Volume 63 — Washington Reports

, entered March 25, 1910, upon findings in favor of the defendant, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action on contract.

, entered February 11, 1910, upon findings in favor of the defendants, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action for cancellation.

, entered May 4, 1910, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, after a trial' on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action for damages and equitable relief.

<p>Trial — Special Verdicts — Lack of Evidence. A special finding that brackets were too light to sustain a wire, when there was no evidence on the subject, is a mere conjecture and not controlling.</p> <p>Trial — Special Verdicts — Uncontroverted Evidence. . A special finding by a jury that a wire was not thrown down by a certain accident cannot- be sustained where it disregards the uncontradicted evidence in the case.</p> <p>Trial — Province of Court and Jury. Where plaintiffs prima facie case, sufficient on motion for a nonsuit, is so fully explained and controverted as to leave no substantial conflict, the case should be taken from the jury.</p> <p>Electricity — Negligence ■ — • Evidence — Presumptions — Trial — Question for Court. Where plaintiffs case rested upon the legal presumption of the negligence of the defendant in allowing one of its high-power wires to fall from its support, plaintiff showing no cause for the fall of the wire, and the defendant’s evidence showed that the power wire had just been knocked down by the breaking of a cable employed by the city in construction work on the street, which evidence was not controverted, there is no issuable fact for the jury, and the defendant was not guilty of negligence, as a matter of law; a presumption of law not being evidence of a fact or effective in the face of the opponent’s prima facie evidence.</p>

<p>Contempt — In View oe Court — Statutes. Rem. & Bal. Code, § 2372, defining contempt of court as disorderly or insolent behavior committed during the sitting of the court, “in its immediate view and presence,” is declaratory of the common law and equivalent to contempt “in the face of the court.”</p> <p>Contempt — Judgment—In View oe Court — Recitation oe Facts— Sufficiency. A judgment of summary punishment for contempt of court sufficiently states that the acts were committed in the “immediate view and presence of the court,” where it recites the pendency of the action, and that the accused was applying to have a judgment “signed by the court,” and that in the presence of the judge at chambers in the court house, he used boisterous and angry language and gestures, and in the clerk’s office and in the immediate presence of the court engaged in a fight; the only reasonable construction being that it was in “view” of the court although that word was not used.</p> <p>Same. Such judgment shows a contempt within Rem. & Bal. Code, § 2372, by a breach of the peace or other disturbance directly tending to interrupt the proceedings of the court.</p> <p>Contempt — In View oe Court — Recess—Judgment—Recitation of Facts- — -Sufficiency. A summary judgment of contempt of court is not open to the objection that it fails to show that the court was in session, where it appears that the accused was guilty of a breach of the peace directly tending to interrupt the proceedings of a court and that the court was transacting business when the interchange of words took place; and it is immaterial that the court suspended business during a fight that followed, or was in recess.</p> <p>Contempt — Proceedings-—Constitutional Law — Due Process of Law. A summary punishment of contempt committed in the presence of the court is not a denial of due process of law merely because there was a delay in entering the order, due process meaning aecording to the established forms of law; especially where defendant’s appeal recited that the notice of appeal was taken in open court on the same day that the act was committed.</p> <p>Contempt — Pkoceedings—Appeal—Facts Recited in Judgment— Review. Upon appeal from a summary conviction of contempt committed in the presence of the court, the facts recited in the order are taken as true; and where they show jurisdiction and are sufficient to constitute contempt, there can be no further inquiry on appeal.</p> <p>Dunbab, C. J., and Fullekton, J., dissenting.</p>

<p>Gaming — Information — Sufficiency. An information charging merely the opening and conducting of a gambling game without alleging that it was done in any of the capacities prohibited by Rem. & Bal. Code, § 2469, is insufficient to sustain a conviction of a felony under that section, or of a misdemeanor under Rem. & Bal. Code, § 2470, prohibiting betting or wagering on a game carried on in violation of § 2469.</p> <p>Dunbab, C. J., dissents.</p>

, entered October 21, 1910, in favor of the plaintiffs, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action for damages.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Yakey, J., entered July 5, 1910, upon a trial and conviction of practicing medicine without a license.</p>

, entered June 29, 1910, upon findings in favor of the defendant, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action to enjoin the use of a trade-name.

