before F. B. Hall, J. Verdict for the plaintiff for $5,000 damages and appeal by the defendant for error in the rulings and charge of the court. The case is fully stated in the opinion.

ACTION for an injury to the plaintiff’s horse through the negligence of the defendant; brought to the Court of Common Pleas in New Haven County, and tried to the jury before Studley, J. Verdict for the plaintiff and appeal by the defendant for errors in the rulings and charge of the court. The case is fully stated in the opinion.

INDICTMENT for murder; in the Superior Court in Fair-field County. Tried to the jury on the plea of not guilty, before Fenn, J. Verdict guilty, and appeal by the defendant for errors in the rulings and charge of the court. The case is fully stated in the opinion.

Suit for tbe construction of a will; brought to the Superior Court in Windham County. Facts found and case reserved 'for advice. The case is fully stated in the opinion.

<p>The defendant was fraudulently induced by B to give a note to M for money loaned by M to her, which she allowed B to take. This note was assigned for a full consideration by M to the plaintiff. Afterwards the defendant gave the plaintiff a new note and mortgage in the place of the original note with accrued interest. At this time she knew of the fraud of B in inducing her to give the first note. In a suit upon the note she set up the fraud in defense. Held—</p> <p>1. That the burden of proof of the fraud rested upon her.</p> <p>2. That the fact that B had fraudulently induced her to give the first note, could not affect M, who acted in good faith in taking the note and paid a full consideration for it.</p> <p>3. That “ earnest solicitation ” of B and the plaintiff that the defendant should give the new note in the place of the original one, could not affect the case in the absence of fraud on their part in soliciting it.</p>

M. Sail, 1. The first reason of appeal assigned is that the court erred in refusing to allow the appellants to open and close the argument in the Superior Court. The rules of practice provide that “ the counsel in support of the affirmative of an issue of fact will be entitled to begin the trial and to open and close the argument.” 58 Conn., 577, Rule 4, § 3. The appellants had the affirmative of the only issue of fact to be tried.

Facts found and judgment rendered for the defendant, and appeal by the plaintiff. The case is fully stated in the opinion.

ACTION to recover back an unearned balance of prepaid interest on a demand note which was paid up by the plaintiffs before the expiration of the time from which the interest had been paid; brought, by appeal from the judgment of a justice of the peace, to the Court of Common Pleas of Hartford County.

The defendant moved that the application be quashed, which motion the court (Thayer, J.,~) granted, and dismissed the application. Appeal by the plaintiff. In this court the defendant moved to strike the appeal from the docket on the ground that it would not lie from such a judgment. Motion heard and overruled, and the case argued on its merits. The case is fully stated in the opinion.

Suit to set aside a note and mortgage claimed to have been obtained of the plaintiff by duress of threats; brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County. The defendant demurred to the complaint, which demurrer the court overruled. The case was then heard on its merits before J. M. Hall, J. Facts found and decree passed setting aside the note and mortgage, and appeal to this court by the defendant. The case is stated in the opinion. 1.

<p>The vendor of land stands on the same ground with the vendee in respect to the right to a specific performance of a contract for the sale of the land, with the qualification that courts have sometimes refused to decree a specific performance in his favor where it would be productive of special hardship.</p> <p>It is not enough that the vendor has a remedy at law in a suit for damages.</p> <p>The plaintiff and defendant agreed by parol, the former to sell and the latter to buy certain real estate. The plaintiff wrote out a memorandum of the sale and submitted it to the defendant, and it was agreed that the plaintiff should have duplicate copies prepared, which he should sign and forward to the defendant for his signature, who agreed to return one to the plaintiff signed by him. Two days later the plaintiff sent the duplicates, both signed by him, saying in his letter — “ If found correct please sign and mail me one of them.” The defendant replied, acknowledging the receipt of the papers, and saying — “I will be in your city to-morrow and call on you with the agreement.” Neither of the duplicates was in fact signed by the defendant, who afterwards refused to carry out the agreement. Held that there was not a sufficient signature of the defendant to the agreement to take it out of the statute of frauds.</p> <p>The only description of the property in the memorandum was — “A tract of land with all the buildings thereon, adjoining the N. H. & D. railroad in the town of 0, containing some twenty acres.” Held that the description was too indefinite.</p> <p>Whether the description could have been applied to the land by extrinsic evidence: Quczre.</p> <p>The plaintiff delivered the keys of the buildings to the defendant at the time of the oral agreement, and he took them. The plaintiff also immediately detached and removed from the buildings a boiler, shafting, vats, and other articles, at a large expense, and proceeded to get all incumbrances on the property removed, the agreement requiring this, and finally effected their entire removal, though not till after the defendant had refused to carry out the contract. Held that this was a part performance on the part of the plaintiff that delivered the case from the application of the statute of frauds.</p> <p>The acts which will constitute a sufficient part performance in such a case must have been done by the party seeking to enforce the contract, in pursuance of it, and with the design of carrying it into execution; and must be done with the assent of the other party or with such knowledge as would imply assent, and be such as altered the relations of the parties.</p> <p>The possession of the land, delivered and taken, must be a possession explainable only by the contract, indicating a new estate or interest acquired, and not the mere continuance of a former possession.</p> <p>Where by a contract for the sale of land the vendor is to convey a clear title, and time is not of the essence of the contract, and is not made material by the offer of the other party to fulfill and his demand of a conveyance, the vendor will be allowed a reasonable time to perfect his title, however defective it may have been at the time of the agreement.</p> <p>By the agreement in the present case the defendant was to pay the plaintiff rent at an agreed rate for the time intervening between the agreement and the conveyance. The complaint set out the agreement and claimed damages for its breach and a specific performance. Held that judgment could be rendered in the suit for the amount of rent found due, as well as for a specific performance.</p> <p>And it did not affect the case that the rent found due was in itself below the jurisdiction of the court.</p>

