63 Md. App. 426 - Mitchell v. Goodyear Service Store’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

12 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 12 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““The reason that the Commission is empowered to set the amount of the attorney’s fees is to prevent any unscrupulous members of the Bar from exacting excessive fees from injured claimants. The fee should be in an amount that is fair and reasonable to claimant and counsel alike. The award of counsel fee should be on the basis of work performed and the result obtained.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Rogers v. Welsh · 83 Md. App. 573 - Edmond v. Ten Trex Enterprises, Inc.

2. “[W]e now focus upon the fee awarded by the Commission with respect to the projected figure of $245,000 in compensation benefits. Of course, that figure, based on life expectancies, is but an educated guess grounded on statistics and, as such, subject to the unexpected. The fee requested by Barnes [Mitchell’s counsel] in the instant case is approximately 5 percent of the additional possible $245,000 award. The $4,000 awarded Barnes by the Commission, as an additional fee, amounts to 1.6 percent of the $245,000. Although the policy statement provides a maximum fee and not an entitlement (see Bowen[, 54 Md. App.] at 386, 458 A.2d 1242 ), the Commission may not set fees so cheeseparingly as to deprive claimants of the practical ability to obtain competent counsel. See Bowen[, 54 Md.App.] at 386, 458 A.2d 1242 A. Larson, Workmen’s Compensation Law § 83.16 (1982 ed. & Supp.1984); Cline v. Warrenberg, 109 Colo. 497 , 126 P.2d 1030 (1942) (denying claimants the right to competent legal representation by fixing [inadequate] attorney’s fees may constitute a denial of due process). The Commissioner further expressed concern that Barnes used life expectancy tables in computing the size of the claimant’s award. The Commissioner opined: “[T]here is no basis of the allegation that he [the claimant] will receive in excess of $250,000. He’ll get it if he lives, and unless you can assure me that he will do that ... [incomplete sentence].” Furthermore, the trial judge was correct in remanding t”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Rogers v. Welsh

3. ““No person shall charge or collect any compensation for legal services in connection with any claims arising under this article ... unless the same be approved by the Commission. When so approved, such fee or claims shall become a lien upon the compensation awarded, but shall be paid therefrom only in the manner fixed by the Commission. Upon application of any party in interest, the Commission shall have full power to hear and determine any and all questions which may arise concerning legal services rendered in connection with any claim under this article and may order any attorney or other person receiving the same, to refund to the person paying the same, any portion of any charge for legal services which the Commission may, in its discretion, deem excessive. Or ders of the Commission regulating payments and refunds for legal services may be enforced in the courts of this State, or may be appealed from in like manner as awards for compensation under this article.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Mitchell v. Goodyear Service Store