, entered June 24, 1910, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, in an action for wrongful death.

Cross-appeals from a judgment of the superior court for Pierce county, Shackleford, J., entered August 8, 1910, in favor of certain defendants, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action on contract.

, .entered January 28, 1910, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, upon withdrawing the case from the consideration of the jury, in an action on contract.

, entered May 6, 1910, upon findings in favor of a defendant lien claimant, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action to foreclose a materialman’s lien.

, entered February 21, 1910, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action on contract.

, entered September 16, 1910, upon findings in favor of the defendant, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action for an injunction.

Application filed in the supreme court March 2, 1911, for a writ of prohibition to the superior court for King county, Tallman, J., to prevent further proceeding with a cause and to vacate a decree.

<p>Application filed in the supreme court March 18, 1911, for a writ of mandamus to the insurance commissioner.</p>

, entered January 25, 1910, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, after a trial on the merits before the (court without a jury, in an action on a promissory note.

, entered June 27, 1910, in favor of the plaintilf, after a trial before the court and a jury, in an action on contract.

, entered March 18, 1910, granting to defendant a divorce upon his cross-complaint, after a trial on the merits before the court, in an action for separate maintenance.

, entered September 28, 1909, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action on a contract of indemnity.

, entered January 4, 1910, upon findings in favor of the plaintiffs, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action for damages for fraud.

, entered July 11, 1910, upon findings in favor of the defendants, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action to recover property held under a writ of attachment.

, entered March 16, 1910, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, notwithstanding the verdict of a jury in favor of the defendants, in an action to foreclose a. mortgage.

, entered June 11, 1910 upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action on contract.

, entered April IS, 1910, upon'the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff, in an action for damages sustained through the collision of an automobile and a street car.

, entered July 11, 1910, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff, in an action to recover damages for loss of property destroyed by fire.

, entered October 14, 1910, granting to a widow an allowance out of an estate being administered under a nonintervention will, after a hearing on the merits before the court.

<p>Perjury — Information—Sufficiency—Charging Falsity of Testimony. ' An information for perjury sufficiently negatives the truth of the false testimony when it sets out the false testimony, and asserts its falsity by negation,and by setting out the true facts.</p> <p>Same — Accused’s Knowledge of Falsity. An information for perjury sufficiently charges the accused’s knowledge of the falsity of his testimony where it charges that he wilfully, knowingly, and falsely testified to a certain state of facts with knowledge of each fact alleged to negative the truth thereof.</p> <p>Evidence — Experts—Opinions—Forgery. Bankers and accountants of long standing having an extended experience in dealing with commercial paper and detecting irregularities therein are qualified to express their opinions as to the forgery of a note and mortgage.</p> <p>Same — Expert Testimony — Subjects—Forgery by Additions. It is competent for experts to express an opinion as to whether certain words and figures upon a note and mortgage were added or written at a different time, with a different pen or ink or under different circumstances from the other parts of the writing thereon.</p> <p>Peejtjky — Evidence—Sufficiency. A conviction of perjury is sustained by the direct testimony of one witness and corroborating circumstances established by independent evidence of such a character as to clearly turn the scale and overcome the oath of the defendant and the legal presumption of innocence.</p> <p>Criminal Law — Trial—Misconduct of Counsel. Prejudicial error cannot be predicated on an improper insinuation of the prosecuting attorney on cross-examination of the defendant’s witness, where an objection thereto was promptly sustained and the jury were instructed to disregard it.</p> <p>Criminal Law-Appeal — Record—Misconduct of Counsel. Error cannot be predicated upon improper argument of counsel to the jury, where it was not preserved in the record on appeal, and no motion was made below to strike it or to instruct the jury to disregard it.</p> <p>Criminal Law — Reception of Evidence. A witness should not be permitted to state his impression after he had testified that it was so long ago that he could not swear to the answer to the question.</p> <p>Criminal Law — Trial—Instructions as Law of.Case — Perjury. Where, upon a trial for perjury, the court instructed the jury that all the testimony given by the accused in a civil action was material to the issue thereon, and the same was not excepted to, it became the law of the case, and error cannot be predicated on other instructions authorizing the jury to convict if they find that the accused gave the testimony as charged or “some substantial part of it.”</p> <p>Criminal Law — Trial—Misconduct of Witness — Time for Objection. An objection that the regular superior court judge of the county, who was a witness for tie state, was guilty of improper conduct in mingling with the other witnesses and manifesting an interest in the prosecution, comes too late when first made on motion for a new trial.</p> <p>Criminal Law — New Trial — Time for Motion. A second motion for a new trial, made after appeal taken and pending the hearing in the supreme court, is untimely and cannot be considered.</p>