Suit for an adjudication as to the construction and effect of the will of William L. Gilbert; brought to the Superior Court in Litchfield County and transferred by agreement to Hartford County. Reserved for advice. The case is fully stated in the opinion.

ACTION to compel the defendant corporation to issue to the plaintiff a certificate for certain shares of its stock, and for damages for the refusal to issue the same; brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County, and heard before Prentice, J. Facts found and judgment rendered for the defendant, and appeal by the plaintiff.

<p>The questions of the duty of a town to keep its highways in repair, and of a traveler to use reasonable care, are questions of law, hut the question in any particular case whether the duty has been performed is wholly one of fact.</p> <p>The statute (Gen. Statutes, § 26S9,) which provides that drivers of vehicles shall turn to the right when they meet on the highway, does not absolutely bar one who turns to the left from the right to recover for an injury from a defect of the highway on that side. It would, however, be a circumstance, and a very strong one, for the court to consider in deciding whether the party acted with reasonable care.</p> <p>The plaintiff's horse was injured, through a defect in a highway, beyond all reasonable hope of recovery. Held that his right to recover its full value was not affected by the fact that he had caused him to be killed.</p>

ACTION for an injury to tbe person and property of the plaintiff through the negligence of the defendant’s servant; brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County and tried to the court ■ upon a general denial before J. M. Hall, J. Facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff, and appeal by the defendant. The case is fully stated in the opinion.

Action to recover damages for malpractice by the defendant as a physician, the plaintiff being a minor and suing by her next friend ; brought to the District Court of Waterbury and tried to the jury, upon a general denial, before Bradstreet, J. Verdict for the plaintiff, and appeal by the defendant for error in the rulings and charge of tlie court. The case is fully stated in the opinion. cited — 2 Shearm. &'Redf. on Negligence, § 609; S Wharton & Stillson’s Med.

ACTION to recover benefits claimed to be due to the plaintiff from the defendant, a mutual benefit society of which he was a member; brought, by appeal from the judgment of a justice of the peace, to the Court of Common Pleas of Hartford County, and tried to the court, on a general denial, before Calhoun, J. Facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff, and appeal by the defendant. The case is fully stated in the opinion.

INFORMATION in the nature of a quo warranto, filed in the Superior Court in Fairfield County in October, 1891, against the captain of police of the city of Bridgeport, for usurping the office of chief of police of the city, claimed to belong to the relator.

ACTIONS by sundry claimants on the insolvent and assigned estate of Bunnell & Scranton, who bad been bankers and brokers in New Haven, the defendant being the trustee in insolvency. The plaintiffs were creditors by virtue of deposits of money with the firm for the purchase and carrying by them for the depositors of stock, in the New York market, and 'claimed a right to the stocks so far as they could be traced.

COMPLAINT, originally preferred to the City Court of the city of Bridgeport by the prosecuting attorney charging the defendant with keeping “ a place for the playing in and conducting and carrying on the game, business and scheme commonly known as policy, contrary to the ordinance of said city, against the peace and contrary to the form of the statute in such cases provided.” The defendant interposed a demurrer, which was overruled, and sentence was passed against him.

