State v. Tavares’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

1 district · 28 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 29 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “(1) Notwithstanding ... any other law to the contrary, any person convicted under section ... 707-730 relating to rape in the first degree, 707-733 relating to sodomy in the first degree, ... who has a prior conviction for any of the above enumerated offenses or of any one of those enumerated in subsection (2) [ ] in this or another jurisdiction, within the time of the maximum sentence of the prior conviction, shall be sentenced for each conviction after the first conviction to a mandatory minimum period of imprisonment without possibility of parole during such period as follows: (a) Second conviction-5 years; (b) Third conviction-10 years. [[Image here]] (3) The sentencing court may impose the above sentences consecutive to any other sentence then or previously imposed on the defendant or may impose a lesser mandatory minimum sentence without possibility of parole than that mandated by this section where the court finds that strong mitigating circumstances warrant such action.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Akao · State v. Kamana'o

2. “a conviction on each count of an indictment represents a separate conviction for the purposes of adding up the number of convictions for sentencing,”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Kamanao · State v. Kamana'o

3. “[a] basic tenet of statutory interpretation is that where the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, construction by the court is inappropriate, and the court is bound to give effect to the law according to its plain and obvious meaning. In re Hawaiian Tel. Co., 61 Haw. 572, 578 , 608 P.2d 383, 387 (1980). On the other hand, where the language of the statute is ambiguous or of doubtful meaning, or where literal construction of a statute would produce unjust results, the court may look beyond express language of the statute to ascertain the legislative intent. Id. at 578 , 608 P.2d at 387 .”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Kamanao · 9 Haw. App. 165 - State v. Simpson