, entered January 29, 1910, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the defendant, in an action on a promissory note.

, entered April 13, 1910, upon findings in favor of the defendant, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action on promissory notes.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Tallman, J., entered May 31, 1910, upon granting a nonsuit, dismissing an action for personal injuries.</p>

, entered February 21, 1910, upon findings in favor of the defendants, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, vacating the appointment of an administrator and dismissing proceedings in the matter of an estate.

, entered April 29, 1910, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff, in an action for personal injuries sustained by an employee in a shingle mill through contact with a cut-off saw.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Spokane county, Huneke, J., entered February 14, 1910, upon sustaining a demurrer to the complaint, dismissing an action to recover money paid on a check by mistake.</p>

, entered April 25, 1910, in favor of the plaintiffs, after a trial before the court without a jury, in an action to vacate a portion of a judgment rendered in condemnation proceedings, and for the cancellation of an assessment for a public improvement.

, entered April 25, 1910, in favor of the plaintiff, after a trial before the court without a jury, in an action to vacate a portion of a judgment in condemnation proceedings, and for the cancellation of an assessment to pay the cost of a local improvement.

, entered January 17, 1910, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, after a, trial on the merits before the court without a jury, establishing the value of a leasehold interest in real property, in proceedings to condemn land for railroad purposes.

, entered February 5, 1910, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action on contract.

, entered April 16, 1910, upon findings in favor of the plaintiffs, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action for damages and for an injunction.

, entered April 15, 1910, sustaining an order of the civil service commission confirming the dismissal of a member of a city’s police force.

Lindsay, Esq., judge pro tempore, entered September 15, 1910, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action on contract.

, entered November 2, 1910, upon findings in favor of the plaintiffs, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action for personal injuries sustained by falling down a stairway.

, entered December 5, 1910, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action for unlawful detainer.

<p>Appeal from an order of the superior court for King county, Albertson, J., entered October 19, 1910, granting plaintiff a new trial, after the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the defendant, in an action to recover for the use of real property.</p>

<p>Interest — Judgments—Decree oe Divorce. A decree of divorce, directing the husband to pay the wife a stated sum as her proportionate part of the community property and attorney’s fees, is a judgment, within Rem. & Bal. Code, § 457, which draws interest from date, the code procedure recognizing no distinctions between judgments and decrees.</p> <p>Divorce — Alimony-—Payment—Credits — Contracts — Construction. Where, on appeal from a decree of divorce awarding a sum of money in lieu of property, and $25 per month for the support of children, the appellant agreed to pay $65 for the support of the children pending the appeal in consideration of an agreement not to' issue execution on the judgment, the increased payments cannot be credited on the judgment, since they are supported by an independent consideration.</p>

<p>Charities — Creation—Purpose of Trust — Education. A charitable trust for educational purposes is created by conveyances in trust for the benefit of the membership of a brotherhood for the purpose of a communal industrial institution and the education of the people in the principles of socialism.</p> <p>Charities — Beneficiaries—Certainty. A conveyance for charitable purposes, in trust for the membership, now existing or hereafter to exist, of an unincorporated brotherhood, is not invalid because the beneficiaries are an unascertained or uncertain body or class, that being characteristic of charitable trusts.</p> <p>Charities — Cessation of Use — Quieting Title — Answer. In an action to quiet title, an answer alleging that a charitable trust had failed by reason of the fact that the beneficiaries had procured a dissolution of the society through the courts, and a judicial sale of the land, which was void, does not show that the title reverted to the donors of the trust, but only shows a cessation of the uses for which the property was devoted, and is insufficient, on demurrer, to show title in the successors of the donors.</p>