Suit for the construction of the will of Lavina Webb; brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County, and reserved, on facts found, for the advice of this court.

Verdict sustaining the will, and appeal by the original appellant for error in the ruling of the court as to evidence. The case is fully stated in the opinion.

Action to recover damages for the death of the plaintiff’s intestate, caused by the negligence of the defendant company; brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County, and heard in damages by a jury, on a demurrer overruled, before Thayer, J. Damages assessed at $5,000, and appeal by the defendant for error at a former term in the granting of a motion of the plaintiff that the case be heard by a jury.

<p>It is provided by Gen. Statutes, § 2673, that no action for an injury from a defective highway or bridge shall be maintained against any town or city, “unless written notice of such injury, and of the nature and cause thereof, and of the time and place of its occurrence” shall be given within a certain time prescribed. An injury occurred on the 2d day of May, but the notice, which was otherwise correct, stated that it occurred on the 5th day of May. Held to be a fatal defect.</p> <p>And it made no difference that the defendant was not misled by the error.</p> <p>And advantage could be taken by the defendant of the want of legal notice upon a hearing in damages after a default had been suffered.</p>

<p>A testator having three sons and three daughters, gave to his daughters three sixths of the residue of his estate, and made the following provision for his sons: — “ The remaining three sixths I give to my friend D and my son-in-law 0 and to their heirs forever, in trust, to be held only for the use and benefit of my three sons, C, G and J, and their heirs ; and from time to time said trustees may pay out from the net income of said trust estate so much as they may think best for the comfortable support and wishes of my said three sons, but to neither of them at any one time more than a third part of said income, and may, if they think best, from time to time pay to either of my said sons any portion of the principal, so however that neither shall receive more than in the whole one third part thereof. And if neither of my said sons shall die before me, or before he has received one third part of the principal and interest, then so much of said trust estate shall belong to the legal representatives of said deceased and their heirs, as shall, with what has been received, amount to one third of said trust estate. And inasmuch as my intent is that my said sons may always have a current and continuous support, therefore I have vested said estate, principal and income, in said trustees and their successors, so that my said sons shall not be capable of alienating the same, nor of anticipating the income, nor possess any vested interest which may be conveyed, therefore any instrument by them designed to convey any interest in said estate or its income, shall be void, while in trust as aforesaid.” Held—</p> <p>1. That by “legal representatives” of the sons was meant their executors and administrators.</p> <p>2. That the legal representatives would take an absolute estate, discharged of the trust.</p> <p>3. That the sons took a vested interest, and that therefore the bequest did not conflict with the statute against perpetuities.</p> <p>4. Whether the provision of the will in restraint of alienation by the sons was valid : Qumre.</p> <p>5. That if not valid, yet its invalidity would not render the bequest invalid, inasmuch as the intent of the testator, gathered from the whole bequest, was an absolute one to provide for the support of his sons, to which the intent to put a restraint upon their alienation of the interest given them was wholly subordinate.</p> <p>The will provided that if the trustees named or either of them should decline the trust, die, or become incompetent, the court of probate, with the the advice of the other trustee, should appoint some suitable person in his place. Both trustees had resigned and their places had been filled; one of the new trustees had died and the other had resigned; the present trustee had then been appoiuted by the court of probate and was now the sole trustee. The will had provided that the trustees named in the will should not be required to give bonds. Held—</p> <p>1. That the testator intended that there should be two trustees, and that a co-trustee with the present one should be appointed.</p> <p>2. That the present trustee had no power to act in the appointment, and that it could be made only by the court of probate.</p> <p>3. That the provision that the original trustees should not be required to give bonds, applied only to them.</p>

The following facts were found by the court. On January 1st, 1890, the appellant- delivered to the partnership possession of the stock and merchandise in his plumber’s store in Hartford, and they signed and gave him a paper of that date, acknowledging that they had “received” the same from him, “ as fully described in an inventory of the same date,” and then proceeding as follows:— “ Which said property we receive and are to hold solely as the property of the said George…

