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← 63 Ill. App. 3d 908 - Jablonski v. Multack

63 Ill. App. 3d 908 - Jablonski v. Multack’s Empirical Analysis

1978

Citation profile

92
cited by 92 later decisions
4
states following
February 2003
most recently cited

5 federal appellate · 3 district · 45 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 92 later decisions — most recently February 2003 · most notably 139 Ill. 2d 455 - Meerbrey v. Marshall Field & Co. (1990), 81 Ill. 2d 229 - Collier v. Wagner Castings Co. (1980)

5 federal appellate · 3 district · 45 state decisions

5001978198019902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on 31 Ill. 2d 272 - Chmelik v. Vana · Matthiessen & Hegeler Zinc Co. v. Industrial Board · Pekin Cooperage Co. v. Industrial Commission · 28 Ill. App. 3d 373 - Mier v. Staley · Readinger v. Gottschall

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 92 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““§5. (a) No common law or statutory right to recover damages from the employer *** or the agents or employees of [the employer] for injury or death sustained by any employee while engaged in the line of his duty as such employee, other than the compensation herein provided, is available to any employee who is covered by the provisions of this Act ***.” “§11. The compensation herein provided, together with the provisions of this Act, shall be the measure of the responsibility of any employer engaged in any of the enterprises or businesses enumerated in Section 3 of this Act ***.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 48, pars. 138.5(a), 138.11.”
    4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “"When the person who intentionally injures the employee is not the employer in person nor a person who is realistically the alter ego of the corporation, but merely a foreman, supervisor or manager, both the legal and the moral reasons for permitting a common-law suit against the employer collapse, and a substantial majority of modern cases bar a damage suit against the employer. The legal reason for permitting the common-law suit for direct assault by the employer, as we have seen, is that the same person cannot commit an intentional assault and then allege it was accidental. This does not apply when the assailant and the defendant are two entirely different people. Unless the employer has commanded or expressly authorized the assault, it cannot be said to be intentional from his standpoint any more than from the standpoint of any third person. Realistically, it to him is just one more industrial mishap in the factory, of the sort he has a right to consider exclusively covered by the compensation system.” (footnote omitted)”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “The correct distinction to be drawn in this class of cases is between a supervisory employee and a person who can genuinely be characterized as the alter ego of the corporation. Take, for example, a case like Heskett v. Fisher Laundry & Cleaners Company, Incorporated, which is sometimes lumped together with assault cases involving foremen. It seems probable from the facts given in the opinion that the assailant there was so dominant in the corporation that he could be deemed the alter ego of the corporation under the ordinary standards governing disregard of corporate entity. He was an officer and general manager of the corporation. His name was Fisher, and the corporation’s name was Fisher Laundry and Dry Cleaners Company — indicating that it was probably in whole or in part his own business. In such circumstances that attribution of moral responsibility for the actor’s conduct to the corporation is quite a different matter from the same process when the actor is merely a foreman or supervisor.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.