<p>Criminal Law ■— Prosecutions — Statutes — Repeal — Savings Clause. Offenses prior to the enactment of the new penal code (Rem. & Bal. Code, § 275a et seq.), are properly prosecuted under the laws in force at the time the offense was committed, being expressly saved by the repealing clauses of the later enactment.</p> <p>Criminal Law — Appeal—Record—Instructions—Exceptions. Error cannot be predicated upon the instructions where the record on appeal does not include the instructions or any exception thereto.</p> <p>Criminal Law — Evidence—Identification—Opinions. The identification of a person need not be positive and certain, but the witness may state that she believes that the accused is the person who committed the crime.</p> <p>Rape — Corroboration oe Prosecutrix — Evidence—Sufficiency. A conviction of statutory rape is sufficiently sustained by corroboration of the prosecutrix, where her story as to being taken to a lodging house by the defendant as his daughter and occupying the same room, after the landlady had prepared a couch for her, and of stopping at a drug store with him the evening before, and at a restaurant the next morning, is corroborated by witnesses who saw them at the drug store and restaurant, and by the landlady who remembered the occurrence but could not identify the girl nor positively identify the accused.</p> <p>Cbiminal Law — Tbial—Witness—Omission of Oath. It is not prejudicial error that by inadvertence a witness gave part of his testimony without being sworn, where it was immediately withdrawn, and repeated after the witness was sworn.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for What-com county, Gilliam, J., entered May 24, 1910, dismissing a prosecution for libel, upon sustaining a demurrer to the complaint.</p>

<p>Assistance, Writ of — Mortgages—Foreclosure—Parties Bound —Privies. Upon the issuance of a certificate of sale on foreclosure, a writ of assistance may issue against one in possession as receiver in bankruptcy of the estate of the defendant, appointed pending the suit, although he was not made a party to the action, on the theory that the proceeding is in rem and he is bound as in privity with the mortgagor.</p> <p>Appeal — Right to Appeal — Writ of Assistance — Privies—Re-ceiver in Bankruptcy. A receiver in bankruptcy in possession of mortgaged premises may appeal from an order granting a writ of assistance or refusing to vacate it, although he was not a party to the foreclosure suit, since he is in privity with the mortgagor.</p> <p>Prohibition — When Lies — Adequate Remedy by Appeal. Prohibition does not lie to prevent the issuance of a writ of assistance, after a mortgage foreclosure, since there is an adequate remedy by appeal.</p>

<p>Appeal — Service of Notice — Parties — Assignee of Party. Where the assignee of one of the defendants was adjudged entitled to a deed of one of the lots involved, he became a party to the suit, upon whom notice of appeal must be served:</p> <p>Appeal — Service of Notice — Parties—Purchaser at Sheriff’s Sale. A purchaser at a sheriff’s sale of property becomes a party of record, upon whom notice of appeal must be served.</p> <p>Appeal — Dismissal—Motion—Affidavit—Service. An affidavit not served at the time of the argument of a motion to dismiss an appeal will not be considered.</p> <p>Same — Sufficiency 0f Affidavit. An affidavit that a party received notice of the appeal does not show such service of the notice as is required to give jurisdiction of the appeal.</p> <p>Appeal — Bond—Necessity. Failure of parties joining in an appeal to give a separate appeal bond within five days is fatal to their appeal.</p>

, entered March 7, 1910, annulling a will, upon findings in favor of the contestant, after a hearing on the merits before the court without a jury.