<p>A testator provided that after certain bequests had been paid and the executor had settled with the judge of probate, the remainder of his estate should be paid to the trustee named. The will then proceeded as follows : “I hereby appoint P trustee of my estate for the following fourteen years from the time he receives said funds from the executor, to be disposed of as follows.” The will then provided for the payment by the trustee from the funds for fourteen years of an annuity to his sister and of six annuities to the widow and children of his brother O, and then proceeded as follows: — “At the expiration of fourteen years I direct my trustee to cause the remainder of my estate to be divided among the grandchildren of my deceased brother O and the adopted daughter of my sister D, share and share alike; that is to say, if there should be three living grandchildren of said O the residue of said estate shall be divided into four shares, and if more or less in the same proportion, said adopted daughter to have no more than one of the grandchildren.” Held—</p> <p>1. That the fourteen year period established for the trust was to commence at the expiration of such reasonable time after the death of the testator as would suffice for the proper settlement of the estate.</p> <p>2. That it was not necessary that such settlement should be the final accounting of the executor.</p> <p>3. That under our laws providing facilities for and requiring prompt action in the settlement of estates, it would not be assumed that such settlement could be delayed seven years.</p> <p>4. That the provision “I hereby appoint P trustee of my estate,” was sufficient to give a legal title to the trustee named.</p> <p>5. That the residuary interest under the trust became vested at the decease of the testator in the adopted daughter of his sister and the class of his brother’s grandchildren; which class would open to let in any other grandchildren of his brother subsequently born.</p> <p>6. That the bequests were not obnoxious to the statute against perpetuities.</p> <p>It is of no importance, in the case of such a trust for a class, that the persons who will ultimately take in possession, provided the time of their taking is not too remote, are different from the persons who took in right at the testator’s death.</p> <p>The law will not favor a construction of a will which suspends a title or holds it in abeyance.</p> <p>A suit for the construction of a will can be properly brought only by an executor or trustee or an administrator with the will annexed, and on the ground that they cannot safely discharge their duties without the advice and protection of a court of chancery. Heirs and legatees have no right to ask the advice of the courts as to matters in controversy between them.</p> <p>And it is no part of the plaintiff’s duty in such a suit to take ground against the validity of the will. He represents the testator, and while it is necessary and proper that he should fully state the points of difficulty, the same reasons which cast upon him the duty of procuring and defending the probate of the will at the cost of the estate require him to assume no position of active hostility to what may appear to have been the intention of the testator.</p>

ACTION on a note; brought to the Superior Court in Fair-field County, and tried to the court before Prentice, J. Judgment rendered for the defendant, and appeal by the plaintiff for error in the rulings and action of the court. The case is stated in the opinion.

<p>It is provided by Gen. Statutes, § 3831, that all taxable property shall be assessed at its “ fair market value;” and by § 3863 that a tax-payer may appeal to tlie. Superior Court from tlie action of the board of relief as to the assessment of his property, and that the court “ shall have power to grant such relief as shall to justice and equity appertain.” The assessors of a certain town had adopted as a rule the assessment of property in the town at half its market value, but had assessed the real estate of a certain party at more than half its value but not at more than its full value. Failing to get relief from the board of relief he took an appeal to the Superior Court. Held that while by the first statute the assessment was not too high, yet as injustice was done the appellant by the disproportionate assessment of his property under the rule adopted by the assessors, the court could, under the second statute, reduce the assessment to the sum required by that rule, as being a relief called for by “ justice and equity,” and that it ought to do so.</p> <p>The appellant had stated in his appeal a certain sum as a just valuation of his property under the rule adopted by the assessors, which sum was somewhat more than half its market value. Held that the court could properly take this sum as the valuation for taxation instead of the half of the market value.</p>

Suit to obtain a judicial construction of a will; brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County, and reserved, on a finding of facts, for the advice of this court. The case is stated in the opinion.

INFORMATION for arson; in the Superior Court in New Haven County.

Suit for an injunction against proceedings by the defendant to obtain an assignment of dower by a probate court in the real estate of Seymour D. Hall, of whose will the plaintiff was executor; brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County. The defendant demurred to the complaint, and the court (6r. W. Wheeler, •_/.,) sustained the demurrer and rendered judgment for the defendant. The plaintiff appealed. The case is fully stated in the opinion.

Action to recover for machinery and tools constructed for and delivered to the defendant; broug-ht to the Superior Court in New London County, and tried to the jury before Torrance, J. The complaint contained a special count on the contract and the common counts for services rendered and materials furnished, with a bill of particulars. The defense was a general denial and a set-off.

Verdict against the will and appeal by the original appellees for errors in the charge of the court. The case is fully stated in the opinion.

ACTION for fraud in contracting an alleged debt; brought originally before a justice of the peace. The defendant, a citizen of Massachusetts, residing in Boston, was arrested in Enfield in this state, upon a writ of attachment issued in the action, which was brought on Gen. Statutes § 1347.

