D.A. v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

1 district · 32 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 34 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “First, it is clear that the interests of this state are paramount to the interests of any other state. W.A. is present in this state and `all relevant information concerning his welfare, progress, needs, and potential adoptive family' are easily accessible here. . . . This state had been financially, emotionally, and physically supporting W.A. since he was adjudicated a dependent child. . . . Perhaps most importantly, we are concerned that if we refuse to exercise authority over [the child's mother], no other state would be able to assert jurisdiction to resolve W.A.'s status. Therefore, because this state clearly has an interest in the outcome of this case paramount to that of any other state, it is only appropriate for the termination of parental rights to occur in Utah.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. State Ex Rel. S.O. · Osborne v. Adoption Center of Choice

2. “Cases dealing with status often involve a fundamental liberty interest. Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court has allowed courts to exercise jurisdiction in such cases where standards of fairness are not violated. For instance, notwithstanding the fact that the right to marry has been deemed of `fundamental importance,' Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 , 98 S.Ct. 673 , 54 L.Ed.2d 618 (1978), the Supreme Court in Shaffer [ v. Heitner ] still recognized that it is appropriate for a state to exercise jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant for purposes of terminating a marriage, see 433 U.S. at 208 n. 30, 97 S.Ct. 2569 (citing Traynor, supra, at 660-61).”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Jd v. Tuscaloosa County Dept. of Human Res. · Tammie J.C. v. Robert T.R.

3. “"6 In his article, Judge Traynor wrote that special considerations surrounding the parent-child relationship `would normally preclude jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant having no contact with the forum state.' Id. at 661 (emphasis added). However, the sentence that immediately follows in Judge Traynor's article sets forth an exception to his assertion of normal preclusion: "`Nevertheless, ... we must recognize that the state where a child is present must be competent to regulate his custody whether his parent is present or not, and if the parent cannot be found or has failed to discharge his parental obligations, that state, given the best notice reasonably possible, should be free to promote the interest of the child by permitting his adoption.' " Id. at 662. Read in context, Judge Traynor's intended message regarding the assertion of jurisdiction over the parent-child relationship becomes clear. As the dissent in a recent Utah Court of Appeals case noted, the Shaffer Court, by `favorably citing to this article, ... appears [to have] contemplated that child custody adjudications, and more specifically termination proceedings, are included within the status exception.' E.A. v. State ( State ex rel. W.A. ), 2002 UT App 72 ¶ 48, (Bench, J., dissenting). "7 Besides those cases ruling that personal jurisdiction could not be asserted over the nonresident parent due to lack of notice, see, e.g., In re One Minor Child, 411 A.2d 951, 952-53 (Del.1980), and those cases that co”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Jd v. Tuscaloosa County Dept. of Human Res. · State Ex Rel. Wa