<p>Partnership — Accounting—Partnership Property — Evidence— Sufficiency — Laches. In. an action for a partnership accounting, an indefinite agreement for partnership relations respecting the operation of a boat to be owned equally by the parties, the hull of which was furnished by plaintiff and the engines and principal part of the expenses by the defendant, is not sufficient to create a partnership in two other boats, thereafter acquired by the defendant, in which the engines of the old boat were installed, where it appears that the partnership operations had been discontinued for a year, the plaintiff taking the hull of the old boat and the defendant the engines, that the' defendant used and exercised full control over the new boats, and the plaintiff took the hull of the old one, and later stored and did work for the defendant on the new boats, charging defendant full value for such storage and service, and made no claim to an interest therein for seven years.</p> <p>Partnership — Accounting—Conditional Sale of Property — Title —Evidence for Accounting — Sufficiency. A partnership accounting for a half interest in a mining claim, alleged to have been acquired by defendant in a trade for a partnership boat, is properly denied, where it appears that the partnership relations had been discontinued, that the boat and claim were considered only of nominal value, the claim being offered to defendant for $150, and that he agreed to take the boat back and pay $150 in case the vendee could not make it run, which defendant did long before the mining claim was found to be of value; since the boat was only conditionally sold, ,the title thereto did not pass, and it did not form the consideration for the claim.</p> <p>Appeal — Review — Trial — Findings — What Constitutes — Necessity of Exceptions. Where the trial court, in dismissing an equitable action, refused to make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is not necessary, in order to secure a review on appeal, to take exceptions to an oral opinion rendered at some length, which the court stated could be written out by the stenographer and considered as findings, where it contained only informal statements that did not cover the controversy.</p> <p>Partnership — Accounting — Defenses — Laches. The lapse of seven years, after the abandonment of a partnership, and the continued exclusive use for that time of some of the property hy the partner who had furnished most of the money, may he sufficient to bar an action for an accounting by the other partner.</p>

, entered March 7, 1910, awarding damages and confirming assessments levied to pay therefor, in proceedings .to condemn land for a system of dikes.

<p>, Constitutional Law — Impairing Obligations of Contracts — Mortgages — Foreclosure — Possession — Remedies. A statute relative to mortgage foreclosure sales is unconstitutional as to existing mortgages as impairing the obligation of the'contract, in so far as it requires the sheriff to postpone the sale for one year and gives the mortgagor possession of the premises during that time, when the former law gave the mortgagee the right to an immediate sale with the right of possession during the period of redemption; but the law is valid in changing the requirements as to the' notices of sale; since that merely affects the remedy and not the obligation of the contract.</p> <p>Mortgages — Foreclosure—Sales—Irregularities—Confirmation. Failure to publish notice of a mortgage foreclosure sale in the exact manner required by law is an irregularity only, and does not render the sale so far void that it is not curable by the order of .confirmation.</p> <p>Mortgages — Foreclosure—Sale—Action to Set Aside — Laches. A delay of nine years in bringing suit to cancel a mortgage foreclosure sale, without any excuse, is such laches as to justify the denial of relief on any ground other than the actual invalidity of the sale.</p>

, entered October 19, 1910, upon findings in favor of the defendants, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action to quiet title and for partition.

, entered November 2, 1909, upon granting a nonsuit, dismissing an action for the wrongful death of an employee engaged in the construction of a building.

, entered October 7, 1910, upon findings in favor of the defendant, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action of ejectment.

, entered September 9, 1910, for three thousand dollars, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, in an action for slander.

, entered January 19, 1911, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action on contract.

<p>Appeal- — Record—Statement op Facts- — Exhibits. Certificates, receipts, and exhibits, inserted in the statement of facts, which the trial judge refused to certify, certifying that they were no part of the evidence introduced at the trial, cannot be considered on appeal.</p> <p>Corporations — Actions by — Capacity to Sue — Payment op License Fee. The act prohibiting any corporation from commencing or maintaining any suit or action without alleging and proving that it had paid its annual license fee should be enforced by the courts as a license tax or revenue measure; and hence judgment for defendant on a counterclaim, in an action between two corporations, should be reversed and the action dismissed where neither corporation proved its capacity to sue, although the objection was not specially urged against the corporation in whose favor the judgment was rendered.</p>

, entered July 14, 1910, in favor of the plaintiff, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action to quiet title.

