63 So. 3d 140 - State v. Patterson’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

31 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 31 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “IsThe determination of a defendant’s culpability rests on a two-fold test: 1) whether, given the facts presented, the defendant could reasonably have believed his life to be in imminent danger; and 2) whether deadly force was necessary to prevent the danger. [State v.] Theriot, 07-71 at 12, [La.App 5 Cir. 6/26/07),] 963 So.2d [1012] at 1020. The jury is the ultimate fact-finder in determining whether a defendant proved his condition and whether the State negated the defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Theriot, 07-71 at 13, 963 So.2d at 1020.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 149 So. 3d 301 - State v. Ceasar · 94 So. 3d 922 - State v. Joseph

2. “(1) A homicide which would be murder under either Article 30 (first degree murder) or Article 30.1 (second degree murder), but the offense is committed in sudden passion or heat of blood immediately caused by provocation sufficient to deprive an average person of his self-control and cool reflection. Provocation shall not reduce a homicide to manslaughter if the jury finds that the offender’s blood had actually cooled, or that an average person’s blood would have cooled, at the time the offense was committed[.]”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 175 So. 3d 1192 - State v. Watson · 161 So. 3d 918 - State v. Murray

3. “"The act of aiming a lethal weapon and discharging it in the direction of the victim supports a finding by the trier of fact that the defendant acted with specific intent to kill." State v. Gonzalez , 07-449, p. 8 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/27/07), 975 So.2d [3] at 8, writ denied , 08-0228 (La. 9/19/08), 992 So.2d 949 . Moreover, specific intent to kill can be inferred from the intentional use of a deadly weapon, such as a knife or a gun, State v. Knight , 09-359, p. 14 (La.App. 5 Cir. 2/9/10), 34 So.3d 307 , 317, from the circumstances and the defendant's actions, and the extent and severity of the victim's injuries. State v. Graves , 99-113, p. 3 (La.App. 5 Cir. 8/31/99), 740 So.2d 814 , 816, writ denied , 99-3013 (La. 3/31/00), 759 So.2d 68 . Whether a defendant possessed the requisite intent in a criminal case is a question for the trier-of-fact, and a review of the correctness of this determination is guided by the Jackson standard. Gonzalez , 07-449 at 9, 975 So.2d at pp. 3, 8.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Andrews