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← 63 SW2D 886 - Liles v. McDonald

Liles v. McDonald’s Empirical Analysis

1933

Citation profile

10
cited by 10 later decisions
1
states following
August 2012
most recently cited

10 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 10 later decisions — most recently August 2012

10 state decisions

30193319401950196019701980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Koch v. Roedenbeck · Thomason v. Ham · Mitchell v. Porter · Texas Co. v. Tankersley · Weeks v. De Young

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 10 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““Since the purpose of the action was to cancel the mineral deed and to remove ■cloud from the title to land, the suit came clearly within the meaning of said subdivision 14. Thomason v. Ham, Tex.Civ.App., 210 S.W. 561 ; Stemmons v. Matthai, Tex.Civ.App., 227 S.W. 364 ; Texas Company v. Tankersley, Tex.Civ.App., 229 S.W. 672 ; Koch v. Roedenbeck, Tex.Civ.App., 259 S.W. 328 . There was evidence that the deed in question had been procured by fraud committed in McLennan county. The question arises, therefore, which of said subdivisions, 7 or 14, should control. “It will be noted that subdivision 7 of said article 1995 provides that suit for fraud ‘may’ be brought in the county where the fraud was committed, whereas subdivision 14 of the same article provides that suits for the recovery of land, or to remove incumbrances from the title to land ‘must’ be brought in the county where the land may lie. It has been held that the language used in subdivision 14 excludes the venue in any other county than that named in such exception whenever a proper plea of privilege is urged. In other words, the language used in subdivision 7, being permissive only, is controlled by the mandatory and exclusive terms of subdivision 14 whenever the purpose of the suit is within the purview of that subdivision and a proper plea of privilege is urged. Mitchell v. Porter Tex.Civ.App., 194 S.W. 981 , par. 1; Weeks v. De Young, Tex.Civ.App., 290 S.W. 852, 854 ; Grogan-Cochran Lumber Co. v. McWhorter, Tex.Civ”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  2. “An examination of the several subdivisions of article 1198, Rev.St. [now Art. 1995], shows an intention on the part of the Legislature to require such actions as may affect or are brought to secure title, either legal or equitable, to land, to be brought in the county in which the land is situated. * * *”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.