, entered July 11, 1910, upon findings in favor of the plaintiffs, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action for personal injuries sustained by a pedestrian struck by an express wagon.

, entered August 31, 1910, upon findings in favor of the defendants, dismissing an action to foreclose a materialman’s lien, after a trial on the merits before the court.

, entered November 12, 1910, upon the ver-' diet of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff; in an action for personal injuries sustained by a coal miner through the fall of roclc.

<p>Robbery — Evidence —r- Sufficiency. A conviction of robbery is sustained by the evidence of the victim that the. defendants seized and carried him along the sidewalk,’ abstracted silver from his trouser’s pocket; ánd threw him down on-the'walk, and that, when he got up, his'pocket book and gold pieces which he was. .carrying in his inside coat pocket were gone.</p> <p>Robbery — Issues- and Proof — -Variance. Upon an information, charging robbery of “lawful money of the United States,” it is not a fatal variance to prove the taking of $1.75 in silver and a twenty and a five-dollar gold piece, the prima facie presumption being that the witness was speaking .of current coins of the country, especially where no objection thereto was made below.</p> <p>Criminal Law — Appeal—Review—Harmless Error. On a trial for robbery,' error in excluding the accused’s explanation of what he did between the time of the transaction and his arrest is not prejudicial, where there was no evidence,of flight.</p> <p>. Trial — Instructions — Time for Request — Discretion. .Under Rem & Bal. Code, § 339, providing that the court shall instruct the jury at the conclusion of the evidence, and thereafter counsel may address the jury; it is discretionary for the court to refuse to give a further instruction after argument of the counsel.</p> <p>Robbery — Trial—Instructions. -In a trial for robbery, where defendants severed; an instruction that the accused could not be found guilty unless the jury found that he took the money from the prosecuting witness, is more favorable to accused than his requested instructions that he could' not be found guilty unless he assisted in taking it or the taking was within the common purpose of the defendants.</p>

, entered November 14, 1910, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff, in an action for personal injuries sustained by a youthful employee in a brick factory.

Application filed in the supreme court April 15, 1911, for a writ of mandamus to compel the superior court for King county, Sheeks, J., to certify a proposed státement of facts.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Thurs-ton county, Sheeks, J., entered August 15, 1910, in favor of the plaintiffs, for the amount of a lien for taxes paid, and interest, in an action to quiet title.</p>

, entered October 21, 1910, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff, in an action for personal injuries sustained by a customer in a store falling upon the floor.

<p>Appeal from an order of the superior court for King county, Gay, J., entered July 18, 1910, granting a new trial, after granting a nonsuit, in an action on contract.</p>

, entered March 28, 1910, granting a nonsuit in an action for personal injuries sustained by an employee in a packing house through the explosion of a vat.

, entered August 5, 1910, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff, in an action for personal injuries sustained by an employee in a sawmill.

, entered December 20, 1910, admitting a so-called will to probate and revoking the probate of a prior will, after a hearing before the court.

Application filed in the supreme court January 27, 1911, to compel the superior court for Okanogan county, Pendergast, J., to certify a statement of facts.

<p>Pleading — Reply—Departure—Quieting Title. In an action to quiet title, in which the complaint alleged that defendant claims some interest adverse to the plaintiffs, which was without right, and the defendant answered claiming title under a deed from the plaintiffs, it is a fatal departure, authorizing judgment for the defendant on the pleadings, for the plaintiffs to reply that the deed, executed in hlank, was fraudulently procured by one B. and wrongfully delivered to defendant as security for a loan to B. for not more than $650, and that if defendant had any interest at all, it was only as a mortgagee (GOse, J., and Dunbab, C. J., dissenting).</p> <p>Deeds — Execution in Blank — Delivery. The execution and delivery of a deed in blank authorizes the party to whom it was intrusted to fill in the name of a grantee and vests title in the grantee.</p>

, entered October 3, 1910, in favor of the plaintiffs, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action to quite title.