<p>Where a vendor retains possession of personal property sold, the sale is good against all the world except the creditors of the vendor.</p> <p>And a creditor can attack the sale only by a legal attachment or a legal levy of an execution upon it, followed by legal proceedings to appropriate the avails to the payment of his debt.</p> <p>Whenever there is a conflict in the evidence or different inferences may be drawn from it, the determination of the jury will not be interfered with unless it appear that it is against the clear weight of the evidence or was influenced in some way by passion, prejudice, perversion os corruption.</p>

Suit for the construction of a will; brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County, and reserved, on facts found, for the advice of this court. The ease is stated in the opinion.

ACTION on Gen. Statutes, § 3005, to recover a penalty for the taking by the defendant of unlawful interest on a loan of personal property; brought to tbe Court of Common Pleas of Hartford County, and tried to the jury before Qalhoun, J. The court denied a motion to set aside a nonsuit granted., and the plaintiff appealed to this court. The case is stated in the opinion.

INFORMATION for an assault with intent to murder; in the Superior Court in Hartford County. The case was tried to the jury before R. Wheeler, J., and a verdict of guilty rendered, and an appeal taken by the accused for errors in the charge of the court. The case is fully stated in the opinion.

Barber; taken to the Superior Court in Hartford County, arid tried to the jury before Robinson, J. Yerdict setting aside the will, and appeal by the original appellees. The case is fully stated in the opinion.

Actioh for personal injuries received by the plaintiff while a passenger on the defendant’s railroad, in consequence of a collision of cars; brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County and heard in damages, after a default, before Robinson., J. Pending the suit, and before the hearing, but after the default, the plaintiff died, and the executor of his will entered to prosecute.

<p>Damages for land taken for a public improvement should be assessed as of the time the land is taken; and that time, in contemplation of law, is the time the improvement is finally adopted, which may or may not coincide with the time actual possession is taken.</p> <p>The plaintiff, whose land had been appropriated by the city of Waterbury for the alteration and widening one of its public streets, appealed from the assessment of damages; while his appeal was pending the land so taken appreciated in value and the plaintiff upon trial in the Superior Court claimed the right to recover damages for the land at its enhanced value. Held:—</p> <p>1. That under the terms of the defendant’s charter the land must he regarded as having been “ taken ” when the report of the road commissioners was accepted by the court of common council and recorded, and compensation had been made or secured to the land owners.</p> <p>2. That the plaintiff’s appeal from the assessment of damages simply postponed the payment of such damages until the final determination of his appeal, but did not postpone the time the improvement was deemed to have been made, nor suspend the right of the city to proceed with the work.</p> <p>3. That the plaintiff therefore, was only entitled to recover damages as of the date of the original assessment.</p> <p>When a public improvement authorized by a city charter is duly carried out by the city, to the extent of taking »the required land, paying damages and collecting benefits therefor, and working the improvement wholly or in part, it is then too late for the city to abandon the improvement to the detriment of one claiming to be aggrieved by the assessment of damages.</p>

ACTION by Nellie W. Holley and husband to recover damages for injury to ber land, alleged to. bave been caused by tbe change of grade of Water street in tbe town and borough of Torrington ; brought to the Superior Court in Litchfield County and heard by a committee appointed by the court, pursuant to the prayer of the plaintiffs’ complaint.

<p>Chapter 147 of the Public Acts of 1893 requires that all contracts for the sale of personal property conditioned that the tiLle thereto shall remain in the vendor after delivery, shall be in writing and acknowledged and recorded in the town clerk’s office where the vendee resides; and that all conditional sales not so made, acknowledged and recorded shall be regarded as absolute sales, “ except against the vendor and his heirs.” Held:—</p> <p>1. That the original vendor of goods sold under such a contract not recorded could nevertheless replevy the goods from a bona fide purchaser for value from the conditional vendee, where the latter had acquired no title from the original vendor at the time of suit.</p> <p>2. That the statute is not wholly without effect, since it might operate against the assigns of the original vendor and against the assigns of his heirs.</p> <p>Courts are not at liberty to speculate upon any supposed actual intention of the legislature. A legislative intention not expressed in some appropriate manner has no legal existence.</p>

Action to recover $500, paid by the plaintiff to the defendants’ testator, upon a written agreement for the purchase of certain real estate, which agreement, the plaintiff claimed, the said testator refused to consummate; brought to the Court of Common Pleas in Fairfield County and tried to the court, Curtis, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff, from which the defendants appealed. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

ACTION to recover for services alleged to have been rendered by the plaintiff as a civil engineer, brought to the City Court of the city of Hartford and tried to the court, McMa-nus, J. The defendant pleaded in abatement, because the amount of damages demanded in the complaint, twenty-five dollars, was not-within the jurisdiction of the court. To this plea, the plaintiff demurred; the court overruled the demurrer and sustained the plea and the plaintiff appealed.