, entered October 28, 1910, in favor of the plaintiffs, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action to enjoin proceedings for the construction of a canal, and for other equitable relief.

, entered July 2, 1910, upon findings in favor of the plaintiffs, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action for specific performance.

, entered April 29, 1910, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the defendant, in an action for personal injuries sustained by a passenger in an elevator.

, entered December 5, 1910, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, after a trial on the merits before the court, in an action for divorce.

, entered March 15, 1911, denying the vacation of a judgment committing the defendant to the insane ward of the state penitentiary.

, entered September 19, 1910, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action on contract.

, entered October 27, 1910, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action for damages through a collision between automobiles.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Gay, J., entered October 11, 1910, dismissing an action' for malpractice, upon sustaining a demurrer to the complaint.</p>

, entered October 18, 1910, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff, in an action for personal injuries sustained by a pedestrian struck by an automobile.

, entered December 6, 1910, upon findings in favor of the plaintiffs, after a trial on the merits before, the court without a jury, in an action to reform a deed.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Gay, J., entered October 25, 1910, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff, in aii action on contract.</p>

, entered January 16, 1911, upon findings in favor of the defendants, in an action for injunctive relief and to quiet title.

, entered November 23, 1910, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action for unlawful detainer.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Thurston’ county, Mitchell, J., entered September 14, 1910, dismissing on the merits actions to establish a marriage and to contest a will, and to establish a resulting trust in real property.</p>

, entered December 22, 1910, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff, in an action for personal injuries sustained by a passenger in alighting from a street car.

, entered November 2, 1910, in favor of the defendants, affirming an order of the state board of equalization in fixing the value of relator’s properties for the purpose of taxation.

, entered December 28, 1910, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the defendants by direction of the court, dismissing an action for personal injuries sustained by an employee in a logging camp.

, entered July 6, 1910, in favor of the plaintiff, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action on contract.

, entered February 8, 1911, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action to quiet title.

<p>Frauds, Statute of — Contract for Broker’s Commissions. A broker’s contract for the sale of real estate rests in parol, and is void within the statute of frauds,' Rem. & Bal. Code, § 5289, requiring an agreement employing an agent to sell real estate for compensation or a commission to be in writing, where it appears that the vendor refused to sign a proposed contract giving the brokers the exclusive right to sell the land and retain all received over $12,000 as commissions, but later wrote that she objected to some parts of the contract, which she said no doubt could be fixed by a satisfactory talk, that they could send down their man and if they sold she wanted $12,000 net, and that they could keep the letter as a contract until they came down; although she afterwards consummated a deal with a purchaser procured by the brokers for $15,000; since the latter does not accept the terms of the contract and they cannot therefore be read together as one; and the statute requires that the amount of the compensation be fixed in the writing (Dunbar, C. J., and Fullerton, J., dissenting).</p>

<p>Appeal from an order of the superior court for King county, Ronald, J., entered November 18, 1910, confirming a reassessment roll for a public improvement, after a hearing before the court.</p>

, entered June £8, 1910, in favor of the defendant, notwithstanding the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff, in an action to recover an award.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Tallman, J., entered March 23, 1910, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, in an action on contract.</p>

, entered July 16, 1910, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action of ejectment.

, entered August 2, 1910, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff, in an action for damages for injuries inflicted by defendants’ servants.

, entered October 17, 1910, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, decreeing the payment of alimony awarded by a decree of divorce, after a hearing before the court.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Chehalis county, Irwin, J., entered November 12, 1910, granting a nonsuit in an action for personal injuries sustained by an employee in a sawmill.</p>

, entered September 28, 1910, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action for unlawful detainer.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Ronald, J., entered October 26, 1910, upon a trial and conviction of grand larceny.</p>

, entered July 25, 1910, in favor of the defendant, upon sustaining a demurrer to one cause of action, in an action for equitable relief.

Cross-appeals from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Albertson, J., entered August 10, 1910, upon findings and the verdict of a jury in favor of the plaintiff, in an action to quiet title.

, entered June 18 and 24, 1910, granting an injunction and directing a receiver’s sale of the property of a corporation, after hearings before the court.

<p>Brokers — Right to Commissions — Payment — Performance by Owner. Although a broker’s contract provided that it should receive its commissions out of payments made by purchasers on contracts for land and water rights, the owner is liable for the whole commissions where the owner breached its contract to furnish water and the payments were not made because of the owner’s failure to perform.</p> <p>Corporations- — Transaction Between Member and Company— Deeds — Failure of Consideration — Cancellation. Where a deed by a stockholder to an irrigation company, made in good faith upon the advice of an attorney, in consideration of water rights for certain lands, is held void as against public policy, and the consideration fails through inability of the company to furnish the water, the grantor is entitled to a reconveyance of the land.</p>

, entered September 29, 1910, upon findings in favor of the defendant, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action for equitable relief.

<p>Corporations — Sale of Stock — Eraud—Evidence — Sufficiency. Where plaintiff was induced to sell the controlling interest in a corporation, and in an action for damages, claimed that defendant was guilty of fraud, and wrongfully discharged the plaintiff as an officer, and so mismanaged the corporation that its assets were sold in bankruptcy proceedings, to plaintiff’s damage in a sum equal to the value of his stock in the company, the evidence is insufficient to establish defendant’s fraud in the purchase of the stock, where it appears that plaintiff was solicitous to sell after several months negotiations, that the price was fair and the sale without fraudulent inducement and there was no fraud in the sale in bankruptcy, that the plaintiff was discharged from his position for good cause, and that the bankruptcy proceeding resulted from plaintiff’s refusal to advance an inconsiderable sum as his pro rata share for the renewal of a mortgage due to a bank.</p> <p>Corporations — Officers • — • Employment — Discharge — Sam" of Stock — Consideration. Where a stockholder sold a controlling interest in the stock in consideration of $1,000 and of a contract to employ him as secretary for one year, the obligation is mutual and he is subject to discharge for diverting property and violating the by-laws, and cannot recover the value of his stock for failure of consideration.</p> <p>Corporations — Employment of Officer — Contract — Breach— Liability of Stockholder. Majority stockholders are not liable for the wrongful discharge by the corporation of one of its officers.</p> <p>Same — Discharge—Recovery for Services. Upon the dismissal for good cause of an officer of a corporation employed for one year, his recovery is limited to quantum, meruit for the service rendered up to the time of the discharge.</p> <p>Gose, J., dissents.</p>

, entered November 4, 1910, in favor of the cross-complainant,, establishing and foreclosing a mechanics’ lien, after a trial before the court.

, entered June 28, 1910, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action on contract.

<p>Waters and Water Courses — Surface Waters — Floods—Protection Against — Liability. Flood waters overflowing the hanks of a stream are surface waters, an outlaw and common enemy, against which a riparian owner may protect itself by turning the same back into the stream; and if a lower proprietor is thereby injured by eddies and currents different from the natural flow of the stream, it is damnum absque injuria, for which no recovery can be had.</p>

, entered June 9, 1910, in favor of the defendants, upon withdrawing from the consideration of the jury an action for malicious prosecution.

, entered June 8, 1910, upon findings in favor of the plaintiffs, after' a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action of ejectment.

, entered April 23, 1910, in favor of the plaintiff, after a trial on the'merits before the court without a jury, in an action to recover for materials furnished to a city contractor.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of- the superior court for King county, Albertson, J., entered November 30, 1910, upon findings in favor of the plaintiffs, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action of replevin.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Leroy V. Newcomb, Esq., judge pro tempore, entered July 14, 1910, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action on contract.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Robert H. Lindsay, Esq., judge pro tempore, entered June 14, 1910, upon findings in favor of the plaintiffs, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action on contract.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Spokane county, Kennan, J., entered June 8, 1910.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Thurston county, Mitchell, J., entered September 28, 1910.</p>

, entered January 8, 1910, upon findings in favor of the defendants, quieting their title, in an action brought for partition.