Action to recover damages for the alleged negligence of the defendant in causing the plaintiff’s horses to run away, thereby diminishing their market value, and injuring the plaintiff’s carriage and harness; brought to the District Court of Waterbury and heard in damages to the court, Bradstreet, J.; judgment for the plaintiff and appeal by the defendant. This is the same ease reported in 62 Conn., p. 503, in which a new trial was granted.

Action to recover the amount of a policy of life insurance, brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County, and tried to the jury before F. B. Hall, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff and appeal by the defendant.

ACTION to recover the balance of an account for glass bulbs furnished by the defendant for its use in the manufacture of incandescent electric lamps ; brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County, and tried to the court, Prentice, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiffs, and appeal by the defendant.

<p>In all actions demanding damages the complaint should be such as to fairly and reasonably apprise the defendant of the grounds upon which the damages are claimed; and the plaintiff should he confined in his evidence to the grounds so stated.</p> <p>Accordingly where the complaint simply alleged a conversion by the defendants of the plaintiff’s goods which had been delivered to the former as warehousemen for storage, it was held, that the plaintiff could not recover damages for injury to the goods prior to the conversion, although attributable to the defendants’ negligence.</p> <p>Evidence of the prices obtained for goods sold at auction is admissible as tending to prove the fair actual value of the goods.</p> <p>The competency of such evidence does not depend upon the form, mode, or particular terms of the contract of sale, though these may have an essential bearing on the weight to be given to the fact of sale as affecting the price, and as indicating the value of the property.</p> <p>The expressions “actual value,” “market value,” or “market price,” mean the price or value of an article established or shown by sales, public or private, in the way of ordinary business.</p>

ACTION to recover damages for injuries to the plaintiff’s gas pipes, brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County and tried to the jury before Thayer, J.; verdict and judgment for the defendant and appeal by the plaintiff for alleged errors in the rulings and charge of the court.

ACTION for tbe specific enforcement of an oral contract alleged to have been made with the plaintiff by the defendant’s intestate, and such remedy failing, then for $5,000, damages ; brought to the Superior Court in Litchfield County. The case was heard by a committee who found and reported the facts, and the Superior Court, (Fenn, Jl,) having accepted the report and found the facts therein contained to be true, reserved the case for the advice of this court.

ACTION to recover damages upon a complaint containing but one count sounding in contract and also in tort; brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the jury before G-eorge W. Wheeler, J. The complaint alleged a purchase by the defendant of the plaintiff of two refrigerating machines for the agreed price of $13,700, and their delivery by the plaintiff; that after-wards the defendant wrongfully claimed that said machines were not of the quality and…

Appeal by Emily C. Hart from a judgment of the Superior Court of Middlesex County, rendered on a verdict sustaining the will of Erastus Brainerd of Portland in said county, deceased. Upon the trial a certain account of the testator against the appellant amounting to $41,000, was introduced in evidence, and it was conceded that this account and the several items or sums which made it up, constituted a gift from the testator to the appellant.

Appeal by the plaintiff in an action of book debt, from a decision of the Superior Court (Ralph Wheeler, J.), in New Haven County, sustaining the remonstrance of the defendant -and rejecting the report of committee in favor of the plaintiff.

Petition by the insurance commissioner, under § 2869 of the General Statutes, for the appointment of a receiver and the annulment of the charter of the defendant company; brought to a judge of the Supreme Court of Errors and heard upon a plea to the jurisdiction. The case is fully stated in the opinion.

The appeal was taken under the provisions of chapter 175, Public Acts of 1898. The county commissioners having decided that the place in which the appellant applied for a license was a suitable one, and an appeal having been taken by the applicant only, a preliminary question arose on the trial, whether evidence to prove that the place was an unsuitable one, was admissible ; the appellant claiming that the issue was only on the personal fitness of the applicant.

' ACTION of libel in personam against the town of Westport; brought to the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut. The case is the same reported in Conn. Reports, Vol. 62, p. 575.